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Abstract 
Recently, the Internet has become a very important medium of communication. Many 
people go online and conduct a wide range of business. They can sell and buy goods, perform 
different banking activities and even participate in political and social elections by casting a vote 
online. The parties involved in any transaction never need to meet and a buyer can sometimes be 
dealing with a fraudulent business that does not actually exist. So, security for conducting 
businesses online is vital and critical. Al l security-critical applications (e.g. online banking login 
pages) that are accessed using the Internet are at the risk of fraud. A common risk comes from 
so-called Phishing websites, which have become a problem for online banking and e-commerce 
users. Phishing websites attempt to trick people into revealing their sensitive personal and 
security information in order for the fraudster to access their accounts. They use websites that 
look similar to those of legitimate organizations and exploit the end-user's lack of knowledge of 
web browser clues and security indicators. 
This thesis addresses the effectiveness of Phishing website detection. It reviews existing 
anti-Phishing approaches and then makes the following contributions. First of all, the research in 
this thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the current most common users' tips for detecting 
Phishing websites. A novel effectiveness criteria is proposed and used to examine every tip and 
rank it based on its effectiveness score, thus revealing the most effective tips to enable users to 
detect Phishing attacks. The most effective tips can then be used by anti-Phishing training 
approaches. Secondly, this thesis proposes a novel Anti-Phishing Approach that uses Training 
Intervention for Phishing Websites' Detection (APTIPWD) and shows that it can be easily 
implemented. Thirdly, the effectiveness of the New Approach (APTIPWD) is evaluated using a 
set of user experiments showing that it is more effective in helping users distinguish between 
legitimate and Phishing websites than the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing tips by email. 
The experiments also address the issues of the effects of technical ability and Phishing 
knowledge on Phishing websites' detection. The results of the investigation show that technical 
ability has no effect whereas Phishing knowledge has a positive effect on Phishing website 
detection. Thus, there is need to ensure that, regardless their technical ability level (expert or 
non-expert), the participants do not know about Phishing before they evaluate the effectiveness 
of a new anti-Phishing approach. This thesis then evaluates the anti-Phishing knowledge 
retention of the New Approach users and compares it with the knowledge retention of users who 
are sent anti-Phishing tips by email. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
The Intemet is a very important medium of communication. Many people go online and 
conduct a wide range of business. They can send emails, sell and buy goods, transact 
various banking activities and even participate in political and social elections by casting a 
vote online. The World Wide Web technologies enable people around the world to 
participate in commercial activities whenever they wish and wherever they live [Poong et 
al.06]. There are many successful and widely used e-commercial websites. There are e-
marketplace websites such as Amazon', and online auction websites such as eBay" that offer 
an online platform where millions of items are exchanged each day. The use of online 
banking services has been growing at a tremendous rate [ReavleyOS]. Many banks and 
financial societies have online banking platforms. For example, the HSBC bank has nearly 
19 million Intemet registered users [Hilley05]. 
Once users go online, they are at risk from online fraud (also known as Intemet fraud). 
Intemet fraud is a crime that uses the Intemet as the medium to carry out financial frauds 
[PhilippsohnOl]. The parties involved in any transaction never need to meet and the user 
may have no idea whether the goods or services exist. Due to this, the Intemet is a good 
vehicle to defraud people who use it to buy goods or services [ibid]. The application access 
keys could be stolen. Applications such as electronic commerce, electronic banking, 
electronic voting and electronic mail are targets for fraudsters. 
' Amazon is a well-known electronic commerce company. Available at: hnp://www,amazon.com, last access 
on 4 Feb 2007, 
^ EBay is an online auction website. Available at: http://www.ebay.com, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
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Security for conducting businesses online is vital and critical. A l l security-critical 
applications (e.g. online banking login page) that are accessed using the Internet are at the 
risk of Internet fraud. Violations of security in these applications would result in severe 
consequences, such as financial loss for e-commerce and online banking organizations and 
for individuals. CyberSource [CyberSourceOS] has revealed that financial loss due to 
Internet fraud is huge; in 2007, such losses amounted to $3.6 billion. 
1.2. Phishing 
Internet fraud has a multiplicity of forms, including Phishing attacks. Phishing has 
become a serious problem for online banking and e-commerce users [Chandrasekaran et 
al.06]. It takes the form of an email message or website that tries to trick people into 
revealing personal security-sensitive information by appearing to be from a legitimate 
organization but it exploits the end-user's lack of knowledge about web browser clues and 
security indicators [Dhamija et al.06]. The emails and websites appearing to be from a 
legitimate organization are known as Phishing emails and Phishing websites respectively. 
Phishing attacks have increased dramatically. 36,002 unique Phishing URLs were active and 
139 brands were hijacked in February 2008 [APWG08]. 
The Phishing problem arises when a user receives a Phishing email. They may not 
understand that the link provided may not take them to where they expect. For example, the 
user's intention may be "go to eBay" but the actual implementation of the hyperlink may be 
"go to a server in South Korea". This misunderstanding enables Phishing and makes it very 
hard to defend against. Users gain their understanding of interaction f rom the presentation or 
the way it appears on the screen. Some technical details of web pages and email messages 
are hidden and some of them are not understandable to most users. Thus, the user does not 
interpret the system clues or is unable to do so. 
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1.3. Phishing Detection and Prevention 
The Phishing problem needs to be mitigated by anti-Phishing approaches. There must be 
solutions that help in detecting and preventing Phishing attacks. The effectiveness of anti-
Phishing approaches must be increased. 
There have been some approaches to mitigate Phishing, such as toolbars and anti-
Phishing tips. The effectiveness of 24 existing online training materials that teach people 
how to protect themselves from Phishing attacks have been evaluated [Kumaraguru et 
al.07b]. However, this research did not consider the effectiveness of each individual tip. 
To access and read online training material, users usually need to open new web 
browsers. Then they go back to their online activity browser to proceed. But this is only 
likely to happen i f users know that there are attacks called Phishing and that there are 
training materials that help in detecting them. I f the users know nothing about Phishing and 
anti-Phishing training materials, they are unlikely to access them. In fact, few people read 
anti-Phishing online training materials although they are surprisingly effective when users 
do read them [Kumaragum et al.07b]. A novel approach was to design an online game in 
order to teach users good habits to help them avoid Phishing attacks [Sheng et al.07]. The 
game presents anti-Phishing information in an enjoyable way. However, the disadvantage of 
this approach is the same as for other online training materials. Users must know something 
about Phishing and its dangers before they are likely to access and play the game. 
Many commercial institutions, such as Microsoft [Microsoftb], provide a service that 
periodically sends emails that wam people about Phishing emails and websites and that 
provide tips to help people detect Phishing websites. However, only subscribed customers 
receive these emails. 
Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaragura et al.07a] considered training people about Phishing 
email during their normal use of email. Their aim was to teach people what Phishing clues 
to look for in emails to make better decisions in identifying Phishing emails. They found 
that this approach works better than the current practice of publishing or sending anti-
Phishing tips by email. However, Kumaragum et al.'s approach did not consider helping 
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people with Phishing website-related tips. Phishing sites can be reached via various methods 
in addition to emails, such as online advertisements and typing their web addresses in a web 
browser. Helping users in distinguishing between Phishing and legitimate websites during 
their normal browsing activities is required. 
In the process of designing anti-Phishing approaches, user experiments were conducted to 
evaluate them. Several approaches which used participants recruited on the basis of their 
technical abilities were evaluated [Downs et al.06, Kumaraguru et al.OVa, Kumaraguru et 
al.07b, Sheng et al.07]. In these studies, participants were classified as 'experts' and 'non-
experts' based on pre-study screening questions. Technical ability was judged on whether 
the participants had changed preferences or settings in their web browser, created a web 
page, and helped someone f ix a computer problem. Participants who said 'no' to at least two 
o f the screening questions were categorized as 'non-experts' and were selected to take part 
in their experiments. However, no question was asked about Phishing or Internet fraud so it 
is possible that participants who were considered to be non-experts could know about 
Phishing and how to detect Phishing attacks before participating in the evaluation 
experiments. Having participants with Phishing knowledge in advance may provide biased 
results in evaluation experiments on anti-Phishing approaches. This is because people who 
know about Phishing before participating in the evaluation experiments may use their prior 
knowledge rather than the anti-Phishing approaches that are being tested in the evaluation. 
Downs et al. [Downs et al.07] studied whether there are correlations between some web 
environment experiences and susceptibility to Phishing. They found that people who 
correctly answered the knowledge question about the definition of Phishing (i.e. Phishing 
aware people) were significantly less likely to fail to detect Phishing emails. Low technical 
users (i.e. non-experts) may be Phishing aware and high technical users (i.e. experts) may be 
Phishing unaware. Therefore, an investigation on the effects of technical ability and 
Phishing knowledge on Phishing websites' detection is required. This would clarify whether 
or not the previous screening questions for recruiting low technical users in evaluating anti-
Phishing approaches are beneficial. 
In this thesis, problems related to the effectiveness of approaches to Phishing websites 
detection have been addressed. Firstly, the effectiveness of the most common users' tips for 
detecting Phishing websites is examined. The effectiveness of each individual tip is assessed 
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and then the tip is ranked accordingly. The aim is to identify the most effective anti-
Phishing tips that users can focus on to detect Phishing attacks. 
This thesis also proposes a novel Anti-Phishing Approach that uses Training Intervention 
for Phishing Websites' Detection (APTIPWD). User experiments were conducted to 
evaluate this approach. The thesis shows that the approach can be easily implemented. 
An investigation that assesses using Phishing knowledge instead of technical ability in the 
screening questions to recruit participants is also presented. User experiments are conducted 
to evaluate the effects of technical ability and Phishing knowledge. If the results of the 
investigation show that there is no effect of technical ability on Phishing website detection, 
then there is need to make sure that the participants do not know about Phishing regardless 
of their technical ability level in evaluating a new anti-Phishing approach. 
This thesis also assesses the anti-Phishing knowledge retention of users. User experiments 
are conducted. The knowledge retention of the users of the New Approach (APTIPWD) and 
the knowledge retention of users sent anti-Phishing tips by email are compared. 
1.4. Criteria for Success 
In this thesis, the criteria for success are set as follows. 
1. An evaluation of the anti-Phishing tips' effectiveness for Phishing websites detection. 
An examination of the effectiveness of the most common users' tips for detecting 
Phishing websites will be presented. Novel effectiveness criteria will be proposed and used 
to examine each single tip and to rank them based on their effectiveness scores. 
2. Development of a more effective anti-Phishing approach and its evaluation. 
This thesis will propose a more effective approach that resolves some issues identified in 
previous approaches. The New Approach will be evaluated and the results will be discussed. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
3. Success to identify factors that influence users decisions against Phishing websites. 
This criterion is divided into two sub-criterions. They are as follows: 
3.1. Effect of technical ability on Phishing websites detection. 
The effects of the technical ability of users on Phishing website detection will be 
discussed. User experiments will be conducted to evaluate the effects of technical ability 
and the results will be analyzed. 
3.2. Effect of Phishing knowledge on Phishing websites detection. 
The effects of the Phishing knowledge of users on Phishing website detection will be 
evaluated. User experiments will be conducted and the results will be analyzed. 
4. An evaluation of the anti-Phishing knowledge retention when using the New Approach. 
This thesis will evaluate the anti-Phishing knowledge retention of users of the New 
Approach. User experiments will be conducted and the results will be analyzed. 
5. Comparisons with other related studies. 
The work in this thesis will be compared with the relevant work of others. Discussions 
on the similarities and differences will be presented. 
6. A proof of concept implementation. 
A prototype proof of concept will be presented in order to demonstrate that the New 
Approach is implementable and viable. 
1.5. Thesis Overview 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of Internet fraud in 
general. Internet fraud is defined, and types and examples are discussed. The chapter 
identifies some web applications that are suffering from Internet fraud and gives some 
statistics for its impact. It also presents existing techniques and strategies to detect and 
prevent Internet fraud. 
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Chapter 3 discusses Phishing attacks. The problem is defined and some real examples 
are discussed. The impact of Phishing attacks is presented with statistics that reveal its 
trends. The chapter reviews existing approaches in detecting and preventing Phishing emails 
and websites and discusses their limitations. 
Chapter 4 begins with an overview of training and discusses its definition and 
methodologies. It goes on to present an overview of embedded training, discusses its 
advantages and provides examples. Finally, the chapter looks at people's retention of the 
knowledge obtained from training and the factors that affect the retention rate. 
Chapter 5 presents an overview of the experimental designs and statistical analysis used 
in this thesis. It shows how the research question is translated into a hypothesis and the steps 
to performing an experiment and testing the hypothesis. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of common statistical analysis methods that are used in this thesis. 
Chapter 6 examines the effectiveness of the most common users' tips for detecting 
Phishing websites. A set of novel effectiveness criteria is proposed and used to examine 
each single tip and rank it based on its effectiveness score. An attempt is made to find the 
best anti-Phishing tips that users can focus on to detect Phishing attacks by themselves. 
Chapter 7 proposes a novel anti-Phishing approach that uses training intervention for 
Phishing websites' detection (APTIPWD). The chapter also presents a prototype proof of 
concept implementation of the proposed approach. The chapter shows the design and then 
the implementation of the prototype. The aim of the implementation is to validate whether 
the New Approach is doable and viable. 
Chapter 8 presents the design of the evaluation experiments and the research hypotheses. 
Details are provided about the way in which the experiments' participants were recruited 
and about their demographic profile. The chapter presents the effectiveness ratios that are 
used in evaluating the hypotheses. It also shows comparisons between real Phishing attacks 
and Phishing experiments in order to decide what should be simulated in the experiments. 
The story board of the experiments is also presented. 
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Chapter 9 discusses the evaluation of the research hypotheses. The hypotheses are 
classified into four research themes, which are evaluating the New Approach, the effect of 
high and low technical abilities on Phishing detection, the effect of Phishing awareness and 
Phishing unawareness on Phishing detection and anti-Phishing knowledge retention. 
Chapter 10 compares the work in this thesis with related anti-Phishing approaches. It 
includes a discussion on the similarities and differences between the evaluations in this 
thesis and the work of others. Issues such as participants' recruitment, scenarios, emails and 
websites, anti-Phishing tips used, results and implementation are discussed. 
Chapter 11 presents the conclusion of this thesis, summarizes its original work and 
identifies directions for future research. 
1.6. Assumptions 
In this thesis, there is an assumption that Phishing attacks do not use either software to 
change the host files in users' operating systems or any malicious software, such as a virus, 
worm or Trojan horse, that runs in users' operating systems. These are called 'Pharming' 
and 'Malware' and are different from Phishing. Phishing is a deceptive attack which aims to 
take advantage of the way humans interact with computers or interpret messages rather than 
taking advantage of the technical system vulnerabilities [Downs et al.06]. 
1.7. Summary 
In this chapter, an introductory overview of Internet fraud and Phishing was presented 
and the problem of Phishing was briefly discussed. The thesis's original work and its criteria 
for success were given. Finally, the structure of the thesis was shown. 
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2. Internet Fraud 
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of Internet fraud in general. The Internet 
fraud definition, types and examples will be discussed. The chapter identifies some web 
applications that are suffering from Internet fraud as well as some statistics for Internet 
fraud impact. It also presents some existing techniques and strategies to detect and prevent 
Internet fraud. 
2.2. Definition 
Fraud is defined as 'an act or instance of deception, an artifice by which the right or 
interest of another is injured, a dishonest trick or stratagem' [OED]. Fraud can be 
committed using variety of methods. In recent times, the Internet has been a suitable method 
for committing fraud because the Internet allows hiding real identification of people who 
deal with it. Therefore, fraudsters use the Internet in order to appear anonymous. 
Once users go online, they are at risk from Internet fraud. Internet fraud is defined by 
Philippsohn [PhilippsohnOl] as any crime that uses the Internet as the medium to exercise 
the ability to carry out financial frauds. In addition to this, Internet fraud is sometimes called 
'Internet Scams' [CAB06]. The parties involved in any transaction never need to meet and 
the user may have no idea whether the goods or services exist. Due to this, the Internet is a 
good vehicle to defraud the users who would like to buy goods or services using it 
[PhilippsohnOl]. 
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2.3. Internet Fraud Types 
2.3.1. Types 
Internet fraud has a multiplicity of types. In the literature, there is no exact number or 
fixed list of these types. Below is a simple taxonomy described for these types: 
• Rogue traders: 
Rogue Internet traders are untrustworthy or dishonest merchants who sell goods or 
services using the Internet [CAB06]. The most common fraud cases that dishonest 
merchants commit when selling something online are [CAB06]: 
• Merchant advertises goods that do not exist. 
• Merchant makes untrue statements about the things they are selling. 
• Merchant sells dangerous goods. 
• Merchant does not tell about import or transport costs. 
• Merchant sends different goods to the ones they advertised. 
• Merchant does not deliver on time. 
• Merchant does not deliver at all. 
Few of the listed cases occur in the Internet auction fraud. The Internet Crime Complaint 
Center (IC3) [IC3] states that 'auction fraud involves fraud attributable to the 
misrepresentation of a product advertised for sale through an Internet auction site or the 
non-delivery of products purchased through an Internet auction site'. 
• Credit card fraud: 
Credit card fraud is where an unauthorized person uses a credit or debit card to obtain 
money or purchase merchandise [IC3]. The fraudsters make online purchases with the credit 
card details of other people which is known as Card-Not-Present (CNP). CNP fraud is a 
credit card fraud that is committed over the Internet, mail, fax or phone without the need to 
present the card physically [APACSc]. According to APACS [APACSa] 'the anonymity of 
CNP transactions allows fraudsters to disguise their true identity. They may use fictitious 
personal details in conjunction with fraudulently obtained card details to make illegal 
purchases'. For most of CNP cases, credit or debit card numbers are stolen from unsecured 
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websites, taken from discarded receipts or obtained in an identity theft scheme without the 
cardholder's knowledge [APACSa, IC3]. 
• Lottery fraud: 
Lottery fraud has been very common on the Internet even though the victim may never 
have participated in a lottery. The victims receive an email that says they are the winners of 
an International lottery. Next, the victims are told that they have to send money to claim the 
prize or has to ring a premium rate number which is very expensive [CAB06, IC3]. 
• Pharming: 
Pharming is defined by APWG as a web security attack that happens when a user types 
in an address and the browser they use redirects them to a fraudulent website without their 
knowledge [APWG07a]. Pharming can be conducted by exploiting vulnerability in Domain 
Name Server (DNS)'' and changing the content of the directory, which contains the domain, 
to IP directory [Jammalamadaka et al.05]. 
• Phishing: 
Recently, Phishing scams have become one of the serious problems encountering end-
users in the Internet world [Chandrasekaran et al.06]. Phishing is an attack that exploits the 
end-user lack of knowledge in terms of web browser clues and security indicators and uses 
similar looking emails and websites for legitimate organizations to trick people in order to 
reveal sensitive information [Dhamija et al.06]. Due to the fact that the main focus of this 
thesis is Phishing, there will be more detailed description of Phishing in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2. Summary 
There is no fixed list of the Internet fraud types. A simple taxonomy of the types was 
described. Parties involved in a transaction on the Internet may commit fraud. In the Internet 
auctions, merchants can defraud customers. The Internet users also receive fraudulent 
^ DNS stands for Domain Name System. The DNS main task is mapping symbolic host names to their IP 
addresses [Friedlander et al.07]. 
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emails discussed as 'lottery fraud'. Pharming and Phishing also are used to steal users' 
sensitive information such as credit card details. 
2.4. Internet Applications that are Suffering from Internet Fraud 
All security-critical applications (e.g. online banking login page) that are accessed using 
the Internet are at the risk of Internet fraud. The reason is that the application access keys 
could be stolen. Applications such as electronic commerce, electronic banking, electronic 
voting, electronic mail and so forth might be targets for fraudsters. Due to their financial 
losses, electronic commerce and online banking will be briefly presented. 
2.4.1. Electronic Commerce 
Gatautis and Neverauskas [GatautisNeverauskasOS] described electronic commerce as 
'form of trading relations, in which interrelated parties interact in electronic way, using 
information technologies'. The World Wide Web technologies enable people around the 
world to participate in commercial activities whenever and wherever without any 
boundaries [Poong et al.06]. 
There are many successful and widely used e-commercial websites. There are e-
marketplace websites such as Amazon'*. Also, there are Internet auction websites such as 
eBay^ which offers an online platform where millions of items are exchanged each day. 
An e-commerce transaction involves some steps. A customer browses a commercial 
website, selects goods and then checks out. Then, the customer reaches the payment process 
where they need to provide the payment page with valid payment card details. After that, the 
•* Amazon is a well-known electronic commerce company. Available at: http://www.amazon.com, last access 
on 4 Feb 2007. 
^ EBay is an online auction website. Available at: http://www.ebay.com, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
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merchant delivers the goods to the customer's physical address or the customer's email 
when the goods are digital (e.g. e-tickets and music). 
The payment process in the e-commerce transaction is one of the most important success 
factors in electronic commerce [JuangOV], However, the payment process is likely to have 
fraud possibility. One possible fraud case is a fraudster uses stolen credit card details in a 
payment process. This case can be considered CNP fraud case. Also, a dishonest merchant 
can commit fraud in the payment process. The merchant can double bill the customer, or can 
use the customer payment details in another payment process. Moreover, the merchant can 
pass on the customer payment details to criminals [DaraGundemoni06]. 
In the case of digital goods, the merchants can commit fraud by not delivering the goods 
(e.g. piece of music) to the customers' email addresses after they receive their money. The 
delivery of the digital goods is difficult to verify since there is no signature required when 
the goods are delivered as used now [Alfuraih02]. The signature is required when hard-
goods* are delivered to a physical address. 
2.4.2. Online Banking 
Online banking (also known as Internet banking) is a term described by Aladwani 
[AladwaniOl] as carrying out most banking services such as accessing bank accounts, 
balance reporting, money transfers and bill-payment electronically using the Internet. The 
use of online banking services has been growing at a tremendous rate [ReavleyOS]. 
Claessens et al. [Claessens et al.02] point out that online banking systems give everybody 
the chance to access their banking details and do banking activities easily. 
Today, many banks and financial societies have their online banking platforms. For 
example, the HSBC bank has nearly 19 million Internet registered users [HilleyOS]. Because 
* Hard-goods include all tangible products that require delivery to a physical address if purchased, such as 
laptops or clothes [Alfuraih02]. 
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of wide usage of online banking, more than 130 milhon Europeans were expected to 
conduct their banking transactions online in 2007 [ReavleyOS]. 
Any online banking transaction involves two parties which are the customer and the 
bank. In contrast, e-commerce transaction requires one additional party which is the 
merchant. In e-commerce there are more possibilities for fraud as both the customer and 
merchant can commit fraud. 
2.5. Impact and Statistics 
The following presents some figures of the negative impact of Internet fraud on 
companies and financial market in the last few years. According to McKenna [McKennaOS], 
a survey revealed that: 
• 90% of the 200 companies participated in the survey suffered from unauthorized 
penetration of company systems. 
• 89% suffered from theft of information. 
The Internet fraud influence hits everywhere. CyberSource [CyberSourceOS] has 
revealed that the total financial losses from Internet payment fraud alone in the United 
States and Canada have steadily increased in the period between 2004 and 2007 as e-
commerce has continued to grow approximately 20%i each year. In addition, online theft 
costs S1 trillion a year and the number of Internet fraud attacks is increasing sharply and too 
many people do not know how to protect themselves [Weber09]. 
The fear of Internet fraud also drives the Internet shoppers away from practicing e-
commerce. More than half of the adult population in the U K does not shop online because 
they do not know how to use a computer, they prefer shopping on the high street or they do 
not have an Internet access [CyberSource09]. But worryingly, 41% of those who do not 
shop online said it is because of the fears of Internet fraud [ibid]. 
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2.6. Mitigating Internet Fraud 
Due to the fact that there have been fraud attempts (attacks), it is normal to have 
protection attempts (defenses) against them introduced by industry and academic 
researchers alike. Some technologies used in mitigating Internet fraud as well as efforts for 
increasing user anti-fraud awareness are discussed in this section. 
2.6.1. Technologies Used 
In e-commerce, the main transaction's stockholders, customer, merchant and the card 
issuing bank, need to make sure that each one is satisfied and authenticated [Cook02]. 
Merchants need to be reassured that the customers they do business with really are 
legitimate. Customers need to be reassured that their card details are not being used by 
unauthorized persons to make purchases on the Internet in their name. Also, the card issuers 
need to know that they are not involved in a fraud loss [ibid]. 
Once customers have completed their purchase on a merchant's Internet payment page, 
their card data is transferred directly to the card issuer. The problem here is that if the card 
issuer considers the transaction is fraudulent, the merchant, who is held responsible for not 
verifying the cardholder's identity, is likely to lose the income from the sale in addition to 
the value of the products sold [ibid]. The merchant then will dispute the transaction and 
claim their money back. This process is known as 'chargeback' [ibid]. 
To solve this problem, some technologies such as MasterCard's 'Secure Code', Visa's 
'Verified by Visa', Address Verification Service and Card Code Value have been introduced 
and aimed to verify the card information and, in turn, to authenticate its user. 
• MasterCard's SecureCode and Visa's Verified by Visa (VbV): 
MasterCard SecureCode and Verified by Visa (VbV) services are similar and based on 
the 3D Secure Protocol [APACSa]. MasterCard's solution is called Secure Payment 
Application (SPA) [Cook02]. In MasterCard SecureCode, cardholder registers to 
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MasterCard and then downloads and installs a browser plug-in or electronic wallet. After 
that, if a customer starts purchasing process at a MasterCard's participating Internet retailer, 
a secure window will appear requesting the customer's SecureCode pin number. Then the 
customer enters their pin number in the window. In seconds, the transaction will be 
authenticated and confirmed. Then, the purchase can be completed [MasterCard]. 
The Verified by Visa (VbV) case is explained as follows. Merchants Plug-In (MPI) 
software is installed on the Merchants' systems [VisaOS]. Then, when a registered 
cardholder executing a transaction reaches the check-out page and clicks the 'buy' button, a 
VbV session is automatically initiated. Customers will know that they are on a secure 
website, since it will carry Visa's VbV symbol. The e-shopper will complete the payment 
page normally, submit their card details and then the system will check if the card issuer is 
participating in the VbV scheme. Shoppers who are registered with their card issuer will 
then be presented with a pop-up window and asked to enter a PIN number to prove their 
identity [Cook02]. 
• Address Verification Service (AVS) and Card Security Code (CSC): 
The banking industry introduced AVS/CSC services in 2001 to help merchants in 
preventing CNP fraud [APACSa]. Both AVS and CSC are designed to make it difficult for 
fraudsters because they require more knowledge than just a card number and expiry date 
[LogicGr]. As Figure 1 illustrates, C S C code is the last three digits located on the signature 
strip on the back of the card. C S C ensures that the card is with the customer while they are 
making a transaction on the web. While, AVS allows the merchant to confirm the numbers 
in the billing address of a cardholder with the card issuer database [APACSa]. Therefore, it 
is less likely that fraudsters will be able to provide the genuine cardholder's address whereas 
they may be able to provide a CSC with a lost or stolen card [APACSa]. 
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Figure 1: C a r d security code ( C S C ) | A P A C S b | 
2.6.2. Consumer Training 
Due to the fact that no complete solution mitigates Internet fraud, both technical and 
educational solutions are required methods of preventing the fraud [Symantec]. 
Financial and commercial, private and government institutions have developed Internet 
fraud awareness websites in which provide Internet fraud prevention training materials. For 
example, there are banks and financial institutions such as PayPal, HSBC and Citibank. 
Also, there are some popular electronic commercial websites such as Amazon and eBay. 
Some anti-fraud organizations such as Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)^, Bank Safe 
Online** website and Card Watch' website which are run by APACS, the U K payments 
association and Get Safe Online"' website (See Figure 2) which is sponsored by the U K 
government jointly with some organizations such as eBay, B T " , Microsoft, HSBC and 
Securetrading. In addition to this, as Figure 3 illustrates, credit card companies such as 
Visa'" and MasterCard'^ have been doing work in the field of 'Consumer Education'. Thus, 
' Anti-Phishing Working Group. Available at: http://www.antiphishing.org, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
" Bank Safe Online. Available at: http://www.banksafeonline.org.uk, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
Card Watch. Available at: http://www.cardwatch.org.uk, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
Get Safe Online. Available at: http://www.getsafeonline.org, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
" B T is the British Telecommunications company. 
Visa. Available at: http://www.visa.com, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
MasterCard. Available at: http://www.mastercard.com, last access on 4 Feb 2007. 
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these institutions are interested in making the human element (end-user) good enough in 
detecting and preventing Internet fraud. 
The online training materials provided by the institutions and organizations are typically 
written as textual lists. The tips provided by these institutions are for variety of purposes. 
They are for users doing online shopping, online auction, online banking, receiving emails 
and so forth. Some examples of the anti-fraud textual tips are worth mentioning. 
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Figure 2: Get Safe Online website 
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Figure 3: Consumer education section at MasterCard website 
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• Anti-fraud textual tips 
The anti-fraud user's tips are different based on the task they intend to do. Examples of 
the tips are shown in Table 1. 
# Tip 
1 When creating a password, it should not be a word at all. It can be a combination of letters, 
numbers and keyboard symbols. 
2 Password should contain a mix of upper and lower case letters, numbers and keyboard 
symbols. 
3 Be different by avoiding using the same password for different services. 
4 If you cannot avoid using a public computer, after you are done, log out of all websites, 
clear the browser's cache and history, and close the browser. 
5 Delete suspicious emails with attachments and never open the attachments. 
6 Do not download attachments: we will never send you an attachment or software update to 
install on your computer. 
7 Never open an email attachment that contains a file ending with .exe, .pif, .vbs as these are 
commonly used with viruses. 
8 Do not send your credit card number to anyone in an unsecured email. 
9 Only access your personal financial information from a computer you trust. Avoid using 
shared computers such as those in Internet cafes. 
10 Make sure you are on a secure connection when entering sensitive information. Secure Web 
pages will have the text https: (note the "s") instead of http: 
11 Before using the website, check out the security/encryption software it uses. 
12 Look for Third-Party Merchant Reviews. Many news websites offer reviews of shopping 
sites. These resources can be a great place to start your online shopping searches. 
13 Make sure you are purchasing merchandise from a reputable source. 
14 Do not judge a person/company by their web site. 
Table 1: Examples of anti-fraud tips'^ 
14 The tips are cited from PayPal, Amazon, eBay, H S B C , Card Watch and Get Safe Online. 
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2.7. Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of Intemet fraud that is a major problem to e-
commerce and online banking. It has defined Intemet fraud, described its different types 
and presented existing solutions to combat fraud. With regards to the potentiality to have 
fraud incidents, it is clear that a single online banking transaction involves two parties which 
are the customer and the bank. In contrast, e-commerce transaction involves one more party 
which is the merchant. Due to the nature of the parties, e-commerce is more likely to have 
fraud incidents since both the customer and merchant can possibly commit fraud. 
This chapter showed that Phishing attacks are types of Intemet fraud. Any method that 
helps in reducing and mitigating Phishing attacks will help in reducing Intemet fraud. 
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3 . P h i s h i n g 
3.1. Introduction 
Gullibility is the quality of being gullible. Gullible is defined as "too willing to believe or 
accept what other people tell you and therefore easily tricked [HombyOO] whereas trust is 
defined as believing others in the absence of hard and clear evidence to disbelieve 
[RonerSO]. The question 'whether trust means gullibility or not' is widely discussed by 
many psychologists. People who are considered trustful are also considered to be naive and 
gullible in the conception of trust [Yamagishi et al.99]. It is commonly believed that those 
people who tend to trust others without hard evidence are easy victims to fraudsters in the 
social jungle [ibid]. 
Phishing attacks are committed by fraudsters. In this chapter, Phishing attacks are 
considered. The problem definition and some of examples are discussed. The impact of 
Phishing attacks is presented with some statistics that reveal its trends. The chapter presents 
the existing research in suitability to Phishing risks. It also reviews the existing approaches 
in detecting and preventing Phishing emails and websites. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on limitations of anti-Phishing approaches. 
3.2. Problem Definition 
Recently, Phishing attacks have become a serious problem for end-users, financial and 
commercial websites alike [Chandrasekaran et al.06]. Phishing is an attack that exploits the 
end-user lack of knowledge in terms of web browser clues and security indicators and uses 
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similar looking emails and websites for legitimate organizations to trick people in order to 
reveal sensitive information [Dhamija et al.06]. The similar looking emails and websites for 
legitimate organizations are known as Phishing emails and Phishing websites respectively. 
Phishing is aimed to take advantage of the way humans interact with computers or interpret 
messages rather than taking advantage of the technical system vulnerabilities [Downs et 
al.06]. Orgill et al. [Orgill et al.04] point out that Phishing uses human emotion and 
manipulation to trick the victim into giving out important information. 
Phishing is about other parties attempting to gain personal information such as bank 
details and passwords. As the Internet has become a vital medium of communication, 
Phishing can be performed in different ways. They are as follows: 
1. email-to-email: this happens when someone receives an email asking for sensitive 
information to be replied to the sender email or sent to another email. 
2. email-to-website: this happens when someone receives an email with embedded web 
address that leads to a Phishing website. 
3. website-to-website: this happens when a Phishing website is reached by clicking on 
an online advert or through a search engine. 
4. browser-to-website: this happens when someone misspelled a web address of a 
legitimate website on a browser and then goes to a Phishing website that has a 
similar address. 
Wu [Wu06] explains the human interaction with Phishing attacks are as follows. When a 
user receives a Phishing email, they may not understand that the link provided may not take 
them to where they expect. For example, the user's intention may be "go to eBay" but the 
actual implementation of the hyperlink may be "go to a server in South Korea". This 
misunderstanding enables Phishing and makes it very hard to defend against. Wu called this 
the "semantic gap" between the user's understanding and the system model (See Figure 4). 
Users gain their understanding of interaction from the presentation or the way it appears on 
the screen. Some technical details of web pages and email messages are hidden and some of 
them are not understandable to most users. Thus, the user does not interpret the system clues 
or is unable to do so. On the other hand, email clients and web browsers follow the coded 
instructions and are unable to check the user's intentions. Therefore, without awareness of 
both models, neither the user nor the computer is able to bridge the semantic gap in Phishing 
attacks. 
22 
Chapter 3: Phishing 
Mental Model ^sSf Sy$tem Modeli 
Who is Ihe olhttr parly ^ | 
What is the meaning of the message^ j What is tJw remote machine'? 
CijiiiiiiwikatiiMi i Communfcation , 
"V ,1 ! _ CrciT: ,, Internet 
jby semantic meanings | pv^^ by bits 
User User's 
computer 
What IS thfi purpose of the action'^ \ What is the system operation? 
Figure 4: There is a semantic barrier between a user and his computer |Wu06 | 
The success of a Phishing attack lies in the fraudster's ability to craft the attack in a 
manner that a naive user is unable to differentiate between legitimate and fraudulent 
websites and messages [Chandrasekaran et al.06]. 
3.3. Clues of Recent Phishing Scams 
Chou et al. [Chou et al.04] described common characteristic of Phishing websites and 
referred to them as Phishing clues. They are as follows: 
• Logos. The Phishing website uses logos found on the legitimate website to imitate its 
appearance. 
• Suspicious URLs. Phishing websites are located on servers that have no relation with the 
legitimate website. The Phishing website's U R L may contain the legitimate website's 
U R L as a substring (http: //www.ebaymode.com), or may be similar to the legitimate 
U R L (http://www.paypal.com) in which the 7' letter in PayPal is substituted with 
number '1'. IP addresses are sometimes used to mask the host name 
(http://25255255255/top.htm). Others use @ marks to make host names difficult to 
understand (http://ebay.com:top@255255255255/top.html) or contain suspicious 
usemames in their URLs (http://middIeman/http://www.ebay.com) 
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• User input. Phishing websites typically contain pages for the user to enter sensitive 
information, such as password, social security number and so on. 
" Short lived. Most Phishing websites are available for only a few hours or days - just 
enough time for the attacker to defraud a high enough number of users. 
• Copies. Attackers copy html from the legitimate websites and make minimal changes. 
• Sloppiness or lack of familiarity with Enslish. Many Phishing pages have misspellings, 
grammatical errors, and inconsistencies. 
• HTTPS is uncommon. Most Phishing websites do not use https'^  even if the legitimate 
website does. This simplifies recognizing the Phishing website. 
These characteristics are not exhaustive and an extended set is shown in Section 6.2.3 in 
Chapter 6. 
3.4. Examples of Phishing 
Symantec [Symantec04] presents a typical example of a Phishing attack as shown in 
Figure 5. There are many real Phishing examples collected and archived by the Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APWG). One example on APWG is an attack against eBay 
customers that was first reported on IS"" April 2005 [APWG07a]. The attack goal was to get 
victim's eBay and PayPal usemame/password, credit card information, bank account 
information and so forth. The email, as Figure 6 shows, sent to the customers was well 
designed and convincing. 
Https is a secured http. It uses S S L (Secure Sockets Layer) which is implemented in most commercial web 
servers [HasslerOl, p. 269]. 
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Figure 5: A typical scenario of Phishing 
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Figure 6: Example of eBay Phishing email | A P W G 0 7 a | 
As seen in Figure 6, the visible link is hrrp://H'ww.ebay.com/aw-cgi/ 
eBayISAPI.dU?VeriJyRegistrationShow, whereas the actual link which leads to a Phishing 
website is http://www.security-validation-your-account.com/signin.ebay.com/acounts/memb/ 
avncenter/dll87443/BayISAPI.dll/sign_in.htm. As shown in Figure 7, the Phishing website does 
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not use a technical trick to hide its actual web address in the address bar. The lack of https 
session protection is also a clue for this scam. 
Th« tricky URL, not HTTPS prot»{a»d 
•Biy immbcr*. tign in la IM IBTW tot bnl*ng. i«»nB. inn tutiv 
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Figure 7: Example of eBay Phishing website. 
When the "Sign In" button, shown in Figure 7, is clicked, then the second page is 
presented which requests personal information (See Figure 8). In order to make the trick 
more legitimate, none of the information w i l l be checked against errors by the website. The 
next page is a 'logout' page (See Figure 9) then the browser is redirected to the legitimate 
eBay homepage. 
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Figure 8: Example of eBay Phishing website (personal information) 
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Figure 9: Example of eBay Phishing website (logout page) 
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3.5. Impact and Statistics 
Gartner conducted a survey of 3,985 individuals in September 2008 to determine 
consumer Phishing trends [Litan09]. The percentage of Phishing victims is higher than ever. 
5 million Internet users in the United States were victims in 2008. This is an increase of 40 
percent over 2007 [ibid]. According to the survey, 4.3 percent of people who received 
Phishing emails lost money from the attack (compared to 3 percent in 2005). Litan believed 
that 'a four percent successful response rate is quite good, considering legitimate mass 
email marketing campaigns have a success rate of about L 5 percent'. 
APWG has produced the Phishing Activities Trends report for the first quarter of the 
year 2008 [APWG08] that details statistics on Phishing activities. A summary of the main 
figures is presented as follows: 
• The number of Phishing websites reached 30,716 unique URLs reported in February 
which is the high recorded number by the APWG (Figure 10). 
• The number of unique Phishing websites detected by APWG was 36,002 in February 
2008 (Figure 11). 
• APWG saw a total of 139 brands being hijacked in February with numerous non-
traditional websites such as social network portals and gambling websites. 
• Financial services continue to be the most targeted industry sector at 92.4-94.2% of all 
attacks in over the quarter (Figure 12). Also, more international banks and brands were 
spoofed. 
• The longest time online for a Phishing website is 31 days. 
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Figure 10: Phishing reports detected in the period January 2008 - March 2008 
28 
Chapter 3: Phishing 
N e w Ph ish ing Si tes by M o n t h - J a n . - M a r c h '08 
4 0 0 0 0 
3 B O 0 2 
1 j J 
Figure 11: New Phishing websites detected in the period January 2008 - March 2008 
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Figure 12: Most targeted industrial sectors in the period January 2008 - March 2008 
The most targeted customers by phishing are PayPal's and eBay's customers. This is 
because they are such a huge demographic - 123 million customers at the end of 2006 and 
also because PayPal is designed for transfering money around easily and thus makes it a 
target for fraudsters [YoungOV]. 
Phishing attacks also have a big negative impact on consumer trust about online banking 
and e-commerce. The Gartner group conducted a survey in 2005 [LitanOS] which estimated 
that Phishing attacks wi l l reduce the growth rates in the U.S. e-commerce and online 
banking in three years period by 1% to 3%. The survey also showed that 80% of users 
confirmed that Phishing has impacted their trust in email f rom companies or individuals 
they do not know personally. 
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3.6. Phishing Susceptibility 
Downs et al. [Downs et al.06] conducted a study with 20 users that revealed peoples' 
strategies when encountering possibly suspicious emails. They explored several strategies 
that people use in evaluating emails and in making sense of warnings offered by browsers 
attempting to help users navigate the web. 
Their research methodology was one-on-one interviews. Participants were informed that 
the interview was about "your computer use" and "how people make decisions while using 
their email and visiting websites". The interview protocol had two parts. The first part is the 
email and web role play in which participants read and responded to a set of emails. The 
second part was the security and trust decisions in which participants described their 
concepts related to their trust on the Internet and their awareness of online security 
measures. 
Downs et al. selected their participants based on criteria they created to filter only those 
who were considered 'non-experts' in terms of computer technical ability. Their criteria for 
filtering their participants was that people who answered "no" to two or more of the 
following screening questions were included in the study: 
1. whether they had ever changed preferences or settings in their web browser, 
2. whether they had ever created a web page, and 
3. whether they had ever helped someone fix a computer problem. 
Downs et al. found that all participants had noticed different clues that they might use to 
decide whether an email or website was trustworthy such as false addresses in the "from" 
line, absence of lock icon and broken images on a website. In contrast, they did not 
necessarily interpret these clues correctly. For example, many of them did not know that a 
lock in the content of a web page was not the same thing as a lock in the browser's 
chrome'^. In addition, many participants thought that the existence of broken images was a 
The borders of a web page window, which include the window frames, menus, toolbars, address bar and 
status bar [Dhamija et al.06]. 
30 
Chapter 3: Phishing 
problem with their computer rather than an indication about the source of the website. 
Fewer participants noticed clues in URLs. 
Participants used different strategies to determine about the trustworthiness of email. 
One of theses strategies was where participants looked for emails that appeared to be for 
them personally. Another strategy was that participants would reply to companies that they 
did business with. The third strategy was where participants thought that reputable 
companies will send emails. Participants mostly focused on interpreting the text of the email 
rather than any clue in email headers or links included in the email. None of these strategies 
appeared to be particularly effective in helping these naive users avoid falling for scams. 
Participants' experience with very particular attacks seemed to be the best clues for spotting 
similar ones. However, this clue could not be applied to unfamiliar attacks. 
Downs et al. [Downs et al.07] conducted further research in order to find out whether 
there are correlations between web environment experiences and the susceptibility to 
Phishing. This study reported a survey of 232 computer users. The survey included sections 
such as a U R L evaluation where respondents identified features of URLs , an email role play 
where respondents responded to screenshots of emails and websites, past experience with 
websites, ratings of potential negative consequences of Phishing and a knowledge section 
where respondents interpreted the meaning of lock icons. They found the following: 
1. Those who properly answered the knowledge question about the definition of Phishing 
were significantly less likely to fall to detect Phishing emails (Behavior is correlated 
with Phishing knowledge), 
2. Knowledge about other computer risks and concepts such as cookies, spyware, or 
viruses was unrelated to clicking on the Phishing link (Behavior is not correlated with 
computer risks knowledge), 
3. Participants, who correctly answered that non-chrome lock images were not the same 
thing as the standard lock image in chrome (See Figure 13), were less likely to fall to 
detect Phishing emails (Behavior is correlated with browser-security-lock knowledge), 
"I I I I f ^ l ® Internet 
Figure 13: Standard lock image in window chrome 
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4. Participants who had experience with Phishing websites were less likely than others to 
click on the Phishing links. Similar results were found for visiting the Phishing website 
and entering information there (Behavior is correlated with having experienced 
Phishing), 
5. Participants who recognized from the U R L (Table 2 shows the URLs used in the 
research) that the website was untrustworthy or not secure were less likely to fall to 





hcrp:. •nwv.ebay.me.ul; cgi-bin .webscr.hmi?ciud=_ 
Table 2: The U R L s evaluated used in Downs et al.'s research |Downs ct al.07| 
6. Participants perceived negative consequences were unrelated to any of the behaviors 
relating to falling for Phishing email (Behavior is not correlated with perceiving 
negative consequences for Phishing). 
Downs et al. concluded that deeper understanding of the web environment is associated 
with less vulnerability to Phishing attacks. 
3.7. Solutions 
There have been solutions to mitigate and reduce the risk of Phishing scams. These 
solutions are technical and educational. 
3.7.1. Technical 
There have been technical solutions to mitigate the problem of Phishing. Anti-Phishing 
email filters to detect and delete emails automatically at the email server. However, there is 
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a risk of mistakenly blocking legitimate email if the filter is configured to be sufficiently 
sensitive to detecting Phishing email [EmighOS]. Security toolbars have been used to 
prevent Phishing websites such as SpoofStick, TrustBar and SpoofGuard as Figure 14 
shows. The anti-Phishing toolbars are web browser plug-ins that either detect and prevent 
users from reaching Phishing website or warn users when they reach a suspected Phishing 
website. The web browser "Internet Explorer 7" has an anti-Phishing toolbar called 
'Microsoft Phishing Filter' [Microsofta]. Microsoft [Microsofta] states that 'Phishing Filter 
checks the sites you visit against an up-to-the-hour, dynamic list of reported Phishing sites. 
If it finds a match, Phishing Filter will show you a red warning notifying you that the site 
has been blocked for your safety'. 
SpoofStick 
Y o u ' r e o n p a v P ^ ' - c o r n 
Netcraft Toolbar 
Since: C>ct 20Q1 Rank: i i Slte_BeESC£ [US] eBay. Ipc 
TrustBar 
eBay Account Guard 
SpoofGuard 
www. paypal .com 
Figure 14: Existing security toolbars | W u et al 06| 
Cranor et al. [Cranor et al.06a] examined the effectiveness of 10 popular anti-Phishing 
toolbars and found that they had many limitations. SpoofGuard was very good at identifying 
fraudulent websites, but it also incorrectly identified many legitimate websites as fraudulent 
(FP)'^ EarthLink, Google, Netcraft, Cloudmark, and Internet Explorer 7 identified most 
Phishing websites correctly and had few false positives, but they still missed more than 15% 
of Phishing websites. 
Anti-Phishing tools use two major methods for detecting Phishing websites. The first 
one is to use heuristics such as checking the host name and checking the U R L for common 
spoofing techniques. The heuristics approach is not 100% accurate since it produces low 
" A false positive takes place when a legitimate website is mistakenly judged as a Phishing website [Zhang et 
al.07]. 
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false negatives (FN)'^, which implies they do not catch all Phishing websites, and high false 
positives (FP) [Zhang et al.07]. The second method is to use a blacklist that lists Phishing 
U R L s verified by paid experts. When experts check a reported U R L and decide that it is 
Phishing U R L due to some Phishing clues, they add the U R L to their blacklist. Blacklists 
have a high level of accuracy [ibid]. However, a reported website is not blacklisted until it is 
verified. Therefore, blacklists require verification and updates by humans. One problem here 
is that verification and updates consume a great deal of resources, especially time. Another 
problem is that unlisted and unreported Phishing URLs bypass blacklists and reaches their 
goal. These limitations significantly complicate the process of compiling a blacklist which 
then can reduce blacklists' effectiveness [ibid]. 
Wu et al. [Wu et al.06] carried out two experiments using three security toolbars and 
other browser security indicators and they found them all ineffective at preventing Phishing 
attacks. They also found that many subjects failed to look at the toolbars and few others 
noticed the suspicious signs coming from the indicators but they either did not know how to 
interpret the signs or they improperly explained them. In addition, they concluded that many 
users do not understand the Phishing attacks and do not know good practices for staying 
safe onhne. 
Dhamija et al. [Dhamija et al.06] carried out research on how Phishing works. Their 
findings are: 
• Good Phishing websites fooled 90% of participants. 
• Many subjects lacked knowledge of how computer systems worked and did not 
understand security systems and indicators. For example, some subjects do not 
understand the domain name's syntax meaning and can not distinguish the deference 
between legifimate and fraudulent URLs (e.g. they may understand that www.ebay-
members-security.com is related to www.ebay.com). 
• Existing anti-Phishing browsing cues are ineffective. 23% of participants in their 
study did not look at the address bar, status bar, or the security indicators. 
" A false negative takes place when a Phishing website is mistakenly judged as a legitimate website [Zhang et 
al.07], 
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Some visual deception attacks (e.g. copying images of browser chrome or the S S L " 
indicators in the address bar or status bar) can fool even the most sophisticated users 
because they sometimes look like authentic indicators. 
3.7.2. Training 
3.7.2.1. Importance 
Anti-Phishing training for end-users is complementary to any proposed technical 
solution. Robila and Ragucci [RobilaRagucci06] suggest that while technical improvements 
continue to stop the attacks, end-user training is a key component in Phishing attacks 
mitigation. Symantec [Symantec04] believes that 'customer education is central to helping 
consumers change their behavior to prevent online fraud'. Security training and awareness 
programs have done a good job in mitigating the risk of Phishing [Dodge et al.07]. 
Anti-Phishing training will make the end-user aware and an effective barrier against 
Phishing attempts. Furthermore, training end-users on how to detect and prevent Phishing is 
a strongly recommended practice. Orgill et al. [Orgill et al.04] point out user training is an 
important part of mitigation against Phishing attacks on information systems. Robila and 
Ragucci [RobilaRagucci06] believe that Phishing attacks have an extremely high success 
rate since they most likely appeal to the user's emotions. Accordingly, anti-Phishing training 
will continue to be considered and improved. 
3.7.2.2. Approaches 
The most basic approach is publishing guidelines for the Internet users to follow when 
they go online. Theses guidelines are referred as users' tips. Many financial and 
commercial, private and government institutions (e.g. eBay, PayPal, Amazon and HSBC) 
have provided anti-Phishing training tips for the Internet Users. All the information used in 
19 Secure Sockets Layer ( S S L ) is a secure communications protocol [OppligerOO, p. 132]. 
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the training approaches is based on the users' tips. There are many different tips to use. The 
first type is anti-Phishing tips for detecting Phishing emails. Secondly, anti-Phishing tips for 
detecting Phishing websites. Table 3 shows some of the anti-Phishing practices provided by 
APWG [APWG07b]. The aim of the tips is to train users to look for Phishing clues located 
in emails and websites to enable them to make better decisions in distinguishing Phishing 
emails and websites. Users usually need to open new web browsers and access online 
material published by institutions to read and then go back to their online activity browser to 
proceed. This scenario happens in the case that users know that there are Internet fraud 
attacks called Phishing and there are training materials for detecting and preventing them. 
# Tip 
1 
Phishers typically include upsetting or exciting (but false) statements in their emails to get 
people to react immediately. 
2 
Phishers typically ask for information such as usemames, passwords, credit card numbers, 
social security numbers, date of birth, etc. 
3 
Phishers emails are NOT personalized, but they can be. Valid messages from your bank or 
e-commerce company generally are personalized, but always call to check if you are unsure. 
4 
Don't use the links in an email, instant message, or chat to get to any web page if you 
suspect the message might not be authentic or you don't know the sender or user's handle. 
Instead, call the company on the telephone, or log onto the website directly by typing in the 
Web address in your browser. 
5 
Always ensure that you're using a secure website when submitting credit card or other 
sensitive information via your Web browser 
6 
Phishers are now able to 'spoof or forge BOTH the "https://" that you normally see when 
you're on a secure Web server AND a legitimate-looking address. You may even see both in 
the link of a scam email. Make it a habit to enter the address of any banking, shopping, 
auction, or financial transaction website yourself and not depend on displayed links. 
7 
Phishers may forge the yellow lock you would normally see near the bottom of your screen 
on a secure website. The lock has usually been considered as another indicator of a 'safe' 
website. The lock, when double-clicked, displays the security certificate for the website. If 
you get any warnings displayed that the address of the website you have displayed does 
NOT match the certificate, do not continue. 
8 
Remember not all scam websites try to show the "https://" and/or the security lock. Get in 
the habit of looking at the address line, too. Were you directed to PayPal? Does the address 
line display something different like "http://www.gotscammed.com/paypal/login.htm?" Be 
aware of where you are going. 
Table 3: Examples of anti-Phishing tips | A P W G 0 7 b | 
Kumaraguru et al.'s [Kumaraguru et al.07b] tested the effectiveness of 24 existing 
online training materials that teach people how to protect themselves from Phishing attacks. 
They collected onhne anti-Phishing materials such as eBay's tutorial on spoofed emails. 
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Microsoft's security tutorial on Phisiiing, Phishing E-card from the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission and tutorial f rom MySecureCyberspace. They had two groups. They recruited 
14 participants for each groups, for a total of 28 participants. To recruit participants, they 
filtered participants with respect to their computer technical ability. They used the same 
criteria that Downs et al. [Downs et al.06] used and mentioned earlier in Section 3.6. They 
aimed to recruit only participants who were considered "non-experts'. 
Their participants spent approximately 15 minutes in reading anti-Phishing training 
materials and then showed good improvements in their ability to identify Phishing websites 
when compared to a control group. They found that 'these training materials are 
surprisingly effective when users actually read them\ Then, they provided some 
recommendations on how to improve training materials based on these principles. 
Robila and Ragucci [RobilaRagucci06] proposed a new technique for training users by 
combining class discussions and Phishing IQ tests. They included Phishing topics in an 
Introduction to Computing course aimed at students studying a non-computer science 
subject. Robila and Ragucci have built a training tool for users that uses Phishing IQ tests. 
The tests included displaying both legitimate and fraudulent emails to users and having 
them identify the Phishing attempts from the legitimate emails. Then, the tool gives a score 
for each user and feedback. Robila and Ragucci concluded that 'class assessment indicates 
an increased level of awareness and better recognition of attacks'. 
Anandpara et al. [Anandpara et al.08] argue that Phishing training using IQ tests seems 
to affect the users' judgment and then increase their fear because it makes them suspicious 
rather than improving their ability to recognize Phishing from legitimate email. They 
conducted a study where 40 subjects were asked to answer a selection of questions from 
existing Phishing IQ tests. They excluded subjects who have unusual knowledge about 
computer science or security. They also included subjects who either use or would consider 
using online shopping, banking or bi l l paying. Their experiment was divided into three 
parts. The first part was that they gave subjects a short IQ test which contained five different 
emails and asked them to identify Phishing emails. Then, the second part was that the 
subjects were asked to read existing Phishing training. The third part was that subjects were 
asked to take a second Phishing IQ test, with the same design as the first one, but with 
37 
Chapter 3: Phishing 
different emails. As a result of their study, Anandpara et al. found that 'the number of times 
a subject labels an example as Phishing does not depend on the number that actually are 
Phishing'. 
Many commercial institutions, such as Microsoft (See Figure 15), periodically send 
email security information to help their customers in protecting their online security 
[Microsoftb]. This email provides practical security tips, useful resources and links, and a 
forum to ask security-related questions. 
Microsoft states that the email is a suitable way for customers to stay up to date on the 
latest issues and events with: 
• Security tips including anti-Phishing tips. 
• Security critical updates. 
• Answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs) on security topics. 
• Information about security trials and downloads. 
• Tips from security team for home users. 
These emails are known as 'anti-Phishing emails' i f they include anti-Phishing tips. 
These emails are usually sent in text and H T M L formats. Customers who are interested in 
receiving these emails need to subscribe with the commercial institutions (i.e. anti-Phishing 
emails providers) in order to be included in receiving them. 
F<M-n ••<ic ca-,, ^ Security for H«T»Con»pwl«Ui«ra;l+ow»Bp<nphWlhta»cwii»« itsnm^-, a . p w ™ * tnoB • 
Inbox (21 i^ wu.: ••htimott' <Mit-cniiH»-iiMi*ii>'i mH'OK.tl.wm,! fr^ 
i^ ASniit 
How to spot phtshing scams and fraudulent e-mai 
' Phubng uBmt are nor jun found <r- fl- TBII SFV) on Inke 
I' ihBTT an EOC'BI netwot kmj STM , in inimnl mifjiaoflii • 
Figure 15: An example of anti-Phishing email 
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Kumaragum et al. [Kumaraguru et al.07a] also provided an approach which focuses on 
teaching people about the risks of Phishing and training them to recognize and avoid email-
related Phishing attacks. They developed an embedded training approach that teaches people 
how to protect themselves from email-related Phishing attacks during their normal use of 
email. Kumaraguru et al. point out that their approach based on periodically sending users 
fake Phishing emails that are actually from their system rather than from a fraudster. I f users 
fal l for a fake email and clicks on a link, an intervention is displayed that provides feedback 
about what simple steps users could follow to protect themselves. Kumaraguru et al. 
[Kumaraguru et al.OVa] designed two email-related training interventions. The first 
intervention used multimedia (screenshot of Phishing email). Figure 16 illustrate the 
screenshot based intervention used in the approach. Also, the researchers used comic strip 
format to design the second training intervention. The comic strip design gave a short story 
explaining how fraudsters work and how the user could do simple things to avoid Phishing 
emails. 
Protect yourself Iron 
Oicttiny on liriks wirtim WHQIIS lik«Tlw.one n the. 'ijtnaTcn.eotT^' vnai vou '« | 
j u i l ixad ( W I S a1 I I I * for tdtntty t+itf t and fftwncMiJ l o « . 
This emott arid i i i lor.d wer« devetopcai by Ccmtgit Meih» \Jm\mrstiy lo 
ttxtch you horv te proT«cT yourself frum these kind of phishifg scams 
^ . 
2. What does a phishing scam look like? 
:,v<iNG sew 
vfitn status ftar 
1. What's a phishing scam? 
r.ara rv^ir^ei or i iaxiirs pflsuwort! i-Jfti tp tfc-MHy li^ -gR n-^ rj iina.nc.-ai loa* 
3. What are simple ways to protect yourself 
from phishing scams? 
• N«nr«r Cttck on Knhs wtUitn omail i: N'aver cliCV or- unKa m\h\n iim-lilfi 
n< -cswv' o">-a'!i^  .intn-x] k>' your p ^ r r ^ i * .n!ofr-.8:icn 
• imt lae contact: •tiway.-i lict A 
• CaU customor aw^rtc*: Navar uiifi '.Tone r,urntms wrthm t.j->ok 
ii JD voiJfwf' oaii ihB Ciisicr"K w m - a wne(^ emml •sMf^s s*jsp*aons 
• Naver give out pwaonal kntofmatiai; Nevor g ^ i out parson* rrfrnrrnaBr^ 
Figure 16: An intervention includes text with an annotated image of the training email approach 
They compared their two training interventions (screenshot and comic strips) with the 
current practice of sending anti-Phishing tips. They evaluated their approach by conducting 
a user study using three groups. Two groups had screenshot and comic strips interventions. 
The third group had anti-Phishing email. There were 10 participants in each group for a total 
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of 30 participants. They included participants in their evaluation experiments with little 
technical knowledge. They recruited only 'non-experts' in terms of their computer technical 
ability. They used the same criteria used in Downs et al.'s [Downs et al.06] and Kumaraguru 
et al.'s [Kumaraguru et al.07b] studies which were mentioned earlier in Section 3.6 and this 
section respectively. 
Participants played the role of an imaginary person called 'Bobby Smith'. Participants 
were not told that the experiments were about Phishing. However, they were told that the 
study investigated "how people effectively manage and use emails." They were told that 
they should interact with their email the way they would normally do in their real life. Each 
participant was shown 19 email messages. The emails arranged in a predefined order. Nine 
messages were emails that Bobby Smith received from his work, friends and family. Two 
emails were legitimate emails from organizations with which Bobby Smith had an account 
such as Amazon and Paypal. Two spam emails, four Phishing emails, and two training 
emails (anti-Phishing email or embedded training interventions). Table 4 shows the email 
arrangement shown to the users in the Kumaraguru et al.'s study. 
1. Legitimate 6. Legitimate 11. Intenention 16.Phiihing 
2. Legitimate Legitimate 12. Spam P.Phiihing 
3. Pbishing 8. Spam IS.Legmmite IS.Legjumate 
4. Legitimate 9. Legitimate 14.Phiihing 19. Legitimate 
•> Inten-entioa 10. Legitimate IS.Lesitimate 
Table 4: Email arrangement in the Kumaraguru et al.'s study 
The results of the user study that conducted to evaluate the embedded training email 
system shows that both training interventions (screenshot and comic strips) helped in 
teaching people about Phishing and how to avoid email-related Phishing attacks. Comic 
strip intervention was the most effective intervention. The training interventions were more 
effective than the current practice of sending online training materials to users. 
In August, 2008, the APWG and Carnegie Mellon CyLab launched the ''Phishing 
Education Landing Page Program" [PEI08]. The program's idea is simple. It redirects users 
who have clicked on links in Phishing email or otherwise to training materials that explains 
that they have just fallen for a Phishing attack and advises them on how they avoid it in the 
future. The goal of this program is to train users in online security at the "most teachable 
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moment" when they have just clicked on a link in a Phishing communication. The project 
authorities encourages 'all brand owners to approve this process, all takedown providers to 
request the use of this redirect scheme, and all ISPs, registrars, registries, etc. to redirect to 
this page instead of serving an error page'. 
The Phishing Education Landing Page Program works as follows: as part of the process 
for shutting down a Phishing website, the project authorities ask ISPs, registrars, and 
persons who have control of the Phishing page to take the following steps: 
• Check whether the brand being attacked has approved having the Phishing website 
URLs re-used to redirect their users (who have fallen) to training page (i.e. a webpage to 
educate users about Phishing). 
• I f the redirection has been approved, instead of showing an error page when a user 
arrives at the URL, redirect them to the APWG/CMU Phishing Education Landing Page 
(See Figure 17). 
W A R N I N G ! 
How t o Help Protect Yourself 
Figure 17: The APWG/CMU Phishing Education Landing Page |PEI081 
41 
Chapter 3: Phishing 
An online game (See Figure 18) was proposed in order to teach users good habits to help 
them avoid Phishing attacks [Sheng et al.07]. Sheng et al. described the story of the game as 
'the main character of the game is Phil, a young fish living in the Interweb Bay. Phil wants 
to eat worms so he can grow up to be a big fish, but has to be careful ofphishers that try to 
trick him with fake worms (representing Phishing attacks)'. 
The game was designed and evaluated through a user study. They included participants 
who are considered as 'non-experts' in terms of computer technical ability. They used the 
same criteria used in other Phishing experiments [Downs et al.06, Kumaraguru et al.07a, 
Kumaraguru et al.OVb]. There were three groups. There were 14 participants in each group 
for a total of 42 participants. Each participant was given the scenario that they have received 
an email that asks them to click on one of its links. Then, they imagine that they clicked on 
the link to see i f it is a legitimate website or a Phishing one. After that, participants were 
presented with ten websites and were asked to decide whether a website was legitimate or 
Phishing. Participants also were asked to tell how confident they were in their decisions (on 
a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means not confident at all, and 5 means very confident). Then, 
participants in each group were given 15 minutes to complete one anti-Phishing training 
task (playing the game, reading an anti-Phishing tutorial created based on the game, or 
reading existing online training materials). Finally, the same as the part before the training, 
participants were presented with ten more websites to decide on. The study revealed that the 
participants who played the game were better in identifying Phishing websites compared to 
other conditions' participants. 
R O U N D •% 
Figure 18: Anti-Phishing training game screen 
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Some training media using a comic-book format for online fraud have been developed 
[JakobssonOV]. As illustrated on Figure 19, the comic-book format approach shows some 
common risks and the users' thoughts about them as well as some advices. 
— 
H E V I v o u S i n 
W K * T V O W rrasT>»uj i i 
Ot« ^K>OC'C»0 • 
fsooTi^o *TuFT r o o o e s i o c T M F 
Figure 19: Comic-book format for anti-fraud end-user education |Jakobsson07| 
3. 7.2.3. Anti-Phishing Knowledge Retention 
Previous study tested users immediately after training. Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru 
et al.OVa] designed and showed that embedded training improved users' ability to identify 
Phishing emails [Kumaraguru et al.OVc]. Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru et al.07c] tested 
users to find out how well they retained knowledge that was received through embedded 
training and how well they transferred this knowledge to detect other types o f Phishing 
emails. They recruited people who did not know what Phishing was. Participants were not 
told that the study is a Phishing study. There were 42 participants and they had been 
randomly assigned to one of three groups: an "embedded" group in which participants were 
presented the training material when they clicked on links in the Phishing emails, "non-
embedded" group in which participants were shown training materials in an email message 
and "control" group did not receive training materials but received an email from a friend. 
The study was carried out in two sessions separated by at least 7 days (mean = 7.2). 
They found that (a) participants learned more when the training materials were presented 
after they clicked links on Phishing email (embedded training) than when the training 
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materials were sent by email (non-embedded training); (b) participants retained more 
knowledge when trained with embedded training than when trained with non-embedded 
training; (c) participants transferred more knowledge about how to avoid Phishing emails 
when trained with embedded training rather than when trained with non-embedded training. 
3.8. Discussion 
In this section, limitations of anti-Phishing approaches are discussed. Table 5 shows a 
summary of the approaches and their limitation. 
Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru et al.07b] evaluated the effectiveness of 24 existing 
online training materials that teach people how to protect themselves from Phishing attacks. 
They found that 'these training materials are surprisingly effective when users actually read 
them'. Their participants spent approximately 15 minutes reading anti-Phishing training 
materials and then showed good improvements in their ability to identify Phishing websites 
when compared to a control group. However, this research did not consider the effectiveness 
of the users' tips themselves. It did not examine the effectiveness of each individual tip. 
Therefore, there is need to examine the effectiveness of the most common users' tips for 
detecting and preventing Phishing websites individually. The effectiveness o f each 
individual tip wi l l be assessed and then the tip wi l l be ranked accordingly. The aim is to 
identify the most effective anti-Phishing tips that users can focus on to detect and prevent 
Phishing attacks by themselves. 
There have been technical (e.g. toolbars) and training (e.g. tips) approaches to mitigate 
Phishing. Regarding the training approaches, users usually need to open new web browsers 
and access online training material to read. Then they go back to their online activity 
browser to proceed. This scenario happens in the case that users know that there are attacks 
called Phishing and there are training materials that help in preventing them. Therefore, i f 
the users know nothing about Phishing and anti-Phishing training materials, they are 
unlikely to access the training materials provided. People do not read anti-Phishing online 
training materials although they are surprisingly effective when users read them 
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[Kumaraguru et al.07b]. Moreover, an online game was proposed in order to teach users 
good habits to help them avoid Phishing attacks [Sheng et al.07]. The game presents anti-
Phishing information in an enjoyable way. However, the disadvantage of this approach is 
the same as the online training materials. Users must have an idea about Phishing in advance 
in order to access and play the game. Also, there are anti-Phishing training courses such as 
IQ tests and class assessments [RobilaRagucci06]. The courses explain to users what 
Phishing attacks are and how to prevent them. The disadvantage of the courses' approach is 
that typically people are unlikely to attend them. 
Many commercial institutions, such as Microsoft [Microsoftb], provide a service that 
periodically sends anti-Phishing emails that warn people from Phishing emails and websites. 
The emails provide tips for people to help them detecting Phishing emails websites. 
However, only subscribed customers can receive these emails. 
Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru et al.07a] considered training people about Phishing 
email during their normal use of email. Their aim was to teach people what Phishing clues 
to look for located in emails to make better decisions in distinguishing Phishing emails. 
They found that email training approach works better than the current practice of publishing 
or sending anti-Phishing tips. However, Kumaraguru et al.'s approach does not consider 
teaching people with Phishing website-related tips. Phishing websites can be reached via 
various methods in addition to emails such as online advertisements and typing their web 
addresses in a web browser. Therefore, helping users on how to make correct decisions in 
distinguishing Phishing and legitimate websites during their normal use is required. 
Several approaches were evaluated using user experiments that involved participants who 
were recruited based on their technical abilities [Downs et al.06, Kumaraguru et al.07a, 
Kumaraguru et al.07b, Sheng et al.07]. Participants were classified into 'experts' and 'non-
experts' users based on pre-study screening questions. Technical ability was judged on 
whether the participants had changed preferences or settings in their web browser, created a 
web page, and helped someone f ix a computer problem. The participant who said 'no' to at 
least two o f the screening questions was selected to take part in their experiments. This 
technical ability assessment was used to recruit low technical people (they called them non-
experts) in the previous studies. Participants who were technically considered non-experts 
could know about Phishing and how to detect attacks before participating in the evaluation 
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experiments. Having participants with Phishing knowledge in advance may provide biased 
results in anti-Phishing approaches' evaluation experiments. This is because people who 
know about Phishing before participating in the evaluation experiments may use their prior 
knowledge rather than the anti-Phishing approaches that are being tested in the evaluation. 
Downs et al. [Downs et al.07] studied whether there are correlations between some web 
environment experiences and the susceptibility to Phishing. They found that people who 
correctly answered the knowledge question about the definition of Phishing (i.e. Phishing 
aware people) were significantly less likely to fall to detect Phishing emails. Low technical 
users (i.e. non-experts) may be Phishing aware and high technical users (i.e. experts) may be 
Phishing unaware. 
An investigation on the effects of technical ability and Phishing knowledge on Phishing 
websites' detection is required. This clarifies whether the previous screening questions for 
recruiting low technical users in evaluating anti-Phishing approaches are beneficial. The 
investigation assesses using Phishing knowledge in the screening questions to recruit 
participants. I f the results of the investigation show that (i) there is no effect for technical 
ability on Phishing detection and (ii) there is an effect for Phishing knowledge on Phishing 
websites detection, then there is need to make sure that the participants do not know about 
Phishing regardless of their technical ability level in evaluating the effectiveness of a new 
anti-Phishing approach. 
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each individual tip was not 
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1. The approach does not consider 
training people for detecting 
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2. Including non-experts without 
testing their Phishing knowledge 







Only subscribed customers can 
receive the emails. 
Table 5: Summary of anti-Phishing approaches and their limitations 
3.9. Summary 
This chapter described and considered Phishing attack. Its definition, clues and some 
examples were shown. Figures about its negative impact on the e-commerce and online 
banking sectors were described. The chapter reviewed the existing research in suitability to 
Phishing risks as well as existing approaches in detecting and preventing Phishing emails 
and websites. The chapter finished with a discussion on limitations of anti-Phishing 
approaches. 
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4. Training 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of training definition and methodologies. It also 
presents an overview about embedded training and discussion on its definition, advantage 
and examples. Retention o f knowledge obtained from training is discussed together with the 
facts that may affect the retention rate. 
4.2. Training Definition 
The term 'training' is defined as 'a planned process to modify attitude, knowledge or 
skill behavior through learning experience to achieve effective performance in an activity or 
range of activities. Its purpose, in the work situation, is to develop the abilities of the 
individual and to satisfy the current and future manpower needs of the organization' 
[KenneyReid86]. Harrison also defined training as a systematic process in which a person is 
helped to understand defined tasks or areas of skill and knowledge to pre-determined 
standards [Harrison88, p. 5]. 
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4.3. Training Methods 
Training, as a process, can be run through a number of methods. They are as follows 
[Coffield et al.04, ReadKleiner96, WilsonOO, ShuHsiu02]: 
1. Lecture. 
The trainees gather in a classroom and are given a lecture. The lecture is a traditional 
method of training and is the most used of all methods despite its limitations 
[WilsonOO]. The lecture alone is a poor training method unless it has good trainees' 
involvement and valuable feedback to them [ReadK]einer96]. A good possible way to 
have effective training through lectures is to stop the lecture periodically and ask the 
trainees to draw conclusions from the information presented. The conclusions should be 
related to the objectives of the training. 
There are assumptions that the lecturer relies on. One of them is that participants are 
motivated to learn. Another assumption is that that the lecturer can have the attention of 
the majority of the trainees [WilsonOO]. 
2. Training Manual. 
This method involves reading reference material. The material should relate to the topic 
being studied. Training manuals may include self-assessment questions, progress tests or 
summaries [WilsonOO]. 
3. Case Studies. 
A case study can bring strong realism into the training process. Usually, a case study 
includes the description of a real problem and leaves the solution of the problem to be 
developed by the trainees. The problem description may involve the facts needed to 
create a solution [ReadKleiner96]. 
4. Cooperative (group) training. 
Basically, group training is a method of collaborative learning. Generally, collaborative 
learning can help trainees to make progress by the activities in which they engage. I f the 
trainees have opportunities to interact with their instructors and other trainees about the 
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instruction or content, then they have opportunities to build their own knowledge. 
Trainees also can share their own knowledge with others [ShuHsiu02]. 
5. Brainstorming. 
Small groups try to create new ideas and attempt to answer a problem. They usually use 
a blackboard or whiteboard. A l l ideas or solutions for problems should be noted whether 
they are useful or not useful. Groups' members train to think differently. They also 
increase confidence in generating ideas. The brainstorming method helps to generate 
creative ideas under informal conditions [WilsonOO]. 
6. Probkm-solving training. 
Trainees need to go through steps to perform this method. They need to define a 
problem. Then, they need to generate data about the problem. After that, trainees need to 
generate ideas or other courses of action to solve the problem. The three steps can be all 
done using brainstorming. Then, they need to choose a solution by voting or ranking 
(with or without criteria). Finally, the trainees are required to implement the solution or 
decision voted or ranked in the last step [WilsonOO]. 
7. Demonstration. 
Demonstration is effective training method because participants use all their senses. It 
brings alive whatever points the trainers are trying to make. Trainees can experience the 
idea or technique that they are trying to gain. There are guidelines, for trainers who 
consider applying the demonstration method, to achieve the most of it. They are careful 
preparation, explaining the purpose of the training, step-by-step demonstration and 
providing the opportunity for trainees to practice [HartCrisp91, p. 51 ] . 
8. Learning by experience 
Learning by experience (it is known as experiential learning) theory defines learning as 
'the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience. 
Knowledge results from the combination of grasping and transforming experience'' 
[Kolb84, p. 41]. The unique feature of experiential learning is that the experience of the 
learner is central place in all considerations of learning [Anderson et al.OO]. This 
experience may involve earlier events in the life of the learner, current life events, or 
those coming from the learner's participation in activities implemented by teachers 
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[ibid]. The development process of experiential learning is that learners analyze their 
experience by reflecting, evaluating and reconstructing it in order to draw meaning from 
it based on prior experience [ibid], 
9. Games. 
The use of games is popular. They usually involve competition between trainees as 
individuals or groups. Wilson [WilsonOO] states that 'games are an experiential learning 
activity governed by rules, entailing a competitive situation with winners and losers'. 
Furthermore, the use of simulation games, i.e. a reality-based game, is more widespread 
due to that they can make fun. People are highly motivated and more likely to participate 
in training when they have a good time. Games also are useful because they can deliver 
more than one idea at a time [ReadKleiner96, WilsonOO]. 
10. Simulation-based training. 
Simulation is defined as 'a false assumption or display, a surface resemblance or 
imitation, of something' [OED]. Simulation-based training makes the skills given by 
trainers more real to the trainees. Kozlowski et al.Ol [Kozlowski et al.OI] points out that 
"practice is central in simulation-based training, since having trainees practice the skills 
that are the target of training services serves the purpose of making the skills more 
"real" to the trainees, rather than leaving them in the abstract, lecture-based domain'. 
Simulation-based training provides a good opportunity for trainees to be involved in 
practical experience (by doing). Practice is an important factor that positively affects the 
training knowledge retention as discussed later in Section 4.6.2. 
11. Computer-based training. 
Computer-based training is classified into two groups. They are computer-assisted 
instruction and computer-managed instruction [ReadKleiner96]. Regarding computer-
assisted instruction, training takes place during an interaction between the trainee and 
the computer which acts as a tutor. The computer asks questions and the trainee 
responds to them by typing on the keyboard. Then, the information is presented via the 
monitor. The disadvantage of computer-assisted instruction is that it is time-consuming 
because each trainee needs one computer. 
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With regards to computer-managed instruction, the training takes place off-line. The 
computer allocates each trainee different personalized instruction modules that are 
completed away from the computer. After completion, the computer evaluates the 
trainees and dives recommendations in the areas of weakness, and gives additional tasks 
i f needed. The advantage of managed instruction is that trainees spend less time online 
so a single terminal may be used by many trainees. This can significantly reduce the cost 
of the training programme [ReadKleiner96]. 
12. One-on-one instruction. 
One-on-one instruction is classified into two methods. They are on-the-job training and 
off-the-job training. On-the-Job training is any training that occurs while the trainee is 
actually working. The trainee is doing work in the real work environment under normal 
working conditions. On-the-Job training ensures that skills achieved from training can 
be transferred to the job. The other method is off-the-job. It refers to any training that is 
performed away from the trainee's work area [ReadKleiner96]. 
13. Role Plays. 
Role playing training implies that the trainees act and plays certain roles in the context 
of a situation that is applicable to the training objectives. Role playing also provides a 
good opportunity for trainees to be involved in practical experience (doing). It is very 
useful in gaining insight into the feelings and viewpoints of others. Role play is limited 
to training situations in which mistakes are treated with tolerance by both the trainer and 
trainees. This is to make sure that reinforcement is mostly positive [ReadKleiner96]. 
Role play method is an active version o f the case study method and is designed to 
represent the real world [WilsonOO]. 
14. Training through practice. 
This method means any training that is performed and acquired through practice. 
Knowledge and skills are strengthened through practice (by doing) [Anderson93]. 
These training methods are common and being used in many areas of skill. No single 
training method is better to all others. When possible, it is best to pick a method that 
satisfies two important activities. They are as follows: 
• Encouraging active participation by the trainee and 
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• Providing adequate feedback [ReadKleiner96]. The descriptive feedback should deHver 
to the trainee what behaviors they did or did not do, what facts or concepts they did or 
did not learn and what results they did or did not achieve [Kozlowski et al.Ol]. 
This increases the likelihood that what is given in training wi l l be later retained and 
applied. Trainees w i l l also retain more and be more will ing to learn i f training is followed 
by positive reinforcement such as praising the trainee and the trainee's internal sense of 
satisfaction that comes f rom learning something new [ReadKleiner96]. 
4.4. Embedded Training 
In this section, the embedded training concept is presented. The section discusses the 
definition of embedded training, the advantage of applying embedded training and an 
existing example of applying embedded training. 
4.4.1. Definition 
Embedded training is a training that has the ability to train a task or a skill using the 
associated operational system including software and machines that people normally use 
[Kirkley et al.03]. When using embedded training, training is not a separate activity but it is 
an ongoing activity that is an integral part of the workplace and its system [Kozlowski et 
al.Ol]. 
4.4.2. Advantage of Embedded Training 
When training materials incorporate the context of the real world, work, or testing 
situation, training wi l l be most effective [Anderson et al.96]. Kozlowski et al. point out that 
many skills and basic knowledge can be acquired in conventional training environments (i.e. 
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classrooms). However, they can be fully developed and refined in the actual performance 
environment or very close approximation to it (by practice or doing) [Kozlowski et al.Ol]. 
This means that training systems must either (a) push training toward long-term exposure of 
integrated teams to a multiplicity of task situations in high fidelity and ful l mission 
simulation or (b) move more training to the performance context to improve acquisition to 
key skills and tasks which also can be integrated with suitable instructional support systems 
(i.e. embed training in the workplace) [ibid]. This means that the training occurs in the 
trainee actual work. 
One of the positive factors that is involved in embedded training is practice. Kozlowski 
et al. [Kozlowski et al.Ol] states that 'within the training context, one of the most obvious 
tools available to trainers is practice'. Practice is an effective factor that is essential to some 
training methods such as training through practice as mentioned before. 
4.4.3. Examples of Applications that Used Embedded Training 
Embedded training has been widely used. Embedded training has been used in the 
training of military personnel on new Future Combating Systems (FCS) [Kirkley et al.03]. 
They developed an instructional methodology called problem-based embedded training 
(PBET). PBET enables designers to create simulated mixed and virtual reality tasks that are 
able to meet certain training objectives. To validate the methodology, they conducted a 
heuristic evaluation with five experts in the US military training and instructional design. 
They found that PBET matches training contexts as closely as possible with real world 
situations and scenarios and it supports training is just-in-time. 
Another example of the use of embedded training is the application of the Advanced 
Embedded Training System (AETS). AETS uses intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) 
technology to improving tactical training quality and reducing the need to human in training. 
AETS is used in one o f the USA's Navy's projects. Embedded training is a good choice for 
applying ITS because it allows the ITS to train in the actual work environment and 
eliminates the need to create workstations [Zachary et al.99]. 
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4.5. Effects on Training during Training Process 
The training process for each trainee, from the state of being untrained to the state of 
being trained, involves factors that can affect training. Figure 20 illustrates the factors that 
can affect the training. They simply are as follows [Getley78]: 
• The training method, 
• The training environment, 
• Individual ability to learn and 
• Individual motivation to learn. 
THE TRAINING PROCESS 
TRAINING • 
METHOD 
[ U N T R A I N E D 
I N D I V I D U A L 
INDIVIDUAL 
A a L I T Y 
T R A I N I N G 
E N V I R O N M E N T ! 
I N D I V I D U A L 
M O T I V A T I O N 
TO L E A R N 
TRAINED 
IhCrVIDUAL 
Figure 20: Factors that can affect training in the training process |Getley781 
4.6. Training Knowledge Retention 
In this section, the people's training icnowledge retention is discussed. Its definition and 
the interval factors that can affect, positively and negatively, training knowledge retention 
for individuals are presented. 
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4.6.1. Definition 
Skill retention can be described as the transfer of skills f rom training to test 
[StothardNicholsonOl]. Retention is also defined as the ability of people to recall or retrieve 
the concepts and knowledge taught when they are evaluated under the same or similar 
situations after a period of time from the first time of knowledge acquisition [Merrienboer et 
al.97]. Any trained skill can be applied in situations that differ from the training 
environment, so trainee can be evaluated in using the skill beyond the original training 
environment [StothardNicholsonOl]. 
4.6.2. Retention Interval Factors 
There are factors that can affect people's knowledge retention. They are called 
'retention interval factors'. They all are important factors in knowledge retention rates. 
They are as follows [StothardNicholsonOl]: 
1. Time interval 
One of the factors is the time interval between training and practice. Therefore, the 
longer the time between training and practice, the greater skill loss that people can have. 
2. Opportunity to practice 
The chance to practice the skill or task would, clearly, reduce the rate of skill loss over 
time. Therefore, training systems that use the methodology training by practice (by 
doing) have the ability to reduce skill loss over time. 
3. Individual factors 
There are personal factors that also may affect the knowledge retention. One of theses 
factors is the motivation that individuals have to train in the first place. Another possible 
factor is personal ability to retrieve information. There differences in people's ability to 
use their skills beyond the training environment. 
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4.7. Summary 
This chapter has shown issues in training. Training definition and methods were 
presented. Then, the chapter discussed embedded training and its definition, advantage and 
examples. Additionally, people's retention of the knowledge obtained from training and the 
factors was discussed. It was also shown that the knowledge retention rate can be affected 
by three factors; time gap between training and knowledge retention, practicing the 
knowledge obtained from training and personal differences between people such as ability 
to remember and motivation to be trained. 
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5. Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of two issues; the experimental designs and statistical 
analysis. It discusses the experimental design definition and terminologies. It also shows 
translating the research question to a hypothesis, the steps to performing an experiment, and 
the steps to test a hypothesis. The chapter shows an overview of common statistical analysis 
methods. 
5.2. Experimental Design 
5.2.2. Definition of Experimental Design 
In order to define the term 'experimental design', the meaning o f 'experiment' needs to 
be understood. An experiment is 'a test or series of tests in which purposeful changes are 
made to the input variables of a process or system so that we may observe and identify' the 
reasons for changes that may be observed in the output response' [Santner et al.03, p. 1]. 
Whereas, the experimental design is defined as 'a complete plan for applying differing 
experimental conditions to your experimental subjects so that you can determine how the 
conditions affect the behavior or result of some activity' [Pfleeger95]. 
58 
Chapter 5: Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis 
5.2.2. The Experiment Terminology 
There are formal terms that describe the experiment components. Pfleeger and Mason et 
al. [Pfleeger95, Mason et al.03] define the important ones. These are as follows: 
• Treatment is the new method or tool the experimenter wishes to evaluate (compared 
with an existing or different method or tool). 
• Trial is an individual test in an experiment. Only one treatment is used in any run of an 
individual test. 
• The experiment is formally described as the set o f trials. 
• The experimental objects or experimental units are defined as the objects to which the 
treatment is applied. 
• Population involves all possible items that have one or more common characteristics 
under specific experimental conditions [Mason et al.03, p. 10]. 
• A Sample is a set of data taken from a population [Mason et al.03, p. 13]. 
• Experimental subjects are those people who are applying the treatment. 
• A control object is described as an object not using the treatment when the 
experimenter is comparing using the treatment to not using it. The control provides 
information that enables to make comparisons. 
• The response variables (also known as dependent variables) are those variables that 
are the results or outcome of an experiment [Mason et al.03, p. 12]. 
• Whereas, state variables (also known independent variables) are those variables that 
may influence the application of a treatment and then influence the result of the 
experiment indirectly. For example, state variables describe characteristics of the 
developers or the processes used to produce a piece of software code. 
• A factor is known as an independent variable in the experimental design. The dependent 
variable may change as one or more of the independent variables changes [Mason et 
al,03,p. 12], 
• An experimental error is defined as the failure of two identically treated experimental 
objects to yield identical results. The error can be as a result of problems such as errors 
o f experimentation, errors of observation, errors o f measurement or the variation in 
experimental resources. 
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5.2.3. Steps to Performing Experiments 
Having meaningful and useful results from an experiment requires a careful planning 
[Pfleeger95]. An overview o f the planning needed and the steps to conducting an 
experiment wi l l be considered. 
Pfleeger [Pfleeger95] provides an outline of the recommended procedures that lead to a 
good design of an experiment. They are as follows: 
1. Conception 
The first step is to define the goals of the experiment. The goals should be considered as 
research questions that need to be answered. Then, the next procedure is to plan an 
experiment that wi l l provide the answers. 
2. Design 
This step includes selection of the response variable, choice of factors and their levels. 
Additionally, experimenters try to design the experiment so that the effects of irrelevant 
variables are distributed equally across all the experimental conditions. Realistically, this 
strategy is better than allowing the irrelevant variables to affect the results of a particular 
condition. Therefore, there are principles that help to reduce experimental error by giving 
guidance on forming experimental units. They are replication, randomization and blocking 
[Santner et al.03]. Replication is described as examining the response variables multiple 
times at the same set of inputs. It allows the experimenter to directly estimate the magnitude 
and distribution of experimental error. However, blocking means running the experiment in 
relatively homogeneous sets called blocks. The blocking allows observing the relation 
between the response variables and the inputs within blocks. Because of the homogeneity 
within a block, experimental error is less within a block than between blocks and then the 
effects of the inputs is more easily observed. Randomization is the process of the random 
allocation of subjects to groups or of treatments to experimental units. This helps the 
experimenter to explore how the response variables vary as the inputs vary. 
Pfleeger [Pfleeger95] classifies the blocking principle under a wider one called 'local 
control'. Local control indicates how much control the experimenter has over the placement 
and the organization of subjects in experimental units. Local control has two characteristics 
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of the design: blocking and balancing the units. Balancing is defined as making sure that 
an equal number o f subjects is assigned to each treatment wherever possible. Balancing is 
not necessary. However, it simplifies the statistical analysis. 
3. Preparation 
This step includes readying the subjects for the experiment. The experiment's 
instructions must be clear and written properly. Also, it is recommended and useful 
procedure that a run of the experiment on a small set of people (pilot) is performed. This is 
to ensure that the design is complete and the instructions are clear. 
4. Execution 
After preparing for the experiment, it can be carried out. The steps provided in the plan 
should be followed and the treatment to the experimental subjects should be consistently 
applied so that comparison of results is sensible. 
5. Analysis 
This phase involves analysis of the sets of data based on statistical principles. The 
statistical analysis gives an answer to the original research question addressed in the 
beginning. 
6. Dissemination and decision-making 
At the end of the analysis step, conclusions about how the different inputs affected the 
outcome wi l l be reached. A l l the aspects involved in the experiment should be documented. 
This means that the goals, the hypothesis, the experimental subjects and objects, the 
treatments, the response and state variables, and the results should be carefully documented. 
Also, documenting both methods and conclusions in a way that wi l l allow the research field 
people to duplicate your experiment and then confirm your conclusions in a similar setting. 
Montgomery [MontgomeryOS] also stated some steps for obtaining a good performance 
of experiments. They seem to be similar to Pfleeger's but with different divisions. They are 
as follows: 
1. Recognition of and statement of the problem (Conception). 
2. Selection of the response variable (Design). 
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3. Choice of factors, levels and ranges (Design). 
4. Choice of experimental design (Design). 
5. Performing the experiment (Execution). 
6. Statistical analysis of the data (Analysis). 
7. Conclusions and recommendations (Dissemination and decision-making). 
The first three steps are pre-experimental ones. The second and the third steps are often 
done simultaneously or in reverse order. 
5.2.4. Translating the Research Goal to a Hypothesis 
When a research question is clearly stated, it must be translated into a formal hypothesis. 
There are two kinds of hypotheses. They are the null hypothesis and the experimental (or 
known as alternative) hypothesis [Mason et al.03, p. 52]. 
The null hypothesis is the one that assumes that there is no difference between two 
treatments with regards to the dependent variable the experimenter is measuring. In contrast, 
the experimental hypothesis believes that there is a significant difference between the two 
treatments. The null hypothesis is assumed to be true unless the data indicates otherwise. 
Thus, 'testing the hypothesis' means examining whether the data is convincing enough to 
reject the null hypothesis and accept the experimental as true [Pfieeger95]. Therefore, in 
order to answer the research question, the hypothesis needs to be tested. 
5.2.5. Hypothesis Testing 
Mason et al. summarizes the steps to test a hypothesis into four basic steps [Mason et 
al.03, p. 77]. They are as follows: 
1. State the null and alternative hypotheses. 
2. Collect a sample and work out the appropriate test statistic. 
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3. Compare the significance probability of the test statistic to the significance level 
selected for the test. 
4. Draw the appropriate conclusion and interpret the results. 
5.3. Analysis 
Having collected data from the experiments, the analysis of the data wi l l be presented in 
this section. An overview of different statistical analysis methods wi l l be presented. This 
section discusses also a way to choose the appropriate analysis methods for different 
experimental designs. 
5.3.1, Choosing Statistical Analysis Methods 
In this section, choosing the suitable statistical analysis method for the evaluation 
experiments is presented. There wil l be some points need to be taken in consideration in 
order to decide what the appropriate method that suits the experiment data. 
Pfieeger [Pfleeger95] has given three major points to consider when choosing the 
analysis methods. They are the nature of the collect data collected (distribution of data), the 
type of experimental design used (design considerations) and the aim of carrying out the 
experiments. Each one of them is considered in turn. 
» Distribution of Data 
It is essential to understand that the data are a sample from a larger population. After 
that, the relatively small sample might be generalized to larger population. Many statistical 
methods assume that the data is normally distributed, and the sample is randomly taken 
from larger distribution [Pfleeger95]. 
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• Design Considerations 
Pfleeger [Pfleeger95] states that Uhe experimental design must be considered in 
choosing the analysis techniques. At the same time, the complexity of analysis can influence 
the design chosen'. For example, multiple groups usually need to use the analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) method, whereas a simple t-test can be used with two groups. 
• Purpose of the Experiment 
The goal o f the experiment plays an important role in choosing the suitable statistical 
analysis method. There are four major objectives to conduct a formal experiment 
[Pfleeger95]. They are as follows: 
A. Confirming a tlieory 
The experiments often exist to evaluate a theory. For example, an experiment hypothesis 
believes that the use of a certain technique (the treatment) has an effect on the experimental 
subjects, making it better than another treatment (usually the existing technique). 
I f the data is taken from a normal distribution and there are two groups to be compared 
to each other, the t-test can be used to analyze the effects of the two treatments. I f there are 
more than two groups to compare, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, using the F 
statistic, is appropriate. In contrast, i f the data is taken from a non-normal distribution, the 
Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests are used for comparing two groups and 
Kruskal-Wallis is suitable to be used for comparing more than two groups [FieldOS, p. 521]. 
B. Exploring a relationship 
Some experiments are conducted to determine the relationship among data that describes 
one variable or across many variables. For example, knowing the normal ranges of 
productivity or quality on many projects, so there is a baseline to compare for the future. 
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In the case of having an experiment to explore a relationship, there are three techniques 
can be used: box plots, scatter diagrams, and correlation analysis. A box plot can describe a 
summary of the range of a set of data about one variable. It shows where most of the data is 
gathered. Regarding the scatter diagram, it describes the relationship between two variables. 
The analyzer can visually determine the likelihood of an underlying relationship between 
the variables. Finally, the correlation analysis uses statistical methods to validate whether 
there is a real relationship between two attributes. 
C . Evaluating the accuracy of a model 
In many software engineering projects, a model of behavior is used to predict what 
should occur. Although the purpose of the experiment is different from confirming a theory, 
the analysis methods are the same. Consequently, the methods mentioned in confirming a 
theory purpose can be used as well. This is because the prediction model generates a 
predicted date set which then can be compared with real data. 
D. Validating a measure 
Verifying the measure that captures the attribute it claims to reflect can be a purpose of 
an experiment. Exploring the relationship purpose can be used in the experiments are often 
designed to validate a measure. This happens when exploring the relationship between the 
measure and data that is recognized to be correlated with the attribute. Due to this reason, 
the analysis methods in 'exploring a relationship' purpose are suitable ones for 'validating a 
measure' purpose. 
5.3.2. An Overview of Common Statistical Analysis Methods 
Having shown a way of choosing the suitable method, this section presents the common 
statistical analysis methods. There are different tests based upon the ways of data collection 
in each test and the number o f samples. They are [Urdan05, pp. 89-90 & p. 309]: 
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5.3.2.1. Tests for Two Independent Samples 
When there are two experimental conditions and two different groups of subjects, each 
group is assigned to one condition (See Figure 21). 
Figure 21: Two independent samples 
The tests for two independent samples are different based on data type; parametric and 
non-parametric. 
• Parametric Tests 
A l l parametric tests are based on normal distribution. They are reliable under 
assumptions. These assumptions are [Field05, p. 64]: 
• Data is extracted from normally distributed population, 
• The dependent variable is measured on an interval scale at least. 
I f the test is used to test different groups of people, two assumptions are added [Field05, p. 
287]. They are as follows: 
• In each experimental group, the variances are roughly equal, 
• Data from different participants are independent. This means the behavior of one 
participant does not influence the behavior of another participant. 
When a comparison between two means collected from two different groups of subjects 
taken from a normal population is required, a statistical method called 'Independent t-test' is 
used [Urdan05, p. 299]. 
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• Non-Parametric Tests 
There is another type of tests called non-parametric tests [SprentOO, p. 3]. They are also 
referred to as distribution-free tests because they do not make assumption about population 
distribution [KinnearGray04, p. 9]. Therefore, the non-parametric tests are used when the 
data distribution is assumed non-normal. 
When there are two means from two different groups of subjects taken from non-normal 
population, a statistical method called 'Mann-Whitney test' is used [KinnearGray04, p. 9]. 
Mann-Whitney test is the nonparametric equivalent for 'independent t-test' [ibid]. 
5.3.2.2. Tests for Two Dependent (Related) Samples 
When there are two experimental conditions and the same subjects take part in both 
conditions (See Figure 22), this is called dependant samples, matched-pairs or paired 
samples test. 
Croup Ono 
Figure 22: Two dependent samples 
As described with the two independent samples, the tests for two dependent samples are 
different based on data type; parametric and non-parametric. 
• Parametric Tests 
When there are two samples taken from the same subjects, a test called 'Paired samples 
t-test' is used [FieldOS, p. 286]. 
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• Non-Parametric Tests 
When there are two means from the same subjects taken from non-normal population, a 
statistical method called 'Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test' is used [Field05, p. 534]. The test is 
the nonparametric equivalent for 'Paired samples t-test' [ ibid]. 
5.3.2.3. Tests for Se vera] Independen t Samples 
In case of having more than two means or more than two groups of participants (e.g. 
three groups), different statistical tests are used based on data type; parametric and non-
parametric. 
• Parametric Tests 
A statistical analysis test called 'Analysis of Variance' (ANOVA) is used when there are 
more than two means taken from different groups of subjects taken from a normal 
population [Urdan05, p. 101]. There are different ANOVA designs. One design is the One-
way independent A N O V A which compares several means taken from different participants 
when there is one independent variable [ibid]. Another design is Factorial A N O V A which is 
used when there are two or more independent variables (the variables are known as factors) 
[Field05, pp. 389-390]. Therefore, there could be Two-way A N O V A which indicates that 
there are two independent variables or Three-way A N O V A when there are three 
independent variables and so forth [ibid]. 
• Non-Parametric Tests 
The nonparametric equivalent test for 'One-way independent A N O V A ' is called 
'Kruskal-Wallis test' [KinnearGray04, p. 219]. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test tells only 
of a difference exists between the groups [Field05, pp. 549-550]. In order to see the 
difference between each group and another group, follow up tests (post hoc tests) are carried 
out using Mann-Whitney test between every two groups. Using many Mann-Whitney tests 
might provide inaccurate results. This can be resolved by using Bonferroni correction [ibid]. 
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Bonferroni correction means that instead of using .05 as a critical value of significant 
difference for each test, the value (.05) is divided by the number of tests carried out as post 
hoc tests [ibid]. For example, i f there are three groups need to be compared, there should be 
three Mann-Whitney tests to compare the groups with each other. Therefore, instead of 
using (.05) as the critical value of significance, (.05/3=.0167) is used. It is recommended not 
to use this follow up tests method in case there are many groups because the critical value 
wi l l be too small [ibid]. 
In all nonparametric tests mentioned (Mann-Whitney, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests), there were different significance methods that should be chosen 
depending on the sample size. I f the sample is large, methods called Asymptotic or Monte 
Carlo could be used. However, i f the sample is small, Exac test should be chosen in order to 
have accurate results [FieldOS, pp. 528,538,547] 
5.4. Summary 
This chapter presents an overview of two issues; the experimental designs and statistical 
analysis. It discusses the experimental design definition and experiment's terminologies. It 
also shows translating the research question to a hypothesis and then the steps to performing 
an experiment. Additionally, in this chapter, the way to choose one of various possible 
statistical methods to use is presented. Finally, an overview of parametric and non-
parametric statistical methods used is given. 
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6. An Evaluation of Users' Tips Effectiveness for Phishing 
Websites Detection 
6.1. Introduction 
Recently, Phishing attacks have become a serious problem for end-users, online banking 
and e-commerce websites. Many anti-Phishing approaches have been proposed to detect and 
prevent Phishing. The most basic approach is publishing guidelines for the Internet users to 
follow when they go online. Theses guidelines are referred as users' tips in this thesis. The 
anti-Phishing tips are published by many governmental and private organizations. A l l the 
information used in the training approaches is based on the users' tips. There are many 
different tips. This chapter examines the effectiveness of most common users' tips for 
detecting Phishing websites. In this chapter, a novel effectiveness criteria is proposed and 
used to examine each single tip and rank it based on its effectiveness score. The chapter tries 
to find fewer anti-Phishing tips that users can focus on to detect Phishing attacks by 
themselves. 
Chapter 3 already reviewed the literature with related to this chapter (Sections 3.3 and 
3.7). The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The chapter describes the 
research methodology and then the results. Then, the final section concludes the chapter 
with a discussion of the findings. 
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6.2. Research Methodology 
Users' anti-Phishing tips for Phishing websites wi l l be examined based on evaluation 
criteria that consist of four criterions. These criteria are called 'Effectiveness Criteria'. 
This methodology is described by three sections. They are as follows: 
6.2.1. Collection of Anti-Phishing Tips Sample for Phishing Websites 
The anti-Phishing tips are collected in two steps as follows: 
6.2. J. J. Survey of Online Fraud Tips 
A survey of online fraud tips was carried out. The survey was for both businesses' 
and users' tips published by government organizations, banks, financial organizations 
and e-commerce websites. The online fraud tips were for all types of online fraud. The 
online fraud tips resulting from this survey was 491 different tips. Figure 23 shows the 












0 # Tips provides 
Figure 23: The sources of the online fraud tips 
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6.2.1.2. Extracting the AntrPhisbing Tips 
The anti-Phishing tips are extracted from the online fraud tips that are related to 
users and for Phishing websites. This step consists of three phases: 
a. Extracting from the online fraud tips' survey the tips that are related to users. 
The number of tips resulted from this phase was 290. 
b. Extracting from the users' online fraud tips that are resulted from phase (a) the 
tips that are related to Phishing attacks. The Phishing emails' and websites' tips 
extracted from this phase were 57. 
c. Extracting from anti-Phishing tips resulted from phase (b) that are applicable to 
Phishing websites. The anti-Phishing tips for websites was 21. Therefore, the 
effectiveness evaluation is on these 21 tips. 
6.2.2. Effectiveness Criteria 
The effectiveness criteria are as follows: 
1. The tip detects the most common clue. This requires analysis of Phishing 
scenarios to find out the most common Phishing clues appear in the scenarios. 
2. Solo reliability. This criterion means that the evaluated tip is enough to detect 
and prevent Phishing attack. 
3. The clue cannot be spoofed [Cranor et al.06b]. In other words, the evaluated tip 
cannot be changed or faked by a fraudster. 
4. The tip does not produce false positives (FP) or false negatives (FN). This means 
that by using the tips, the decision made w i l l not be FN or FP. There are four 
types of decisions regarding any website legitimacy. They are, as shown in Table 
6, True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) and False 
Negative (FN). 
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Positive TP FP 
Negative TN FJ\ 
Table 6: The possible decisions could be made regarding websites' legitimacy 
In order to understand the four types o f decisions, they are defined as follows; 
" True Positive (TP): The TP case happens when a legitimate website is considered 
as legitimate. 
• True Negative (TN): The T N case happens when a Phishing website is considered 
as Phishing. 
• False Positive (FP): The FP case happens when a legitimate website is considered 
as Phishing. 
• False Negative (FN): The FN case happens when a Phishing website is considered 
as legitimate. 
These criteria are then given weights as shown in Table 7. The effectiveness weight for 
the criteria is divided into four equal quarters. This means that each criterion has 0.25 of the 
weight. 
# Criterion Score(out o f l ) 
1 The tip prevents the most common clue 0.25 
2 Solo reliability 0.25 
3 The clue, addressed by the tip, cannot be spoofed 0.25 
4 The tip does not possibly produce FP or FN 0.25 
Table 7: The effectiveness criteria and their scores 
After evaluating each single tip against each single criterion and finding out whether or 
not it satisfies the criterion, the tip effectiveness can be calculated using the following 
'Effectiveness Metric' EM: 
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i = l 
where EM(T) is the effectiveness metric of the tip T, . is the weight of criterion I and 
C I is 1 i f criterion I is relevant or 0 i f criterion I is not relevant or not applicable. 
Therefore, the tip with the most effectiveness score wi l l be first in the effectiveness 
ranking and the second effective tip should be the second and so on. In the case where two 
or more tips have the same effectiveness score, the tip with the most percentage of clue 
appearance in Phishing scenarios analysis should come first and so on. This is referred as 
'Ranking Role\ 
6.2.3. Applying the Effectiveness Criteria 
Applying the effectiveness criteria to each individual tip requires having the common 
Phishing clues appear in Phishing scenarios. Therefore, an analysis of Phishing scenarios is 
carried out. 
6.2.3.1. Phishing Scenario Analysis 
An analysis of 42 real Phishing scenarios presented in the APWG's archive 
[APWGOTc] was carried out. The scenarios analyzed were the latest scenarios that were 
added to the archive by APWG experts. The scenarios were described and explained in 
details in the archive. Figure 24 illustrates an example of a Phishing scenario. 
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Figure 24: An example of Phishing scenario described in APWG archive 
The purpose of analyzing the scenarios is to find the most common Phishing clues that 
appear in the scenarios. In other words, what are the Phishing 'indicators' that appear most 
in Phishing scenarios? 
In the analysis, each clue that appears in a Phishing scenario is counted. One clue could 
appear in many Phishing scenarios and one Phishing scenarios could have more than one 
clue. This is illustrated in Figure 25. 
# Scenario # Phishing clues 
1 Www.secunly-ebay corn 1 S I R I . 
2 Wivw example.conVhsbc, DO uk 2 H I rPSPruAlM 
3 V\W'.paypa1.oom 3 Si KI.-VddBar 
# Phishing clues 
1 Sim. 
Figure 25: Example of extracting Phishing clues from scenarios 
Table 8 presents the clues that appear most in the Phishing scenarios. Table 9 shows the 
meanings of the abbreviations used for the clues. 
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Clue No. of Appearances % of Appearance 
SURL 42 100.00 
LockStBarAbs 38 90.48 
HTTPSProAbs 31 73.81 
SURL-AddBar 30 71.43 
AddBarNotVisible 3 7.14 
HTMLError 1 2.38 
StatBarDisabled 1 2.38 
Table 8: Clues that appear in the Phishing scenarios 
Abbreviation Description 
SURL Suspicious URL for the web page 
LockStBarAbs Absence of a 'lock' icon in the status bar 
HTTPSProAbs Absence of the https protocol in the address bar 
SURL-AddBar Suspicious URL in the address bar 
AddBarNotVisible Address bar is not visible. 
HTMLError HTML errors in rendering the page 
StatBarDisabled Status bar is disabled. 
Table 9: Clue abbreviations 
The analysis of the Phishing clues identified that there were 7 major clues. Table 9 
presents these clues. Only 2 of these clues {SURL and HTTPSProAbs) were the same as 
these identified by Chou et al and discussed in Section 3.3 in Chapter 3. Thus, few new 
clues were identified and replaced those of Chou et al. 
As Table 8 shows, the clue SURL 'suspicious URL for the web page' appeared in all the 
42 Phishing scenarios. Furthermore, the clue SURL-AddBar 'suspicious URL in the address 
bar' appeared in approximately 90% of the scenarios. In contrast, clues such as HTMLError 
' H T M L errors in rendering the web page' and StatBarDisabled 'status bar is disabled' have 
the least appearances. Each clue appeared once in the scenarios. 
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6.3. Results 
# Tip Criteria 
1 2 3 4 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 TE T R 
/ 
Type in your browser the address 
of the website you intend to go or 
use a bookmark that you 
previously created. 
N Y NA Y 0.5 2 
2 
Make sure you are on a secure 
connection when entering 
sensitive information. Secure 
Web pages will have the text 
https: instead of http: 
Y 
(73.8) 
N N N 0.25 5 
3 
Do not be fooled by a padlock 
that appears on the web page 
itself It's easy for conmen to 
copy the image of a padlock. 
Look for one that is in the 
window frame of the browser. 
N N N N 0 >6 
4 
Look beyond the logo and do not 
give out your information before 
you check the privacy and 
security seals. Scammers often 
include actual logos and images 
of legitimate companies. 
N Y Y N 0.5 ~2 
5 
A fake website's address is 
different from what you are used 
to, perhaps there are extra 
characters or words in it or it 
uses a completely different name 
or no name at all, just numbers. 
Check the address in your 
browser's address bar after you 
arrive at a website. 
Y(71.4) N N N 0.25 6 
6 
Even though you are asked to 
enter private information there is 
NO padlock in the browser 
window or 'https://' at the 
beginning of the web address to 
signify that it is using a secure 
link and that the website is what 
it says it is. 
Y (90.4) N N N 0.25 4 
7 
A fake website may have this 
characteristic: The website's 
address is different from what 
you arc used to, perhaps there are 
extra characters or words in it or 
it uses a completely different 
name or no name at all, just 
numbers. Check the True U R L . 
The true U R L of the website can 
be seen in the page 'Properties'. 
Y(IOO) Y Y N 0.75 1 
Table 10: Results of tips effectiveness 
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As a result of the applying the effectiveness criteria, there are different tips effectiveness 
TE scores and different tips ranking TR accordingly. Table 10 presents the results of the 
first seven ranked tips (all 21 tips are presented in Appendix A) . 
In order to clarify how Table 10 was constructed, an example of one item from the table 
is shown. The example explains the construction of item 2. The tip representing item 2 in 
Table 10 is 'make sure you are on a secure connection when entering sensitive information. 
Secure Web pages will have the text https: instead of http:\ This tip is examined against 
every criterion from the 'Effectiveness Criteria' shown in Table 7. As Table 10 presents, 
each criterion has a weight of 0.25. As explained earlier in Section 6.2.2, i f a tip satisfies a 
criterion then the weight is multiplied with 1 whereas the weight is multiplied with 0 i f the 
tip does not satisfy the criterion or is not applicable. Thus, when tip 2 examined against each 
criterion, the tip effectiveness TE score was constructed using the effectiveness metric (See 
Section 6.2.2) as follows: 
EM{2) = 0.25 X1 + 0.25 x 0 + 0.25 x 0 + 0.25 x 0 
EM{2)=0.25 
After this calculation, the tip with the most effectiveness score became first in the 
effectiveness ranking and the second effective tip became the second and so on. Thus, tip 2 
was ranked as fifth according to the tip effectiveness score TE. 
Regarding the results, there is no tip that satisfies all the criterions defined. The most 
effective tip is tip number 7. It has met three out of four criterions. Its effectiveness score is 
0.75. Tips 1 and 4 come second in the ranking because they have the same score (0.50). 
The tips 2, 5 and 6 have the same score (0.25). However, they have different ranking. 
Their ranking is fifth, sixth and fourth respectively. This is because the 'Ranking Role' is 
used. The three tips have different clue appearance's percentages. As shown between 
brackets in criterion I in Table 10, the clue o f tip 6 appeared in 90.4% of Phishing scenarios 
whereas, tip 5 appeared in 73.8% and tip 6 appeared in 71.4%. 
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It is worth mentioning that the ranking of tips 1 and 4 has not been calculated in the 
same way as the ranking o f the tips 2, 5 and 6. This is because there are no clue 
appearance's percentages for tips 1 and 4. Therefore, the Ranking Role can not be ful ly 
applied. 
The tip 3 has the last ranking because its effectiveness score is zero. This is because it 
does not meet any o f the criterions. Its ranking is (>6). It is not given rank seven because all 
the rest of tips have the same ranking. 
6.4. Discussion 
There is no completely effective tip (with an effective score of 1). The most effective tip 
met three out of four criterions. Its effectiveness score is (0.75). It has not met the criterion 
four. This is because the tip helps finding the true URL of a page but it does not help in 
verifying whether or not the URL is related to a legitimate website. Thus, it possibly 
produces FP or FN by using it alone. Using a search engine, such as Google, in verifying the 
URL after using the tip would overcome its weakness. 
Therefore, the most effective anti-Phishing tip is used with a search engine 
recommendation as follows: "a fake website's address is different from what you are 
used to, perhaps there are extra characters or words in it or it uses a completely 
different name or no name at all, just numbers. Check the True URL (Web Address). The 
true URL of the site can be seen in the page 'Properties' or 'Page Info': While you are on 
the website and using the mouse Go Right Click then Go 'Properties' or 'Page Info'. If 
you don't know the real web address for the legitimate organization, you can find it by 
using a search engine such as Google''. 
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6.5. Summary 
In this chapter, an evaluation of the effectiveness of most common users' tips for 
detecting and preventing Phishing websites was carried out. A novel effectiveness criteria 
was proposed and used to examine each single tip and rank it based on its effectiveness 
score. The 'Effectiveness Criteria' involves four criterions. 
The chapter found the most effective anti-Phishing tips that users can focus on to detect 
Phishing attacks. The most effective tip met three quarters o f the criterions. It has not met 
the criterion four because the tip helps finding the true URL of a page but it does not help in 
verifying whether or not the URL is related to a legitimate website. The tip would overcome 
its weakness by using a search engine, such as Google, after its use to verilV the URL. Also, 
the effective tips can be focused by anti-Phishing training approaches. 
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7. An Anti-Phishing Approach That Uses Training 
Intervention for Phishing Websites Detection 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter proposes a novel Anti-Phishing Approach that uses Training Intervention 
for Phishing Websites Detection 'APTIPWD' . The APTIPWD approach considers helping 
people detecting Phishing websites during their normal use of the Internet. It brings 
information to end-users and helps them immediately after they have made a mistake in 
order to recognize Phishing websites for themselves. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The New Approach is presented in the second 
section. Then, the scenarios of the proposed approach are discussed in the third section. 
After that, this chapter presents a prototype proof of concept implementation of the New 
Approach. The aim is to validate whether the New Approach is implementable, viable and 
can be deployed properly. The final section concludes the chapter with a discussion on the 
New Approach. 
Chapter 7: The New Approach (APTTPWD) 







Aware? Surfing Check V sit 
-Training 
Figure 26: The broad idea of the anti-Phishing proposed approach 
The process of the New Approach is shown in Figure 26. The broad idea is to check 
whether a user is Phishing aware when they surf the Internet and visit a Phishing website. I f 
the user tries to submit their sensitive information to the Phishing website, they are shown 
intervening message to help them understand what Phishing websites are and how to detect 
them. The New Approach also keeps anti-Phishing training ongoing process. This means 
that whenever users try to submit information to Phishing website, they w i l l be trained. In 
the case where the user is Phishing aware, the approach does nothing and lets the user keep 














Figure 27: The architecture of the New Approach (APTIPWD) 
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The New Approach is based on training intervention based around the use of blacklists 
to detect Phishing websites. Figure 27 shows the main components of the approach. The 
components are Proxy, URL Agent (UA) and Knowledge Base (KB). The intervention takes 
place between the Internet and Users. Any URL request made by a user goes through the 
Proxy. The Proxy communicates with a URL Agent (UA). When the user browses the URL 
page and clicks to submit information, the UA verifies whether the URL is blacklisted or not 
by checking the blacklists. I f the URL is not blacklisted, the Proxy allows submission 
process to proceed. I f the URL is blacklisted, the Proxy prevents the information being 
submitted. Then, the UA shows an intervening message to the user in order to help them 
understanding what Phishing is and how to detect them in the future. 
There are many anti-Phishing tips that can be used in the intervening message. The most 
effective anti-Phishing tip evaluated in Chapter 6 is used. The tip used in the intervening 
message is as follows: "a fake website's address is different from what you are used to, 
perhaps there are extra characters or words in it or it uses a completely different name or 
no name at all, just numbers. Check the True URL (Web Address). The true URL of the 
website can be seen in the page 'Properties' or 'Page Info': While you are on the website 
and using the mouse Go Right Click then Go 'Properties' or 'Page Info'. If you don't know 
the real web address for the legitimate organization, you can find it by using a search 
engine such as Google". 
Using the New Approach wi l l present the intervening messages to users who access 
Phishing websites and try to submit their information. Also, by using this approach, users do 
not need to attend training courses and do not need to access online training materials. This 
is because the approach brings information to end-users and helps them immediately after 
they have made a mistake in order to detect Phishing websites by themselves. The New 
Approach helps users on how to make correct decisions in distinguishing Phishing and 
legitimate websites during their normal use of the Internet. 
This approach wi l l only work i f intervention is shown to be an effective method for 
training people in detection of Phishing websites. In order to effectively evaluate the New 
Approach, a series of experiments need to be carried out. 
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7.3. Simulating the Proposed Approach 
Evaluating the New Approach on the real Internet is difficult because the blacklists 
component is dynamic and therefore is hard to control. A better solution is to evaluate under 
experimental conditions. I f the evaluation reveals that the approach is successful and 
achieve its goals, the approach wi l l be implemented and evaluated on the Internet with 
dynamic blacklists. 
In order to evaluate the approach accurately under experimental conditions, all possible 
scenarios of the approach need to be simulated and the blacklists (dynamic components) 
need to be made fixed. The scenarios are shown in the flow chart diagram illustrated in 
Figure 28. The possible scenarios are as follows: 
7 / Start 
visit a webRi 
(New URL) 




( Do nothing (ProcesR j termination) ^ 
An actionable warning 
intervention to warn 
user of the website 
Figure 28: Flow chart diagram for the New Approach's scenarios 
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I . Scenario one: 
The user visits a new website (i.e. new URL) and it is checked whether the URL is 
blacklisted. I f the URL is blacklisted and the user does not hit the submission button to 
submit their information, no action is taken. 
I L Scenario two: 
The user visits a new website (i.e. new URL) and it is checked whether the URL is 
blacklisted. I f the URL is blacklisted and the user hits the submission button to submit 
their information then an intervening anti-Phishing message is shown. 
i n . Scenario three: 
The user visits a new website (i.e. new URL) and it is checked whether the URL is 
blacklisted. I f the URL is not blacklisted then no action is taken. 
These scenarios wi l l be implemented and then used in the evaluation experiments 
described in Chapter 8 and analyzed in Chapter 9. 
7.4. An Approach to the Implementation of the A P T I P W D 
7.4.1. Proxy based Computer Network 
7.4.1.1. General Structure 
A client-server model is a common design for distributed computing. The client and the 
server are two components that interact between each other [JiaWanlei04, p. 16]. 
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Client Client Clianl 
Proxy 
Server Internet 
Client Client Client 
Figure 29: Server-Proxy-Client Interaction" 
A client-proxy-server model extends the client-server model [SinghOS, pp. 36-9]. It 
introduces an additional component which is a proxy. The proxy is located between the 
client and the server [ibid]. Figure 29 presents an overview of the interaction between the 
client, proxy and server. The server component is represented by the "Internet" because in a 
proxy based computer network, any URL request to the web made by a client is directed to 
the URL domain server. Proxies have been widely used in many applications to perform 
various tasks such as 
• clients' connections control, 
" URLs' request control, 
• caching and 
• filtering data [XiaoChen08, p. 331]. 
7.4.1.2. How it Works 
The interaction between chent and server is as follows [JiaWanlei04, p. 16]: 
• Client requests a service from Server. 
• Server processes the requests and replies to Client. 
However, in the client-proxy-server, the interaction becomes as follows: 
» Client sends request for Server to Proxy. 
• Proxy passes request to Server. 
Source: ServerWatch.com, available at; 
http://www.serverwatch.com/tutorials/article.php/10825_3092521_l, last access on 15 November 2008 
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• Server processes the request and sends reply for the Client to Proxy. 
• Proxy passes reply to Client. 
7.4.2. Applying the New Approach to a Proxy based Computer Network 
In this section, the New Approach is applied to a proxy based network. The blacklists 
(dynamic components) in the approach architecnire shown in Figure 27 is made fixed list. 
The design and implementation are described. 
7.4.2.1. System Design with Fixed List of Phishing Websites 
Proxy 
Admin strator 
Email Tfwl Has 




U R L fU-»pomn' 
I i i l t i r v c n l u m 
Server 




J U R L ^ 
Fixed L i s t of 
/Vnti-PhiBhing 
T r a i n i g 
Websites 
Figure 30: The high level design of the New Approach system 
As shown in Figure 30, the design of the New Approach system consists of four 
components. They are: 
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• Server, 
• Proxy (Gateway), 
• Administrator, and 
• Client (User). 
The Administrator is a person who is in charge of sending Phishing emails to any User 
in a network. The Proxy is in place between the Internet and Users. The Proxy acts as a 
gateway for all requests made in the network by its Users. Any URL request made by a 
User goes through the Proxy. The Proxy then communicates with the Server. The Server 
contains three sub-components. They are a Fixed List of Anti-Phishing Training Websites 
(FLAPTW), a URL Agent (UA) and the Intervention message. The FLAPTW contains a 
fixed number of fake websites that are designed to look the same as the original ones and 
to be used for anti-Phishing training only, whereas the UA is responsible for checking 
whether the requested URL passed by the Proxy is in the FLAPTW. The Intervention 
message is stored in the Server. It is shown to the User in order to help them understand 
what Phishing is and how to detect it in the future. 
The Administrator sends the anti-Phishing training email to (a) specific User(s). The 
email contains a link (URL) for one of the FLAPTW. I f the User goes to the URL, the UA 
verifies whether or not the URL is listed in the FLAPTW by checking the FLAPTW. I f the 
URL is listed, the proxy redirects the User to a simulated Phishing page (i.e. not Phishing) 
to browse it. The page submission button is linked with an intervention message so that i f 
the User clicks the button to submit information the intervention message is presented to 
them. I f the URL is not listed, the Proxy allows the User to browse the Internet as normal. 
This process is similar to the scenarios described in Section 7.3. 
7.4.2.2. Assumption 
There is an assumption that the Administrator is given the privilege in the network 
email system to send anti-Phishing training email that bypasses the anti-Phishing filters 
that might be applied in the network email system. This means that the anti-Phishing 
training email should have the following characteristics: 
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• The domain of the sender's email should be the same as the domain of a legitimate 
website. 
• The email content should look as it is legitimate email. 
7.4.3. Implementation 
In this section, the implementation of the components of the APTIPWD is presented. 
Each component's implementation is described separately. 
7.4.3.1. Server 
The Server component was implemented using Apache HTTP Server. Apache HTTP 
Server is an open-source web Server for popular operating systems such as UNIX and 
Windows [ApacHttp]. A 1.40GHz Toshiba laptop, which runs Microsoft Windows XP 
home edition, was used to run the Apache HTTP Server. 
The Server's sub-components, the URL Agent (UA), the Fixed List o f Anti-Phishing 
Training Websites (FLAPTW) and the Intervention message, were linked to each other. 
The UA received any URL from the Proxy and directed it to either the local server (i.e. the 
prototype's Server) or the requested website on the Internet. This was accomplished by the 
virtual hosts"' directives in Apache HTTP Server. The virtual hosts' container is a 
configuration file that contains all the web addresses that were served locally by the 
Server when requested (See Figure 31). However, this container had to be pointed by the 
main Apache HTTP Server's configuration file (See Figure 32). 
^' Virtual Host is defined as the practice of running more than one website, such as www.example l .com and 
www.example2.com, on a single machine [ApacHTTPVir tua l ] . 
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* v i r t u a l H o s t example: 
» Almost any Apache directive may go Into a vIrtualHost container. 
,¥ The f i r s t virtualHost section is used for a l l requests that do not 
* match a serverName or serverAlias in any < v i r t u a l H o s t > block. 
<v1rtualHost •;80> 
DocumentRoot "ci/Program FiTes/Apache Software Foundation/Apache2. 2/htdocs" 
ServerName localhost 
ErrorLog "logs/localhost-error.log" 





Er rorLog "logs/www.amazon. co.uk.me.com-error.log" 
CustomLog "logs/www.amazon.co.uk.me.com-access.log" common 
</virtualHost> 
wIrtualHost ":80> 
Document Root c : /rnys 11 es /c1 tybank 
ServerName www.citybank.co.uk 
ErrorLog "1ogs/www.c1tybank.co.uk-error.log" 
CustomLog "logs/wiw.citybank.co. uk-access.log" common 
.i/virtualHost> 
v -v i r tua lHost ":80> 
DocumentRoot C:/mysites/halifaxme 
ServerName VAA-J. hal i f ax-online, co. uk. me. com 
ErrorLog "logs/vAvw. hal i f ax-onl 1 ne. co. uk. me. com-error. log" 
CustomLog "logs/i-AW/. hal i f ax-online, co. uk. me. com-access. Tog" common 
</virtualHost> 
^vlrtualHost -:80> 
DocumentRoot c :/mysites/argosmyshop 
ServerNaroe mm. argos. co. uk. myshop. com 
ErrorLog "logs /wv.v;. argos .co.uk. niyshop. com-error. 1 og" 
CustomLog "logs/wv.w. argos. co.uk. myshop. com-access, log" common 
< , v i r t u a l H o s t > 
<;virtualHost '•:S0> 
DocumentRoot c:/mysites/cometonline 
ServerName v.\%v;. comet-on! ine.co.uk 
ErrorLog "logs/i-Avw. comet-onl i ne. co. uk-error .log" 
CustomLog "1ogs/MVw.comet-on!ine.co.uk-access.log" common 
</v i r - tua lHosc> 
Figure 31: Examples of virtual hosts' directives in their container 
# v - i r c u a l h o s t s 
I n c l u d e c o n f / e x c r a / h r t p d - v h o s r s . c o n f 
Figure 32: Pointing virtual hosts' container in Apache conFiguration Tile 
In addition, the DNS"" host files in the Windows operating system were modified so 
that web browsers displayed the URL of the actual Phishing websites. As Figure 33 
illustrates, the web addresses listed were pointed to the local machine IP address 
(127.0.0.1) so that any request to one of the addresses that arrived at the Apache HTTP 
Server was directed to and served by the local server. Thus, the users were not actually at 
risk since they used local web pages. 
"" DNS stands for Domain Name System. The DNS main task is mapping symbolic host names to their IP 
addresses [Friedlander et al.07]. 
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t* C o p y r - T g F c Cc!) M i c r o s o f t C o r p . 
xh-i s i s a s a m p l e H O S T S f i l e u s e d b y M i c r o s o f t X C P / I P f o r w i n d o v / s -
T h i s f i l e c o n r a i n s T h e m a p p i n g s o f I P a d d r e s s e s T O h o s t n a m e s . E a c h 
«» e n t r y s h O L i T d b e k e p t o n a n i n a i v i d u a ! " l i n e . T h e I P a d d r e s s s h o u l d 
*«* b e p l a c e d i n t h e f i r s t c o l u m n f o l l o w e d b y t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g h o s t n a m e . 
T h e I P a d d r e s s a n d t h e h o s t name s h o u l d b e s e p a r a t e d b y a t l e a s t o n e 
s p a c e . 
** A d d i t i o n a l l y , c o m m e n x s Csuch a s t h e s e ) may b e i n s e r t e d o n i n d i v i d u a l 
l i n e s o r f o l l o w i n g t h e m a c h i n e naJiie d e n o t e d b y a s y m b o l . 
* F o r e x a m p l e : 
1 0 2 . S 4 . 9 4 . 9 7 
3 8 . 2 5 . 6 3 . l O 
r h i n o . a c m e . c o m 
X . a c m e . c o m 
127 O. o. 1 n o c a 1 h o s t 
127 O. o. 1 www. e b a y - s e c u r i t y . com 
127 O. o . 1 www. p a y p a l . c o m 
127 O. o . 1 w^•.\v. o n T 1 n e . 1 1 O y d s r s b . c o . u k 
127 O. o . 1 V A W / . a m a z o n . c o . u k . m e . c o m 
127 O. o . 1 V A W / . b a r c T a y s b a n k i n g . c o . u k 
127 o o 1 WVA"/ . h a l i f a x - o n l l n e . c o . u k . me. c o m 
127 o o 1 www. c 1 c y b a n k . c o . u k 
127 o o 1 www. c a p l t a l O n e O n l i n e . c o . u k 
127 o o 1 w\*.*\v. c o - o p e r a t t i v e b a n k . c o . u k 
127 o o 1 www. c o m e t - o n l T n e . C O . uk 
127 o o 1 VA-.W . a r g o s . C O . u k . m y s h o p . c o m 
Figure 33: Screenshot of the modiricd DNS host file used for the prototype 
As seen in Figure 31, the every single virtual host pointed a single location for a website 
pages directory stored in the Server. Thus, there was a directory for each anti-Phishing 
training website. As shown in Table 11, eleven websites were used. They were a fixed list of 
anti-Phishing training websites (FLAPTW). There were different URL syntax tricks (i.e. 
Phishing clues). They formed the URLs for the Phishing websites. They were as follows: 
• URLs with a different domain from a well-known domain, 
• URLs with misspelled known websites and 
• URLs with large host names that contained a part of a well-known web addresses. 
# Anti-Phishing URL Tricks 
Training Websites 
1 eBay www.ebay-security.com Different domain 
2 Paypal www.paypal .com Misspelled 
3 Lloyds TSB Bank www.onIine.llOydstsb.co.uk Misspelled 
4 Amazon www.amazon.co.iik.me.com Large host name 
5 Barclays Bank www.barclaysbanking.co.uk Different domain 
6 Halifax Bank www.halifax-online.co.uk.me.com Large host name 
7 Citibank www.citybank.co.uk Misspelled 
8 Capital One www.capitalOneOnline.co.uk Misspelled 
9 Cooperative Bank www.co-operattivebank.co.uk Misspelled 
10 Comet www.comet-online.co.uk Different domain 
11 Argos www.argos.co.uk.myshop.com Large host name 
Table 11: The fixed list of anti-Phishing training websites used in the prototype 
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Each one of the websites was linked to the intervention message by modifying the 
submission button so that it transferred the traffic to the intervention message. The 
intervention message was a simple H T M L page adjusted by JAVA scripts to appear as a 
pop up window and to locate in the middle of the screen. Figure 34 presents the 
intervention message used in the prototype. 
i@ W a r n i r r s t o Y o u ^ W n d o w ' i n t e r n e t txpior^r' 
j g http://wwiw.paypal.com/lntervention.htm 
Y o u were go ing ro be a V I C T I M o f an In te rne t security-
a t tack called 
• P H I S H I N G ' 
T h e webs i te tras a f a k e one bnilt by f r a n d s r e r to s tea l y o n r 
important informat ion . T h e r e f o r e , D O not submit y o u r 
iorormation until you nial ip s u r e it is t h e organizat ion's legi t imate 
webs i te . 
• A. fake website s address is different from what you are used to, 
perhaps there are extra characters or words in it iDr it uses a 
completel>- different txame or no name at aH, just numbers. C h e c k 
the T r u e U R L O V e b A d d r e s s ) . T h e true U R L of the s i te 
can be s e e n in tbe page "Properties" or 'Page Info": 
yoii ni e o n t h e \^•ebsiT*r• a n d tisin^: tht . i n o i i s e 0<» R i g h t CHck: 
t h e n Oo Properties' or 'Page Info'. 
I f you don't know the real web address for the legitimate 
organization, you can find it by using a search engine such as 
O o o g l c . 
1 ^ & Internet 
Figure 34: The intervention message used in the prototype 
7.4.3.2 Proxy (Gateway) 
The Proxy component was implemented using Apache HTTP Server because it has 
proxying capabilities that are useful and very easy to implement. The Proxy was 
implemented by activating the proxy module in the Server. As shown in Figure 35, the 
Apache HTTP Server configuration file was modified so that the proxy was able to do 
caching and to handle http and secure hnp requests. Therefore, the Proxy deals with all 
requests made to a specific port, which is 80. 
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LoadModule proxy_module modules/mod_proxy.so 
LoadModule proxy_ftp_module modules/iiiod_proxy_ftp. so 
LoadModule proxy_http_module modules/mod_proxy_hctp.so 
LoadModule cache_niodule iiiodu1es/mod_cache. so 
LoadModule disk_cache_module modules/mod_disk_cache.so 
LoadModule proxy_connect_module modules/iiiod_proxy_connect. so 
<IfModule mod_proxy.c> 
ProxyHequests on 
|a1 lowCONNECT 80 44 3 
<Proxy •=•> 
order deny,allow 
Deny from a l l 
Allow from 192.168.1.65 
</Proxy> 
<./lfModul e> 
Figure 35: The proxy module in the Server's connguration file 
7.4.3.3. A dministra tor 
There was no Graphical User Interface (GUI) implemented for the Administrator part. 
Microsoft Outlook was used instead. Microsoft Outlook has Email Accounts settings 
where people can provide sender name and email address. Therefore, the Administrator 
provided false sender name and email address that appeared as it was issued by a 
legitimate organization such as eBay (See Figure 36). 
Due to that the fake emails were read using Maktoob email portal [Maktoob], the fake 
emails were sent by using Maktoob'?, M X Record"^ as the outgoing mail or server. The 
outgoing mail settings were adjusted in Microsoft Outlook (See Figure 36). 
After setting the Email Account information, the Administrator could send an email 
with content that looked authentic and similar to that used by a legitimate organization. As 
shown in Figure 37, the emails sent by the Administrator had links to anti-Phishing 
training websites stored and run by the Apache HTTP Server discussed previously. 
""' It stands for mail exchange record. It is an entry in a domain name database that identifies the mail server 
that is responsible for handling emails for that domain name. More information can be found at 
http://www.goecart.com/domain-name-terms-glossary.asp, last access on 19 September 2008. 
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E-mail Accounts 
In te rne t E- mail Settings (POP3) 
Each of these settings are required to get your e-mail account workinOi 
User In fo rmat ion 
your Namei eBay Customer Protection 
Server In fo rma t io i i 
Incoming mail server ipOPSit 
E-mail Address: [customer.protection®ebov Outgoing mail server (SMTP): jpn02.maktoob.com 
Isecurityteam: 
Logon In fo rma t ion 
User isiame: 
Password: | 
f Remember password 
r " Log on using Secure Password 
Authentication gPA) 
Test Settings 
After filling out the information on this screen, we 
recommend you test your account by dickirig the butto ;^! 
belo'rt. (Requires network connection) 
Test Account Settings.,. I 
More Settings . 
Caned 
Figure 36: M S Outlook account's settings 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ v * r i t v vour <fBay a c c o u n t - A^snogc (H I M L ^ ^ 
pte etfit a w ^aefX, Format loota AcOonB tND 
, ffvaepiv fJVReply toAII .•pForm-rt ^ • T C>T X ^ l ^ '. 
From: eBav Customer Protection Lajatamer.orotecSiWi'B»bav-«J.ukJ-
To: Dave Smith {doveamt5*i2001oSPn)oktOOb.Com> 
Cc: 
Subiect: Ptease verifV VOLX eBay accoigit 
Sent: Tue 13v'D5/'200S 20:58 
Dear Dave Smith 
We are s o T y for inconv-enience We had some errora in our d3ia Please updatei your infrarmation tn ofder to venfy your account 
You can acce-is y c u r account at wywy ftt^ay co uk 
For help please coniaci *Qay Customer Protection immediately by 
ema.l at cu3tomerDrotBct iong>ebav cc uk or call ..is 31 1.877-909-3268 
Thank yau (ot usmg abay co uk! 
Best '-V:3lie=; 
eBay Customoi Frotectlon 
2008 All Rights Reserved ^ 
Figure 37: Example of Phishing email created and sent using M S Outlook 
Z4.3.4. Client (User) 
There was no implementation required for the client side of the prototype. The user 
used the Internet Explorer (IE) 7 browser for accessing emails and websites through 
Maktoob mail portal [Maktoob]. Figure 38 shows a screenshot of the eBay anti-Phishing 
training website used in the APTIPWD System. 
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^ W « l c o m B to &tlav • Wlnctows ! n t * r r w t f^^^^^^jff^'^W^- ~HPl 
. . . <o,., 
Fite Edit VwA FnvoritM rmm Help 
•0-- m Wtfco."- to «<».y ,. p f -
5 J -
Welcome to eBay 
B^tflaiei 3S an eB;ii I Alio si i loi orMi»B«» including. 
RW. Diiy onrt rirt" oaroains f rcm nli over « i* 
t ' r o l ^ c t y o i T account Checu irmttne v<cC a d o r « 3 e In foui 
nr^v^^erslarTBwmi nopa ifsigtitn cbav com,' MOr« account 
6>ICUfltY'UO«. 
AooMisBay Announr.tmrtiits a^c i i r l^ CBntar Policies Governm«otR«i» t i ina SUB Map HBIR 
Figure 38: Screenshot of eBay-like anti-Phishing website 
7.4.4. Configuring Clients' Local Area Network (LAN) Settings to Speak to 
the Proxy 
In a proxy based computer network, the proxy settings in the L A N settings of every 
single machine (client) that is connected to it should be configured so that the address of the 
proxy is provided with its port. For example, clients in Durham University network applied 
the university proxy in their L A N settings^''. Therefore, each client was connected to the 
Proxy to request any URL. This was carried out by putting the server machine as its L A N 
proxy on the default port 80 (See Figure 39). 
Computer nerwork settings in Durham University. Available at: 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/its/services/network/lan/quicicsettings, last access on 2 December 2008. 
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Automatic cont iouraoon 
Autom4!>bc confioLiration may overr ide manuai set t inas. To 
use i7f rrHsnual set t ings, disable autiomatic con-figuratton. 
t 1 AutomabcBiSy de tec t setttngis 
CD Use automatic conf igurat ion flKTipt.. 
ensure t^ie : 
E l L'se A p roxy server for youi LAN Cr'">«*e sett ir igs wifl n o t apply to .; 
dteU -up or VPN cormectiot is). 
Address! : 192-.23-4.93,-43 : Port: so [ I Advanced, 
[^ 1 Syposs proxv server for local adcfa-esseB 
Local Area Network C-AN) sett inas - - -
LA^^ Settings do not apply to dtal-up connections. j UAN set t ings 
Choose Settings above for dial-up sett ings. 
Figure 39: The Internet Explorer's L A N settings 
7.4.5. Discussion 
7.4.3.1. Advantages and Limitation 
Applying the APTIPWD to a proxy based computer network has advantages and a 
possible limitation. The advantages can be summarized as follows: 
1. It is easy to implement. 
2. There is no need to write any programming code. 
3. It is a browser independent tool. Thus, there is no specific browser that is required 
for the tool to be run. 
4. Since the training is sent by email, the Administrator is able to send anti-Phishing 
training to specific users. 
5. The aim of training users without informing them that it is anti-Phishing training is 
satisfied. Therefore, the limitation of using the role-play protocol in anti-Phishing 
training is resolved. 
6. The aim of training users while they normally use the Internet is satisfied. 
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In contrast, a possible limitation of applying the APTIPWD to a proxy based computer 
network is that because the network proxy is added with new tasks to perform (i.e. 
checking the fixed list of anti-Phishing training websites (FLAPTW) when a URL request 
is received), the proxy speed for handling the requests might slow down. However, when 
the APTIPWD has few anti-Phishing training websites, then the checking process does not 
consume much time. In the APTIPWD prototype, there were eleven URLs that needed to 
be checked. This did not cause a noticeable slow down to the speed of the traffic. 
7.4.5.2. Deploying the New Approach with its own Proxy in a Proxy based 
Computer Network 
Applying the New Approach to an existing proxy based computer network has been 
described. This means that the proxy used in applying the New Approach is the network 
proxy that handles the URLs requests made by the network's clients. The proxy needs to 
be configured to communicate with the Apache HTTP Server and the clients. 
In addition to this, the New Approach can be applied to a proxy based computer 
network (in this instance, Durham University network) without configuring its proxy. This 
was accomplished by having a proxy only for running the New Approach. This meant that 
there were two proxies when the New Approach was running; the Durham University 
network's proxy and the New Approach's own proxy. The New Approach's proxy was 
planted between the Durham University network's proxy and the Client. For this to be 
done, a simple alteration to the Apache HTTP Server configuration file, shown in Figure 
35, was performed. As presented in Figure 40, the New Approach's proxy forwarded all 
URLs requests to the University proxy unless the URLs requested were listed to be served 
in the New Approach local server. 
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Loa*iodule proxy_niodule modules/rBod_proxy. so 
Loa*1odule prGxy_ftp_roodule niodul€s,'atod_prai(y_ftp.so 
Loat*^odule proxy_http_niodu1e niodules.''mod_proxy_htcp.so 
L o i * c i d u l e t:ache_iiiodule modules/iTOd_cache.so 
LoatJ^odule disk_cache_module i i i o d u l e £ / n i o d _ d 1 s k _ c a c h e . s o 
LoadModule proxy_connect_module niodules/iTK)d_proxy_connect. so 
<IfModule mod_proxy.c> 
proxyRequests on 
AllowCONNECT SO i i l 
Proxy "> 
lorder deny ,a l low 
Deny from al 1 
Alloiv from 192 .168 .1 .65 
<.'proxy> 
•lfHodule> 
ProxyRemoce h t tp : .^ ''^ v^ ^ v^cache. dur. ac. uk;80S0 
NoProxy wrtfA^.ebay-security.com rmw.paypal.com v,ww. on! ine . U O y d s t s b . co. uk wwi-.. amazon. co. uk. me. com 
Figure 40: Pointing the Durham University's proxy in the Server's configuration file 
7.5. Summary 
In this chapter, a novel Anti-Phishing Approach that uses Training Intervention for 
Phishing Websites Detection (APTIPWD) was proposed and discussed. The New Approach 
presents an intervening message to users who access Phishing websites and try to submit 
their information. The intervention message uses the most effective anti-Phishing tip 
evaluated in Chapter 6. By using this approach, users do not need to attend training courses 
and do not need to access online training materials. This is because the approach brings 
information to end-users and helps them immediately after they have made a mistake in 
order to detect Phishing websites by themselves. 
Due to the fact that the blacklists component is dynamic and therefore is hard to control, 
evaluating the New Approach on the real Internet is difficult. A better solution is to evaluate 
under experimental conditions. In order to evaluate the approach under experimental 
conditions, all possible scenarios of the approach were simulated and the blacklists 
(dynamic components) were made fixed. 
A prototype proof o f concept implementation o f the New Approach was presented. It 
also showed that the New Approach is feasible and can be implemented easily without 
writing a single line of a programming code and without undue disruption of the users 
system. 
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8. Experiments 
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the evaluation experiments are considered. The hypotheses and their 
themes are discussed together with the way in which the experiments' participants were 
recruited and their demographic information. Effectiveness ratios that are used in evaluating 
the hypotheses are defined. The chapter also reviews comparisons between real Phishing 
attacks and Phishing experiments in order to decide what should be simulated in the 
experiments. It then concludes with a discussion on the story board of the experiments. 
8.2. Hypotheses and Themes 
Before discussing the themes and hypotheses, it is useful to define few terms. The New 
Approach is an Anti-Phishing approach that uses Training Intervention for Phishing 
Websites Detection (APTIPWD), discussed in Chapter 7. The Old Approach is the current 
practice of sending anti-Phishing tips by email, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
High Technical Abili ty (HTA) people are those who are considered experts in terms of 
computer technical ability. In contrast, Low Technical Abili ty (LTA) people are those who 
are considered non-experts in terms of computer technical ability. The criteria for 
classifying experts and non-experts as well as Phishing aware and Phishing unaware people 
wi l l be discussed in Section 8.3.2. 
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The hypotheses in this section are experimental hypotheses. The null hypotheses are 
shown in Chapter 9. 
8.2.1. Theme 1: Evaluating the New Approach 
Hypothesis 1: There is no difference between using the New Approach and the Old 
Approach in helping people recognize legitimate websites and detecting Phishing websites. 
8.2.2, Themes 2 and 3: Technical Ability and Phishing Knowledge 
A number of anti-Phishing approaches have been evaluated using participants who were 
recruited based on their technical abilities [Downs et al.06, Kumaraguru et al.07a, 
Kumaraguru et al.07b, Sheng et al.07]. Participants were classified into 'expert' and 'non-
expert' users based on pre-study screening questions. Technical ability was judged on 
whether the participants had changed preferences or settings in their web browser, created a 
web page, and helped someone fix a computer problem. Any participant who said 'no' to at 
least two of the screening questions was selected to take part in their experiments. This 
technical ability assessment was used to recruit people with low technical ability (they 
called them 'non-experts'). However, the participants who were considered non-experts 
could know about Phishing and how to detect attacks before participating in the evaluation 
experiments. Having participants with Phishing knowledge in advance may provide biased 
results in evaluation experiments on anti-Phishing approaches. This is because people who 
know about Phishing before participating in the evaluation experiments may use their own 
Phishing knowledge rather than the anti-Phishing approaches of the evaluation in which 
they are participating. Downs et al. [Downs et al.07] studied whether there are correlations 
between some web environment experiences and susceptibility to Phishing. They found that 
people who correctly answered the knowledge question about the definition of Phishing (i.e. 
Phishing aware people) were significantly less likely to be deceived by Phishing emails. 
Low technical users may be Phishing aware and high technical users may be Phishing 
unaware. 
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It is necessary to make sure that the participants do not know about Phishing regardless 
of their technical ability level. Therefore, a research hypothesis is expressed as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: In evaluating an anti-Phishing approach, it is better to recruit subjects based 
on their Phishing knowledge rather than their technical ability. 
The hypothesis has two main issues. They are technical ability and Phishing knowledge. 
In order to find out which issue has an effect on people's decisions on legitimate and 
Phishing websites, each issue must be assessed separately. The hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 
discuss the technical ability and Phishing knowledge respectively. 
8.2.2.1. Theme 2: The Effect of High and Low Technical Abilities on Phishing 
Websites Detection 
Hypothesis 2.1: There is no difference between high technical people and low technical 
people in recognizing legitimate websites and detecting Phishing websites. 
8.2.2.2. Theme 3- The Effect of Phishing Awareness and Phishing 
Unawareness on Phishing Websites Detention. 
Hypothesis 2.2: Phishing aware people are better than Phishing unaware people in 
recognizing legitimate websites and detecting Phishing websites. 
8.2.3. Theme 4: Anti-Phishing Knowledge Retention 
I f the New Approach, which uses training intervention, demonstrates that users are 
better than the users of the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing tips by email in detecting 
Phishing attacks when they are evaluated immediately after they are trained, the question 
arises about whether the New Approach users can retain the knowledge that they gained 
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during training after a period of time better than the Old Approach users. As a result of this, 
a hypothesis is expressed as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: People who used the New Approach retain their anti-Phishing knowledge 
better than people who used the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing emails. 
In evaluating these hypotheses, other hypotheses are extracted from them and are shown 
in Chapter 9. The extracted hypotheses are then evaluated and analyzed. 
8.3. Recruiting Participants and Demographic Information 
Before running the evaluation experiments, the participants had to be classified 
according to their technical ability and their Phishing knowledge. Regarding their technical 
ability, they were classified into two categories, high and low. In terms of their Phishing 
awareness, they were classified into two categories, Phishing aware and Phishing unaware. 
In order to do these classifications, a pre-study survey was conducted. There were both 
online and offline surveys to be answered by respondents. Invitation posters to participate in 
the experiments were distributed in different places on the Durham University campus. 
Invitations were also distributed to the university's students by emails using the colleges' 
mailing lists. 
There was time gap between participants f i l l ing in the pre-study survey and their 
participation in the experiments. In this gap, the participants' technical ability and Phishing 
awareness situations might have changed from low to high and from unaware to aware 
respectively. Due to this, a 'pre-session survey' for the participants just before participation 
in the experiments was conducted. This was to make sure that the information given by the 
participants in the pre-study survey was still valid. 
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8.3.1. Pre-Study Survey 
The survey was built from multiple resources. It asked questions about Internet and 
email usage, participant's technical ability, their web browser knowledge and computer 
terminology. The computer terminology section included the question about Phishing 
knowledge. The questions about Phishing knowledge and participant's technical ability 
were the main concerns in the survey. 
Initially, potential participants were asked to provide their email addresses so that they 
could be contacted i f they were selected to take part in the study. Also, participants were not 
asked about their demographic information in the pre-study survey in order to save their 
time and because they might be deterred from f i l l ing in the survey i f it took more than 10 
minutes. Therefore, the participants were asked about their demographic information just 
before taking the study. 
The pre-study survey is presented in Appendix B. An overview of the survey sections is 
discussed as below. 
8.3.1.1. Internet and Email Usage 
Participants were asked questions about their email usage and skills [Health e-Tech]. In 
addition, they were asked questions about their online transactions experience [Downs et 
al.07]. The reason for having this section was to convey the idea that the experiment was 
just a study about the participant's use of email systems and Internet. 
8.3.1.2. Technical AbUity 
The participants were asked questions on computer technical tasks in order to assess 
their technical ability. The questions were as follows [Sheng et al.07]: 
• Have you changed preferences or settings in your web browser? 
• Have you created a web page? 
• Have you helped someone f ix a computer problem? 
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The goal of having this section was to classify the participants into low and high with 
regards to their technical abilities. 
8.3.1.3. Web Browser Knowledge 
Participants were asked questions about their knowledge of URLs (i.e. interpreting the 
URLs syntax) and padlock icons. Participants were shown an image of the padlock icon 
found within the browser chrome and were asked whether they had seen "this padlock 
image" before (See Figure 41) [Downs et al.07]. 
Figure 41: The padlock image 
The goal of having this section was to reinforce the idea that the experiment was a study 
about the use of email systems and the Internet. 
8.3.1.4. Computer Terminology 
Participants were asked to choose the best definition for six computer related terms 
[Downs et al.07]. They were cookie, spyware, Google, virus, messenger and Phishing. 
Participants were given the same list o f ten possible definitions to choose from for each 
definition, as well as options to indicate familiarity with the word or not. Each term had one 
correct answer on the list. The goal of having this section was to classify the participants 
into Phishing Aware and Phishing Unaware in terms of their Phishing knowledge. 
8.3.2. Classification Criteria 
The selection of the experiment's subjects was based on their answers on the pre-study 
survey. Because 'the Internet and email usage' and 'web browser knowledge' sections were 
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included simply to convey the idea that the experiment was a study just about the 
participant's use of email systems and Internet, these sections were not included in the 
selection criteria. The questions about Phishing knowledge and technical ability are the 
main concerns in the survey. The participants were not told that the experiments were about 
Phishing. Therefore, the answers to the survey questions were used to classify the survey 
respondents as: 
• Low or high technical people in terms of technical ability and 
• Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware. 
Regarding the technical ability questions, respondents who say 'no' to more than one of 
the three questions were considered 'low technical people'. Otherwise, the respondents were 
considered 'high technical people'. 
In terms of Phishing awareness, the section Computer Terminology (8.3.1.4) included a 
Phishing definition question. Those who defined Phishing correctly were regarded as 
'Phishing Aware'. Otherwise, the respondents were considered as 'Phishing Unaware'. 
8.3.3. Participants 
As a result of the pre-study survey invitations, 219 people responded to the survey. Of 
these, 13 skipped the survey's questions, providing their names and contacts only. 
Therefore, they were excluded from the experiments. 
With regards to participants' classifications, 133 out of 206 were 'Phishing Aware', 
which represent 64.6% of all respondents. This means that they knew the Phishing 
definition. In contrast, 73 out of 206 were 'Phishing Unaware'. This means that they did not 
know the Phishing definition and represented 35.4% of all respondents. In terms of the 
respondents' technical ability, 125 out of 206 were 'high technical ability', which represent 
60.68%. However, 81 out of 206 were ' low technical ability', representing 39.32%. 
In terms of the pre-session survey given to the participants before starting the 
participation in the experiments, two participants had changes in their technical ability and 
105 
Chapter 8: Experiments 
Phishing awareness. One of them had high technical ability based on the information given 
in the pre-session survey though classified as low technical ability from the pre-study 
survey. The other participant was Phishing Aware according to the pre-session survey 
whereas the participant was Phishing Unaware as suggested by the information given in the 
pre-study survey. 
8.3.4. Demographic Information 
First Experiment 
I Control 1 
H(6 ) 
L { 6 ) 
^ p r o a c h 
H ( « ) 
L ( 6 ) 
H (6 ) 
L ( 6 ) 
Keys: 
H means people with High technical ability, 
L means people with Low technical abtiiiy. 
(n) ihe number between Drackets indicates 
ihe number of participants. 
The webs i tes ' and treatment's order followed by each group. 
Ordtr 
Ordn- Titck 
















H (3 ) 
L ( 3 ) 
Thiird Experiment {Ph ish ing A w a r e n e s s ) 
Phishing 
Aware 
H ( 6 ) 
t ( 6 ) 
Phish ing 
(control) 
H ( 6 ) 
L ( 6 ) 
Figure 42: The three experiments & the websites' and treatment's order 
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For the evaluation experiments, three different experiments were carried out and their 
overview is shown in Figure 42. A total of 48 different people participated in the 
experiments and Table 12 shows their demographics. In all three experiments, participants 
were randomly placed in the experiments' groups. 
Age 
18-25 42 (87.5%) 
26-32 5(10.4%) 




Male 16 (33.33%) 
Female 32 (66.66%) 
Language 
Native English Speaker 42 (87.5%) 
Non-native English Speaker 6 (12.5%) 
Level of Study 
Undergraduate 37(77.1%) 
Postgraduate 11(22,9%) 
Table 12: The demographics of the total subjects participated in the three experiments 
In the first experiment, to assess the anti-Phishing approach, there were three groups. 
Control, Old Approach and New Approach. There were 36 participants in the experiment. 
Each group had 12 participants divided into two subgroups. High and Low technical ability. 
Thus, each subgroup had 6 panicipants. Table 13 presents the demographics of the first 
experiment's participants. 
Age 
18-25 31 (86.1%) 
26-32 4 (11.1%) 




Male 12 (33.33%) 
Female 24 (66.66%) 
Language 
Native English Speaker 31 (86.1%) 
Non-native English Speaker 5 (13.9%) 
Level of Study 
Undergraduate 29 (80.6%) 
Postgraduate 7 (19.4%) 
Table 13: The demographics of the subjects participated in the first experiment 
The second experiment, to assess anti-Phishing knowledge retention, is called also the 
Retention experiment. This experiment had two groups, Old Approach and New Approach. 
There were 12 participants in the experiment. Each group had 6 participants divided into 
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two subgroups. High and Low technical ability. Thus, each subgroup had 3 participants. A l l 
subjects in the second experiment also participated in the first experiment. This means that 
they participated in the first experiment and then, after a period of time, they were called 
back and asked to participate in the second experiment. The period between the two 
experiments varied from subject to subject. However, the average period was 16.7 days. 
Table 14 presents the demographics of the second experiment's participants. 
18-25 11 (91.7%) 
26-32 1 (8.3%) 





Female 7 (58.3%) 
Language 
Native English Speaker 
Non-native English Speaker 
10(86.1%) 
2(13.9%) 





Table 14: The demographics or the subjects participated in the second experiment (Retention) 
The third experiment is named the Phishing Aware experiment. 24 participants were 
divided into two groups, Phishing Aware participants and Phishing Unaware participants 
(Control). Each group had 12 participants. Each group was divided into two subgroups. 
High and Low technical ability. Thus, each subgroup had 6 participants. Table 15 shows the 
demographics of the third experiment's participants. 
18-25 20 (83.3%) 
26-32 3(12.5%) 




Male 8 (33.33%) 
Female 16 (66.67%) 
Native English Speaker 21 (87.5%) 
Non-native English Speaker 3(12.5%) 
Level of Study Undergraduate 
16(66.67%) 
Postgraduate 8 (33.33%) 
Table 15: The demographics of the subjects participated in the third experiment (Phishing Aware) 
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In total, 48 participants took part in the experiments. 60 trials (i.e. experiment runs) were 
carried out (48 participants, of whom 12 participated in both the first experiment and the 
Retention experiment). While this might seem limited, the numbers for an experiment of 
this type quickly grow to unmanageable sizes. A decision was taken to conduct small well-
controlled experiments and hence the experiments setup described. 
There were two different blocks in the experiments, Technical Ability (TA) and 
Phishing Awareness (PA). Each block had two different levels. Technical Abil i ty had High 
and Low whereas the Phishing Awareness had Aware and Unaware. The first experiment 
had three groups, Control, Old Approach and New Approach. In order to compare these 
groups properly, it was necessary to include the blocks Technical Abili ty (TA) and Phishing 
Awareness (PA) in each group. As an initial number, 10 participants for each level in each 
block in each group were set as shown in Table 16. This means 40 participants were 
required in each group. This implies 120 participants were required for the experiments. 
This number was considered to be unmanageable in size and requiring too much effort in 
time and funds to be conducted. 
Technical Ability 
Phishing Knowledge 
High Low Total 
Aware 10 10 20 
Unaware 10 10 20 
Total 20 20 40 
Table 16: The initial size for each group in the first experiment 
Then, the number of participants in each level was reduced several times until it was set 
as 6 participants. This means that 24 participants were required in each group. 
Consequently, 72 participants were needed for the experiments. Due to the fact that only 
Phishing Unaware people were needed to participate in the first experiment, Phishing Aware 
people were excluded. Therefore, there were 6 participants in each Technical Ability level, 
which in turn means 12 participants were required in each group. Thus, 36 participants were 
asked to participate in the first experiment. 
In the retention experiment, as many o f the first experiment' participants who were 
available came back to take part. For the third experiment, Phishing Aware people were 
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required to participate and their results were needed to be compared with the results of 
Phishing Unaware people (Control group in the first experiment). Therefore, a decision was 
taken to have a similar number to the Control group (12 participants) considered 'Phishing 
Aware'. There were 6 participants in each Technical Ability level. Then, they were asked to 
take part in the experiment. In total, there were 48 participants and their distribution is 
presented in Table 17. 
Technical Ability 
Phishing Knowledge 
High Low Total 
Aware 6 6 12 
Unaware 18 18 36 
Total 24 24 48 
Table 17: The final sample size for all groups participated in the experiments 
8.4. Effectiveness Ratios 
In this section, the effectiveness ratios that were used in evaluating the hypotheses are 
described. 
8.4.1. Decisions for Website Legitimacy 
8.4.1.1. Definitions 
There were four types of decisions. They are, as shown in Table 18, True Positive (TP), 
True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN). They are defined as 
follows: 
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User Decision 
Website Legitimacy ^^^-^^ 
True False 
Positive TP FP 
Negative TN FN 
Table 18: The possible decisions could be made regarding websites' legitimacy 
True Positive (TP): The TP case happens when a legitimate website is considered as 
legitimate. 
True Negative (TN): The T N case happens when a Phishing website is considered as 
Phishing. 
False Positive (FP): The FP case happens when a legitimate website is considered as 
Phishing. 
False Negative (FN): The FN case happens when a Phishing website is considered as 
legitimate. 
8.4.1.2. Decision vs. Result's Type 
The four different decisions have different types o f results in terms o f their effects on the 
end-user's sensitive security information. The types of the decision's results are illustrated 
in Table 19. 




Incorrect. It is a matter of inconvenience since the user does not 
hand in their sensitive information to legitimate website because of 
their fears. 
FN 
Incorrect. It is considered as the most und&sirable result since the 
user hands over their sensitive information to fraudsters. 
Table 19: Decisions vs. results' types 
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8.4.2. Ratios 
8.4.2.1. Calculation 
The ratios described here were used in evaluating the experiments. The end-user's 
decisions on judging a website could be either correct or wrong. The Correct Decision 
means either submitting information to a legitimate website or not submitting information to 
a Phishing website. Otherwise, the decisions are classified as wrong ones. Therefore, the 
first ratio is the Correct Decision Rate (CDR). The CDR is calculated as shown in Formula 
1. 
NumberOfCo rrectDecis ions 
CDR = (1) 
NumberOfWe bsites 
The other two ratios used in the evaluation are False Positive Rate (FPR) and False 
Negative Rate (FNR). The FPR's and FNR's calculations are shown in Formulas 2 and 3 
respectively. 
NumberOfFa IsePositives 
FPR = (2) 
NumberOfLegitimateSi tes 
_ NumberOfFalseNegatives ^ 
NumberOfPh ishingSites 
8.4.2.2. Values 
The values of the three ratios (CDR, FPR and FNR) are between 0 and 1. Because CDR 
is based on correct answers, a higher CDR result from the experiments is better than a lower 
value. In contrast, because FPR and FNR are based on wrong answers, the lower FPR and 
FNR the better is the result. 
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8.4.2.3. Ratios' Use in Evaluating the Hypotheses 
Each hypothesis in the evaluation is stated based on the three ratios (CDR, FPR and 
FNR). This means that each hypothesis then becomes three different hypotheses because 
there is one hypothesis for each ratio. 
The three ratios were used for different purposes in evaluating the research hypotheses. 
The Correct Decision Rate (CDR) is the main and the decisive ratio. Therefore, the final 
resuh is based on the CDR comparisons. However, the comparisons of False Positive Rate 
(FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR) were used to give clear descriptions of the decisions 
made about the legitimate websites and Phishing websites respectively. The False Positive 
Rate (FPR) was based on the legitimate websites and the False Negative Rate (FNR) was 
based on the Phishing websites. 
8.5. Comparisons between Real Phishing Attaclcs and Experiments 
In the real world, a variety of issues are involved in the majority of Phishing attacks. 
These include the following: 
1. The user does not know that they have received a Phishing attack. 
2. The Phishing attack has some clues that are indicative that it is a Phishing attack. For 
example, an eBay user may be advised to follow a link spelled www.paypal.com 
(the ' / ' of 'pal' is replaced by the digit one '1 ' ) and provide their information 
believing it to be the genuine Paypal website. 
3. The user may reveal their sensitive information to the phisher via a fake email or 
website. 
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4. In context-aware Phishing attacks"^ the user may receive an email that uses their 
contextual information such as the user's real name. 
For the Phishing experiments, in order to simulate real Phishing attacks, there should be 
some considerations of the following issues; 
1. The subjects should not have knowledge about Phishing before taking part in the 
experiment. This is because knowing about Phishing in advance wi l l affect the 
subjects' behaviors. Thus, having subjects who are considered 'unaware' about 
Phishing is better than having aware subjects. Therefore, the more accurate the 
selection of the unaware subjects, the more accurate wi l l be the results of the 
experiment. 
2. The subjects should not know that they are being tested about Phishing attacks. 
3. The Phishing attacks in experiments should be similar to the real ones. This means 
that the Phishing clues in emails or web browsers should be similar to the real ones. 
4. The experiment should not put the participants at any risk. This means that their 
sensitive information (passwords, PFNs, credit card details, and so on) should be 
safe, secure and anonymous to anyone, even to the experimenters themselves 
[JakobssonRatkiewicz06]. 
5. In context-aware Phishing experiments, the attacks should use some contextual 
information about the participants. 
6. The dependent and independent variables, and the metrics to be calculated, need to 
be clear. 
8.6, Methodology 
In order to evaluate the research hypotheses, a pilot study was undertaken and then three 
experiments were conducted. 
A context-aware Phishing attack happens when the phisher gains knowledge (name, date of birth, part of 
credit card number, etc.) about the victim and then use it to customize an attack that appears to be from a 
genuine website [RobilaRagucci06]. 
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8.6.1. Pilot Study 
8.6.1.1. Objective 
In order to carry out well-designed evaluation experiments, a pilot study was run before 
the experiments. The main benefit of having a pilot study was to discover the mistakes and 
errors that could occur in the experiment. Subsequently, the errors were corrected in order to 
have well-designed experiments. 
8.6.1.2. Scenario Overvie w 
A pilot study that involved 8 participants was carried out. The participants used the 
experimental scenario as well as the software of the proposed anti-Phishing approach. There 
were no different groups. A l l participants had the same scenario. Each participant performed 
in a separate session of nearly 20 minutes. The scenario, email and websites used, were 
similar to the scenario used in the first experiment and shown in the next section (8.6.2). 
861.3. Errors 
The errors that occurred in the pilot study are divided into two types, technical and 
procedural. 
I. Technical Errors 
The technical errors were related to the technologies used in the experiments. There 
were few technical errors, such as the email client {Maktoob email portal [Maktoob]) 
marking the emails as unsafe. So the emails were signed suspicious and the client did not 
show the organization's legitimate logo in the content of the emails. Additionally, the 
firewall running in the machine popped up messages. 
II. Procedural Errors 
The procedural errors were related to the experiment procedures and scenarios. There 
were few procedural errors, such as the Halifax password written on the Scenario 
115 
Chapter 8: Experiments 
Information Sheet (See Appendix B) was not completed. One error also was that a 
participant checked the emails randomly (i.e. not in order). 
8.6.1.4. Debugging 
A l l the errors reported in the pilot study were resolved. The technical errors were fixed 
and the procedural errors were corrected and re-designed. 
8,6.2. The First Experiment 
The experimental participants undertook email and web role-play protocol. The use of 
role-play in the experiment, while not being ideal, does give a close approximation to real 
world behaviour [Downs et al.07]. The evaluation protocol was used successfully in other 
studies [Downs et al.06, Kumaraguru et al.07a]. Participants were asked to deal with emails 
because Phishing websites are usually reached through emails that ask users to click on a 
link. Each participant played the role of an imaginary person named "Dave Smith". Dave 
Smith is an employee of a company and works in the marketing department. Participants 
were asked to interact with the emails and websites in the way they would normally do. 
Participants were told that the experiment would investigate "how people effectively 
manage and use the Internet and emails". They undertook a pre-study survey about their 
email usage to enforce the idea that this was an experiment about their use of email systems 
and the Internet. A l l participants in this experiment were considered 'Phishing Unaware' 
because it was necessary to have participants with no knowledge about Phishing in 
evaluating the New Approach. Having participants with Phishing knowledge in advance 
may provide biased results in Phishing experiments. People who know about Phishing (i.e. 
Phishing Aware) might use their own knowledge to detect a Phishing website rather than the 
knowledge they receive from the New Approach. 
The study was recorded (audio and screen) using Camtasia software in order to re-play 
the experiments for further analysis i f required. 
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Accounts with some well-known organizations such as eBay, PayPal and Amazon were 
created for the user, Dave Smith. Participants were given an information sheet that included 
a description of the experiment's scenario as well as usemames and passwords for the 
employee's accounts at the organizations (See Appendix B). 
The experiment was divided into two parts: pre-treatment and post-treatment. In the pre-
treatment part, all participants in all groups dealt with the emails and websites without 
having their treatment. In the post-treatment part, participants had different treatments 
according to the group in which they had been placed. The groups were as follows: 
• Control group: In this group, the treatment was an email from work (in this instance, an 
ordinary email from work, essentially a null treatment). 
• Old Approach group: In this group, the treatment was anti-Phishing tips sent by email. 
It was an email with online training material on Phishing. 
• New Approach group: In this group, the treatment was the New Approach. 
Each participant was shown 13 email messages (7 messages are for the pre-treatment 
part and 6 are for the post-treatment part). Five messages were legitimate email messages, 
with no embedded links, that Dave Smith received from colleagues at his company and 
friends. These messages were just to re-enforce the idea that the experiment was about how 
people effectively use and manage the Internet and email. Dave Smith was expected to 
perform simple tasks such as replying. The other 8 email messages (implies 8 related 
websites) were divided into 4 simulated legitimate emails f rom organizations with which 
Dave Smith had an account and 4 Phishing emails. In the New Approach group, the 
intervention was run based on visiting a blacklisted (Phishing) website. This website is 
Paypal Phishing website (See Table 20). 
The order of the emails and websites for both the pre-treatment and post-treatment parts 
were predefined in all groups and are shown in Table 20. The emails and websites 
highlighted are the groups' different treatments. 
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Website Tricks U R L 
1 Phishing Phishing Phishing Amazon Large Host names www.amazon.co.uk.me.com 
2 Friend Friend Friend N / A N/A N/A 
3 Work Work Work N / A N/A N/A 
4 Legitimate Legitimate Legitimate Hal i fax N/A www.halifax-online.co.uk 
5 Phishing Phishing Phishing Citibank Misspelled Website www.citybank.co.uk 












N / A 
N / A 
N / A 
www.ebay.com 
For the Intervention 
website, misspelled website 
was used 
(www.paypal .com) 
9 Legitimate Legitimate Legitimate Amazon N / A www.amazon.co.uk 
10 Phishing Phishing Phishing Lloyds Misspelled Website www.online.110ydstsb.co.uk 
11 Friend Friend Friend N / A N / A N / A 
12 Legitimate Legitimate Legitimate Barclays N/A www.barclays.co.uk 
13 Friend Friend Friend N / A N/A N / A 
14 Phishing Phishing Phishing eBay Different Domain www.ebay-security.com 
Table 20: The emails and websites order for each group in the first experiment 
There were different URL syntax tricks (i.e. Phishing clues) used in the experiment. 
They formed the URLs for the Phishing websites. They were as follows: 
• URLs with a different domain from a well-known domain, 
• URLs with misspelled known websites and 
• URLs with large host names that contained a part of a well-known web addresses. 
8.6.3. The Second Experiment (Retention Experiment) 
About 16 days after the first experiment, users of the New Approach and Old Approach 
groups in the first experiment were asked to perform a follow up experiment. This was the 
Second experiment. The target number of participants was as many as could come back. 
However, participants with low technical ability (LTA) and high technical ability (HTA) 
were needed within each group in order to ensure equal chances. Therefore, 12 participants 
were available and participated in the second experiment. Each group (Old Approach and 
New Approach) had 6 participants, divided into two subgroups, High and Low technical 
ability. Each subgroup had 3 participants. 
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This experiment was similar to the first one. The participants undertook email and web 
role-play protocol. Each participant played the role of an imaginary person named "Dave 
Smith". They had the same scenarios. However, there were differences. There were no 
treatments given to the participants. They had different emails and websites. Each 
participant was shown 14 email messages. Six messages were legitimate email messages, 
with no embedded links, that Dave Smith received from colleagues at his company and from 
friends. The other 8 email messages (implies 8 related websites) were divided into 4 
simulated legitimate emails from organizations with which Dave Smith had an account and 
4 Phishing emails. 
The order of the emails and websites was predefined and identical for both groups and 
they are shown in Table 21. Re-using the emails and websites used in the first experiment 
might have allowed the participants to use their memory rather than their Phishing 
knowledge to react to the websites; consequently, the emails and websites in the second 
experiment were different from the ones used in the first experiment. However, the emails 
and websites in the second experiment used the same order followed in the first experiment. 
The websites also used the same URL tricks (i.e. Phishing clues) used in the first 
experiments and in the same order (See Tables 20 and 21). 
# 
eMails and Website Tricks U R L 
Websites Order 
1 Phishing Argos Large Host names www.argos.co.uk.myshop.com 
2 Friend N / A N / A N / A 
3 Work N/A N / A N/A 
4 Legitimate Abbey Bank N / A www.abbeynational.co.uk 
5 Phishing Capital One Misspelled Website www.capitalOneOnline.co.uk 
6 Work N / A N / A N/A 
7 Legitimate Comet N / A www.comet.co.uk 
8 Work N / A N / A N / A 




Misspelled Website www.co-operattivebank.co.uk 
11 Friend N / A N / A N / A 
12 Legitimate Egg Bank N / A www.egg.com 
13 Friend N / A N / A N/A 
14 Phishing Phishing Different Domain www.comet-online.co.uk 
Table 21: The emails and websites order for each group in the second and third experiment 
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8.6.4. The Third Experiment (Phishing Awareness Experiment) 
This experiment was exactly the same as the second one. The participants undertook 
email and web role-play protocol. Each participant again played the role of an imaginary 
person named "Dave Smith". They had the same scenarios. There were no treatments given 
to the participants. They had the same emails and websites with the same order as shown in 
Table 21. They also had the same URL tricks. 
There were 12 participants. They were divided into two subgroups, High and Low 
Technical Abil i ty. Each subgroup had 6 participants. A l l participants were 'Phishing Aware' 
people because there is need to have participants with knowledge about Phishing in order to 
compare their CDRs, FPRs and FNRs with Phishing Unaware people. These people were 
the Control group participants who took part in the first experiment. 
8.7. Summary 
This chapter has discussed the evaluation experiments. The chapter started with the 
hypotheses and their themes. Then, it presented the recruitment of the experiments' 
participants and their demographic information. This included the design of pre-study 
survey and its goals. After that, the chapter showed the effectiveness ratios, CDR, FPR and 
FNR, used in evaluating the hypotheses. Then, in order to have an overview of what should 
be simulated in the experiments, the comparisons between real Phishing attacks and 
Phishing experiments were considered. Finally, the methodology of the experiments was 
then discussed. 
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9. Evaluation 
9.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the evaluation of the research hypotheses presented eariier in 
Chapter 8. The hypotheses are classified in four research themes. They are evaluating the 
New Approach, the effect o f high and low technical abilities on Phishing prevention, the 
effect of Phishing awareness and Phishing unawareness on Phishing detection and anti-
Phishing knowledge retention. Each research theme has its own research hypotheses. 
Achieving the conclusion of each theme is accomplished by statistically analyzing its 
hypotheses. 
9.2. Analysis 
The statistical methods used were Kruskal-Wallis, Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks tests because the data is not normally distributed. The Confidence Interval was 95%. 
9.2.1. Evaluating the New Approach 
The theme of evaluating the New Approach has three aspects. Each aspect is discussed 
separately. They are as follows: 
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9.2.1.1. Aspect: Assessing Users without Treatments 
Hypothesis (1.1): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.1): Before using any treatment in the three groups (Control, Old 
Approach and New Approach groups), there are no differences between the correct 
decisions rates (CDRs) between all groups. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Group 
Level of Technical 
Ability 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Low .5417 .10206 6 
Control Group High .5000 ,00000 6 
Total .5208 .07217 12 
Low .5000 .00000 6 
Old Approach Group High .5000 .00000 6 
Total .5000 .00000 12 
Low .5417 .10206 6 
New Approach Group High .5000 .00000 6 
Total .5208 .07217 12 
Low .5278 .08085 18 
Total High .5000 ,00000 18 
Total .5139 .05808 36 
Table 22: Descriptive statistics for C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.1 
The correct decisions' rates (CDRs) for the New Approach, Old Approach and 
Control groups are based on the decisions taken by the groups' subjects before having 
their treatments. As Table 22 shows, the CDRs for the New Approach, Old Approach, 
and Control groups are nearly the same. They are .52, .50 and .52 respectively. 
There are no significant differences between the rates of the three groups. The 
statistical difference between all groups before having treatments is p=.464. In order to 
see which group differs from another, Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to follow up 
the different results. A Bonferroni correction was applied so that the critical level of 
significance becomes 0.0167. Therefore, the statistical difference between the New 
Approach group and the Old Approach group is p=.522 and the difference between the 
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New Approach group and the Control group is p=1.000. The statistical difference also 
between the Old Approach group and the Control group is p=.522. Thus, the null 
hypothesis 1.1 is accepted. As a result of this, it is clear that the CDRs for all the three 
groups were the same before having any treatments. 
Hypothesis (1.2): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.2): Before using any treatment in the three groups (Control, Old 
Approach and New Approach groups), there are no differences between the false 
positive rates (FPRs) between all groups. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Group 
Level of Technical 
Ability 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Low .0000 .00000 6 
Control Group High .0833 .20412 6 
Total .0417 .14434 12 
Low .0833 .20412 6 
Old Approach Group High .1667 .25820 6 
Total .1250 .22613 12 
Low .0833 .20412 6 
New Approach Group High .0000 .00000 6 
Total .0417 .14434 12 
Low .0556 .16169 18 
Total High .0833 .19174 18 
Total .0694 .17537 36 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics for F P R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.2 
The false positive rates (FPRs) for the New Approach, Old Approach and Control 
groups are based on the decisions taken by the groups' subjects before having their 
treatments. As Table 23 demonstrates, the FPRs for the New Approach and Control 
groups are lower than the Old Approach group's rate. The rate for both is approximately 
0.04 whereas the FPR for the Old Approach group is about 0.13. 
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There are no significant differences between the three rates for the three groups. This 
is because the statistical difference between them i s p = 3 l 6 . In order to see which group 
differs from another, Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to follow up the different 
results. Thus, the difference between the New Approach group and the Control group is 
p= 1.000. The difference between the New Approach and Old Approach groups is 
p=.317 and the difference between Old Approach group and Control group is also 
p=.317 as well. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 1.2 is accepted. 
Hypothes i s (1.3): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.3): Before using any treatment in the three groups (Control, Old 
Approach and New Approach groups), there are no differences between the false 
negative rates (FNRs) between all groups. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Group 
Level of Technical 
Ability 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Low .9167 .20412 6 
Control Group High .9167 .20412 6 
Total .9167 .19462 12 
Low .9167 .20412 6 
Old Approach Group High .8333 .25820 6 
Total .8750 .22613 12 
Low .8333 .25820 6 
New Approach Group High 1.0000 .00000 6 
Total .9167 .19462 12 
Low .8889 .21390 18 
Total High .9167 .19174 18 
Total .9028 .20069 36 
Table 24: Descriptive statistics for F N R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.3 
The false negative rates (FNRs) for the New Approach, Old Approach and Control 
groups are based on the decisions taken by the groups' subjects before having their 
treatments. Table 24 shows the FNRs for all groups. The FNR for the Old Approach 
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group is about 0.88. The FNRs for the New Approach and Control groups are higher 
than the Old Approach group's rate. The rate for both is approximately 0.92. 
A l l the three rates are high. There are no significant differences between them 
(p=\.000). In order to see which group differs from another, Mann-Whitney tests were 
carried out to follow up the different results. Thus, it was found that the statistical 
difference between each group and the other groups is not significant; p=l.OOO. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis 1.3 is accepted. 
Aspect Discussion: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 1.1 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.2 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.3 Accepted 
Table 25: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing users before treatments 
It is clear from Table 25 that users in the three groups were nearly equal with regards 
to their decisions about legitimate and Phishing websites before using any treatment. 
There is no difference in their correct decisions' rate (CDR). There are also no 
differences in their false positive and false negative rates. 
9.2.1.2. Aspect: Assessing the New Approach in Comparison with the Old 
Approach 
Hypothesis (1.4): 
" Null Hypothesis (1.4): There is no difference between the correct decisions rate 
(CDR) for the New Approach group after using the New Approach and the CDRs for 
the Old Approach group and the Control group after using their treatments. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
" Result: Reject. 
• Discussion: 
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Group 
Level of Technical 
Ability Mean 
Std. Deviation N 
Low .4583 .10206 6 
Control Group High .5833 .12910 6 
Total .5208 .12873 12 
Low .5000 .15811 6 
Old Approach Group High .5417 .18819 6 
Total .5208 .16714 12 
Low .8333 .12910 6 
New Approach Group High .7083 .18819 6 
Total .7708 .16714 12 
Low .5972 .21246 18 
Total High .6111 .17620 18 
Total .6042 .19249 36 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics for C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.4 
The correct decisions' rates (CDRs) for the New Approach, Old Approach and 
Control groups are based on the decisions taken by the groups' subjects after having 
their treatments. As Table 26 shows, the CDR for the New Approach group is higher 
than the Old Approach group's rate. The rate is approximately 0.77 out of 1 for the New 
Approach group whereas it is about 0.52 for the Old Approach group and the Control 
group. 
There is a significant difference between the groups (p=.00\). In order to see which 
group differs from another, Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to follow up the 
different results. The significant difference between the New Approach and Old 
Approach groups is p=.002. Additionally, there is a significant difference between the 
rates o f the New Approach group and the Control group (p=.OQl). This means that there 
was a significant positive effect of using the New Approach in comparison with the Old 
Approach and having no approaches (Control group). By using the New Approach, the 
subjects were highly protected from making mistakes in judging legitimate and Phishing 
websites. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. Regarding the comparison between 
the Old Approach and the Control groups, there is no significant statistical difference 
between the two groups which is p=.500. 
As a result of this, it is shown that the CDR for the New Approach group after using 
the New Approach was better than the CDRs for the Old Approach group and the 
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Control group after using their treatments. The Old Approach also had no significant 
effect on judging both the legitimate and Phishing websites. 
Hypothesis (1.5): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.5): There is no difference between the false positive rate (FPR) 
for the New Approach group after using the New Approach and the FPRs for the Old 
Approach group and the Control group after using their treatments. 
" Statistical analysis method used: Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Group Ability Mean Std. Deviation N 
Low ,1667 .25820 6 
Control Group High .0833 .20412 6 
Total .1250 .22613 12 
Low .1667 ,25820 6 
Old Approach Group High .3333 ,25820 6 
Total .2500 .26112 12 
Low ,0833 ,20412 6 
New Approach Group High .1667 .25820 6 
Total .1250 .22613 12 
Low .1389 ,23044 18 
Total High .1944 .25082 18 
Total .1667 .23905 36 
Table 27: Descriptive statistics for F P R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.S 
The false positive rates (FPRs) for the three groups (the New Approach group, Old 
Approach group and Control group) were counted after the subjects had their different 
treatments. Because the false positive was a wrong decision, the lower the FPR result the 
better was the judgment by subjects about the legitimate websites. As Table 27 shows, 
the FPRs for the New Approach and Control groups are lower than the Old Approach 
group's rate. The rate is about 0.13 out of 1 in both the New Approach and Control 
groups, whereas it is 0.25 in the Old Approach group. 
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There were no significant differences between the three rates for the three groups 
{p=.490). In order to see which group differs from another, Mann-Whitney tests were 
carried out to follow up the different results. The statistical difference between the New 
Approach group and the Control group is p=.68Q. However, the difference also between 
the New Approach group and the Old Approach group and the difference between the 
Old Approach group and the Control group are equal (p=.200). Therefore, there were no 
significant effects of using the New Approach and the Old Approach on properly 
judging the legitimate websites by the subjects because they did not significantly differ 
from the Control group who did not have any approach. As a result of this analysis, the 
null hypothesis 1.5 is accepted. The New and the Old Approaches had no effect on 
helping the subjects to judge the legitimate websites. 
The reason why there are no differences in false positive rates (FPRs) across the 
three groups is because nearly all the participants responded to the legitimate websites 
regardless of whether or not they were cautious of Phishing websites. This is due to the 
fact that i f they knew about Phishing, they most probably responded to the website 
because they considered it to be 'legitimate' and i f they did not know about Phishing, 
they responded because they believed that it was a legitimate website. 
Hypothes i s (1.6): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.6): There is no difference between the false negative rate (FNR) 
for the New Approach group after using the New Approach and the FNRs for the 
Old Approach group and the Control group after using their treatments. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Reject. 
• Discussion: 
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Group 
Level of Technical 
Ability 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
Low .9167 .20412 6 
Control Group High .7500 .41833 6 
Total .8333 .32567 12 
Low .8333 .25820 6 
Old Approach Group High .5833 .20412 6 
Total .7083 .25746 12 
Low .3333 .25820 6 
New Approach Group High .4167 .37639 6 
Total .3750 .31079 12 
Low .6944 .34890 18 
Total High .5833 .35355 18 
Total .6389 .35074 36 
Table 28: Descriptive statistics for F N R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.6 
The false negative rates (FNRs) for the three groups are based on the subjects' 
decisions on Phishing websites after they had their different treatments. Because the 
false negative was a wrong decision, the lower the FNR result the better was the 
subjects' judgment on the Phishing websites. Table 28 presents the FNRs for the three 
groups. The New Approach group has the lowest rate. Their rate is 0.38 out of 1. In 
contrast the subjects in Control group have the highest rate, which is approximately 
0.83. The Old Approach group's rate is in between the New Approach group and the 
Control group at about 0.71. 
The difference between the groups is significant {p=.002). In order to see which 
group differs f rom another, Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to follow up the 
different results. There is a significant difference between the New Approach and the 
Old Approach groups (p=.0l2). In addition, there is a significant effect on the New 
Approach group in comparison with the Control group (p=.001). Therefore, the null 
hypothesis 1.6 is rejected. However, although the rate of the false negative decisions for 
the Old Approach subjects is better than for the ones for the Control group, there is no 
statistically significant difference between them. The difference is p= .107. 
It is clear that there are significant effects of using the New Approach group in 
comparison with the Old Approach group and no treatments (the Control group) in 
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helping subjects to judge the Phishing websites properly and thus to enable them to 
detect the Phishing attacks. Thus, the false negative rate (FNR) for the New Approach 
group after using the New Approach is better (less) than the FNR for the Old Approach 
group and the Control group. 
Aspect Discussion: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 1.4 Rejected 
Hypothesis 1,5 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.6 Rejected 
Table 29: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing the New Approach in comparison with 
the Old Approach 
Table 29 shows a summary of the results of the three hypotheses discussed so far for 
assessing the New Approach in comparison with the Old Approach. It has been found 
that there is a significant positive effect of using the New Approach in comparison with 
the Old Approach. The users of the New Approach were highly protected from making 
mistakes in judging legitimate and Phishing websites. In detail, the New and the Old 
Approaches were equal on helping the subjects to judge the legitimate websites. 
However, there was a significant effect of using the New Approach in comparison with 
the Old Approach in helping subjects to judge the Phishing websites properly and this 
enabled them to detect the Phishing attacks. This means that the New Approach worked 
better than the Old Approach. This is demonstrated by the comparisons of the correct 
decisions' rate (CDR) of the two approaches discussed earlier. 
Regarding the comparison between the Old Approach and the Control groups, the 
Old Approach had no significant effect on their ability to judge both the legitimate and 
Phishing websites. 
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9.2.1.3. Aspect- Assessing Users Before and After Using the Treatments 
Hypothesis (1.7): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.7): In the Control group, there is no difference between the correct 
decisions rates (CDRs) after having the treatment (in this instance ordinary email from 
work essentially not treatment) and the CDRs before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Results: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
CDR after treatment .5208 12 .12873 
CDR before treatment .5208 12 .07217 
Table 30: Descriptive statistics for C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.7 
The correct decisions' rates (CDRs) for the Control group compared in the 
hypothesis 1.7 are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after 
having their treatment which was an ordinary email from work. Table 30 shows the two 
rates. The CDR for the Control group before the treatment is exactly the same as the 
CDR for the same group after taking the treatment. The CDRs before and after the 
treatment are 0.52. There is also no statistical difference between the two CDRs. This is 
because the statistical difference between them is /?= 1.000. As a result of this analysis, 
the null hypothesis 1.7 is accepted. Due to the fact that the Control group did not have 
an actual treatment, the subjects reacted to both the Phishing and legitimate websites 
before and after the treatment at nearly the same average rate in the experiments. 
Hypothesis (1.8): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.8): In the Control group, there is no difference between the false 
positive rate (FPR) after having the 'treatment' (in this instance ordinary email from 
work essentially not treatment) and the FPR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
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Result: Accept 
Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
FPR after treatment .1250 12 .22613 
FPR before treatment .0417 12 .14434 
Table 31: Descriptive statistics for F P R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.8 
The false positive rates (FPRs) for the Control group compared in hypothesis 1.8 are 
based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after having their 
treatment, which was an ordinary email from work. As Table 31 shows, the false 
positive rate FPR for the Control group before the treatment is lower than the FPR for 
the same group after taking the treatment. The FPR before the treatment is 0.04, whereas 
it is approximately 0.13 after the treatment. However, there is no statistical difference 
between the two FPRs. This is because the statistical difference between them isp=.500. 
As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 1.8 is accepted. Due to the fact that the 
Control group did not have an actual treatment, the subjects reacted to the legitimate 
websites before and after the treatment at rates close to each other in the experiments. 
Hypothesis (1.9): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.9): In the Control group, there is no difference between the false 
negative rate (FNR) after having the treatment (in this instance ordinary email from 
work essentially not treatment) and the FNR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
" Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Results: Accept. 
" Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
FNR after treatment .8333 12 .32567 
FNR before treatment .9167 12 .19462 
Table 32: Descriptive statistics for F N R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.9 
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The false negative rates (FNRs) for the Control group compared in hypothesis 1.9 
are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after having their 
treatment, which in this instance was an ordinary email from work, essentially not 
treatment. Table 32 shows the two rates. The FNR for the Control group before the 
treatment is higher than the FNR for the same group after taking the treatment. The FNR 
before the treatment is 0.92 but it is 0.83 after the treatment. However, there is no 
statistical difference between the two FNRs. This is because the statistical difference 
between them is p=.500. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 1.9 is accepted. 
Due to the fact that the Control group did not have an actual treatment, the subjects 
reacted to the Phishing websites before and after the treatment at nearly similar average 
rate in the experiments. 
Hypothesis (1.10): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.10): In the Old Approach group, there is no difference between 
the correct decisions rate (CDR) after having the treatment (i.e. an anti-Phishing 
training email) and the CDR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
The rate after treatment .5417 12 .20871 
The rate before treatment .4792 12 .07217 
Table 33: Descriptive statistics f o r C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.10 
The correct decisions rates (CDRs) for the Old Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after 
having their treatment which was an anti-Phishing training email. As presented in Table 
33, the CDR for the Old Approach group before the treatment is 0.48 whereas it is 0.54 
after the treatment. There is no statistical difference between the two CDRs; p=.250. As 
a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 1.10 is accepted. 
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Hypothesis (1.11): 
= Null Hypothesis (1.11): In the Old Approach group, there is no difference between 
the false positive rate (FPR) after having the treatment (i.e. an anti-Phishing training 
email) and the FPR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
° Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
FPR after treatment .2500 12 .26112 
FPR before treatment .1667 12 .24618 
Table 34: Descriptive statistics f o r FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.11 
The false positive rates (FPRs) for the Old Approach group shown in this hypothesis 
are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after having their 
treatment, which was an anti-Phishing training email. As shown in Table 34, the FPR for 
the Old Approach group before the treatment is lower (0.17) than the FPR after the 
treatment (0.25). This is deterioration but there is no statistical difference between the 
two FPRs; p=.344. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 1.11 is accepted. 
The deterioration in the FPRs is because, before having the treatment, nearly all the 
subjects responded to the legitimate websites because they believed that they were 
legitimate websites. After having the treatment, they became worried about the 
legitimacy of websites. Then, i f they had a legitimate website to respond to, they 
preferred not to respond in order to be on the safe side. Thus, the FPR after the treatment 
is higher (worse) than the FPR before the treatment. 
Hypothesis (1.12): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.12): In the Old Approach group, there is no difference between 
the false negative rate (FNR) after having the treatment (i.e. an anti-Phishing training 
email) and the FNR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
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Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
Result: Accept. 
Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
FNR after treatment .6667 12 .32567 
FNR before treatment .8750 12 .22613 
Table 35: Descriptive statistics f o r FNRs ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.12 
The false negative rates (FNRs) for the Old Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after 
having their treatment, which was an anti-Phishing training email. As shown in Table 
35, the FNR for the Old Approach group before the treatment is higher (0.88) than its 
FNR after the treatment (0.67). 
The statistical difference between the FNR after the treatment and the FNR before 
the treatment is not significant; p=.063. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 
1.12 is accepted. Therefore, in the Old Approach group, the FNR after having the 
treatment (i.e. an anti-Phishing training email) is better (less) than the FNR before 
having the treatment but there is no significant effect. 
Hypothesis (1.13): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.13): In the New Approach group, there is no difference between 
the correct decisions rate (CDR) after having the treatment (i.e. anti-Phishing 
intervention) and the CDR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Reject. 
• Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
The rate after treatment .7708 12 .16714 
The rate before treatment .5208 12 .07217 
Table 36: Descriptive statistics f o r C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.13 
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The correct decisions' rates (CDRs) for the New Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after 
having their treatment, which was an anti-Phishing intervention. As presented in Table 
36, the CDR for the New Approach group before the treatment is 0.52 whereas it is 0.77 
after the treatment. There is a significant statistical difference between the two CDRs; 
p=.002 (for the CDR after the treatment). As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 
1.13 is rejected. 
Thus, the New Approach had a significant positive effect on the subjects' decisions. 
Therefore, in the New Approach group, the CDR after having the approach (i.e. anti-
Phishing intervention) is significantly better (more) than the CDR before having the 
approach. 
Hypothesis (1.14): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.14): In the New Approach group, there is no difference between 
the false positive rate (FPR) after having the treatment (i.e. anti-Phishing intervention) 
and the FPR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
FPR after treatment .1250 12 .22613 
FPR before treatment ,0417 12 .14434 
Table 37: Descriptive statistics f o r FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 1.14 
The false positive rates (FPRs) for the New Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after 
having their treatment, which was an anti-Phishing intervention. As presented in Table 
37, the FPR for the New Approach group before the treatment is 0.04 whereas it is about 
0.13 after the treatment. This is deterioration because the FPR before the treatment is 
better than the FPR after the treatment. However, there is no statistical difference 
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between the two FPRs; /P=.313. AS a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 1.14 is 
accepted. 
The deterioration in the FPRs is because of the same reason that was given and 
discussed in hypothesis 1.11. 
Hypothesis (1.15): 
• Null Hypothesis (1.15): In the New Approach group, there is no difference between 
the false negative rate (FNR) after having the treatment (i.e. anti-Phishing 
intervention) and the FNR before having the treatment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Reject. 
• Discussion: 
Response Variable Mean N Std. Deviation 
FNR after treatment .3333 12 .32567 
FNR before treatment .9167 12 .19462 
Table 38: Descriptive statistics f o r PNRs' comparisons related to hypothesis I . I S 
The false negative rates (FNRs) for the New Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects before and after 
having their treatment, which was an anti-Phishing intervention. As shown in Table 38, 
the FNR for the New Approach group before the treatment is higher (0.92) than the FNR 
after the treatment (0.33). 
There is a statistical difference between the FNR after the treatment and the FNR 
before the treatment; p=.00\. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 1.15 is 
rejected. Thus, the New Approach had a significant positive effect on the subjects' 
decisions on judging the Phishing websites. Therefore, in the New Approach group, the 
FNR after having the approach (i.e. anti-Phishing intervention) is significantly better 
(less) than the FNR before having the approach. 
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Aspect Discussion: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 1.7 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.8 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.9 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.10 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.11 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.12 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.13 Rejected 
Hypothesis 1.14 Accepted 
Hypothesis 1.15 Rejected 
Table 39: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing users before and af ter using the 
treatments 
Table 39 shows an overview of the hypotheses results in assessing users before and after 
having the treatments. In the Control group, there are no differences between the correct 
decisions rates (CDRs), false positive rates (FPRs) and false negative rates (FNRs) before 
and after having the treatment (in this instance, an ordinary email from work). 
In the Old Approach group, there is no difference between the FPRs and the FNRs. The 
CDRs also were not significantly different. The CDR is more important because it is 
indicative of users' decisions on the total of both legitimate and Phishing websites. 
Therefore, the Old Approach had no significant effect on users' decisions on the legitimacy 
of websites. 
Regarding the New Approach group, there is no significant difference between the FPRs 
before and after having the treatment (i.e. an anti-Phishing intervention). However, there is a 
significant difference between the FNRs (for the rate after the treatment). More importantly, 
the CDRs are significantly different. The CDR after having the treatment is better than the 
rate before the treatment. Therefore, the New Approach had a significant effect on users' 
decisions on the legitimacy of websites. 
138 
Chapter 9: Evaluation 
9.2.1.4. Theme Summary 
To sum up, users of the three groups were nearly equal with regards to their decisions 
about legitimate and Phishing websites before using any treatment. After using the 
treatments, there is a significant positive effect of using the New Approach in comparison 
with the Old Approach. The New Approach is better than the Old Approach in helping users 
properly judging the legitimacy of websites. 
9.2.2. Effect of High and Low Technical Abilities on Phishing Detection 
The theme of effect of high and low technical ability on Phishing detection has three 
different aspects. Each aspect is discussed individually. They are as follows: 
9.2.2.1. Aspect: Assessing the Effect of the Technical Ability Level among 
Phishing Una ware Users 
Hypothesis (2.1): 
" Null Hypothesis (2.1): In the Control group, there is no difference between the correct 
decisions' rate (CDR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the CDR for low 
technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
" Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .5000 .07906 
High 6 .5417 .06455 
Table 40: Descriptive statistics f o r C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.1 
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The correct decisions rates (CDRs) for the Control group shown in this hypothesis 
are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high technical ability 
(HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) . As presented in Table 40, the CDRs for the 
LTA subjects is 0.50 whereas it is 0.54 for the HTA subjects. The two rates are nearly 
the same. There is no significant difference between the two CDRs; p=.6?>6. As a result 
of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.1 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.2): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.2): In the Control group, there is no difference between the false 
positive rate (FPR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FPR for low 
technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .0833 .12910 
High 6 .0833 .20412 
Table 41: Descriptive statistics f o r FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.2 
The false positive rates (FPRs) for the Control group shovra in this hypothesis are 
based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high technical ability 
(HTA) and low technical ability (LTA). As presented in Table 41, the FPR for the LTA 
subjects and the FPR for the HTA subjects are exactly the same. They are both 0.08. 
There is no difference between the two FPRs; p=\.000. As a result o f this analysis, the 
null hypothesis 2.2 is accepted. 
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Hypothesis (2.3): 
» Null Hypothesis (2.3): In the Control group, there is no difference between the false 
negative rate (FNR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FNR for low 
technical ability (LTA) people. 
" Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .9167 .20412 
High 6 .8333 .30277 
Table 42: Descriptive statistics fo r FNRs ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.3 
The false negative rates (FNRs) for the Control group shown in this hypothesis are 
based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high technical ability 
(HTA) and low technical ability (LTA). As presented in Table 42, the FNR for the LTA 
subjects is 0.92 whereas it is 0.83 for the HTA subjects. The two rates are high. There is 
no significant difference between the two FNRs; p=.121. As a result of this analysis, the 
null hypothesis 2.3 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.4): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.4): In the Old Approach group and before having the treatment 
(i.e. anti-Phishing training email), there is no difference between the correct decisions 
rate (CDR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the CDR for low technical 
ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
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Level of Technical 
Ab i l i t y N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .5000 .00000 
High 6 .4583 .10206 
Table 43: Descriptive statistics f o r FNRs ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.4 
The correct decisions rates (CDRs) for the Old Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high 
technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having the treatment (i.e. 
anti-Phishing training email). As presented in Table 43, the CDR for the LTA subjects is 
about 0.50 whereas it is 0.46 for the HTA subjects. There is no statistical difference 
between the two CDRs; p=\.OOQ. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.4 is 
accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.5): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.5): In the Old Approach group and before having the treatment 
(i.e. anti-Phishing training email), there is no difference between the false positive rate 
(FPR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FPR for low technical ability 
(LTA) people. 
" Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .0833 .20412 
High 6 .2500 .27386 
Table 44: Descriptive statistics f o r FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.5 
The false positive rates (FPRs) for the Old Approach group shown in this hypothesis 
are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high technical ability 
(HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having the treatment (i.e. anti-Phishing 
training email). As Table 44 shows, the FPR for the LTA subjects is about 0.08 whereas 
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it is 0.25 for the HTA subjects. There is no statistical difference between the two FPRs; 
p=.545. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.5 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.6): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.6): In the Old Approach group and before having the treatment 
(i.e. anti-Phishing training email), there is no difference between the false negative rate 
(FNR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FNR for low technical ability 
(LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
" Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of 
Technical Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .9167 .20412 
High 6 .8333 .25820 
Table 45: Descriptive statistics f o r FNRs ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.6 
The false negative rates (FNRs) for the Old Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high 
technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having the treatment (i.e. 
anti-Phishing training email). As presented in Table 45, the FNR for the LTA subjects is 
about 0.92, whereas it is 0.83 for the HTA subjects. There is no statistical difference 
between the two FNRs; p=\.000. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.6 is 
accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.7): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.7): In the New Approach group and before having the treatment 
(i.e. anti-Phishing intervention), there is no difference between the correct decisions' 
rate (CDR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the CDR for low technical 
ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
143 
Chapter 9: Evaluation 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviat ion 
Low 6 .5417 .10206 
High 6 .5000 .00000 
Table 46: Descriptive statistics fo r C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.7 
The correct decisions rates (CDRs) for the New Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high 
technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having the treatment (i.e. 
anti-Phishing intervention). As shown in Table 46, the CDR for the LTA subjects is 
about 0.54, whereas it is 0.50 for the HTA subjects. There is no statistical difference 
between the two CDRs; p=\.000. As a result o f this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.7 is 
accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.8): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.8): In the New Approach group and before having the treatment 
(i.e. anti-Phishing intervention), there is no difference between the false positive rate 
(FPR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FPR for low technical ability 
(LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviat ion 
Low 6 .0833 .20412 
High 6 .0000 .00000 
Table 47: Descriptive statistics f o r FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.8 
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The false positive rates (FPRs) for the New Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high 
technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having the treatment (i.e. 
anti-Phishing intervention). As Table 47 shows, the FPR for the LTA subjects is about 
0.08, whereas it is 0 for the HTA subjects. They are both low rates. There is no 
significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=\.000. As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.8 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.9): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.9): In the New Approach group and before having the treatment 
(i.e. anti-Phishing intervention), there is no difference between the false negative rate 
(FNR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FNR for low technical ability 
(LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
" Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .8333 .25820 
High 6 1.0000 .00000 
Table 48: Descriptive statistics f o r FNRs ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.9 
The false negative rates (FNRs) for the New Approach group shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by the group's subjects with both high 
technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having the treatment (i.e. 
anti-Phishing intervention). As presented in Table 48, the FNR for the LTA subjects is 
about 0.83, whereas it is 1.00 for the HTA subjects. They are both high rates. There is no 
significant staUstical difference between the two FNRs; p=.455. As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.9 is accepted. 
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Hypothesis (2.10): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.10): With regard to technical ability levels and regardless of 
which group (Control, Old Approach or New Approach) they belonged to and before 
having the treatments, there is no difference between the correct decisions rate (CDR) 
for high technical ability (HTA) people and the CDR for low technical ability (LTA) 
people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 18 .5278 .08085 
High 18 .4861 .05893 
Table 49: Descriptive statistics fo r C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.10 
This comparison does not consider the group to which the subjects belonged. The 
focus is on their level of technical ability. Therefore, the correct decisions rates (CDRs) 
shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by subjects with both high 
technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having their treatments. 
Table 49 presents the two rates; one rate for LTA subjects and the other for the HTA 
subjects. The CDR for the LTA subjects is about 0.53, whereas it is 0.49 for the HTA 
subjects. They are nearly the same. There is no significant statistical difference between 
the two groups; p=.257. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.10 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.11): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.11): With regard to technical ability levels and regardless of the 
group (Control, Old Approach or New Approach) to which they belonged and before 
having the treatments, there is no difference between the false positive rate (FPR) for 
high technical ability (HTA) people and the FPR for low technical ability (LTA) 
people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
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Result: Accept. 
Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 18 .0556 .16169 
High 18 .1111 .21390 
Table SO: Descriptive statistics fo r FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.11 
As in the previous discussion on hypothesis 2.10, this comparison does not consider 
the group to which the subjects belonged. The focus is on their level of technical ability. 
Therefore, the false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the 
decisions taken by subjects with both high technical ability (HTA) and low technical 
ability (LTA) before having their treatments. Table 50 presents the two rates; one rate 
for LTA subjects and the other for the HTA subjects. The FPR for the LTA subjects is 
about 0.06, whereas it is 0.11 for the HTA subjects. They are both low rates. There is no 
significant statistical difference between the two FPRs; p=.658. As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.11 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.12): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.12): With regard to technical ability levels and regardless of the 
group (Control, Old Approach or New Approach) to which the subjects belonged and 
before having the treatments, there is no difference between the false negative rate 
(FNR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FNR for low technical ability 
(LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Abi l i ty N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 18 .8889 .21390 
High 18 .9167 .19174 
Table 5 1 : Descriptive statistics f o r FNRs ' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.12 
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As for hypotheses 2.10 and 2.11, the groups in this comparison are not important. 
The focus is on the level of technical ability for all Phishing unaware subjects. 
Therefore, the false negative rates (FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the 
decisions taken by subjects with both high technical ability (HTA) and low technical 
ability (LTA) before having their treatments. Table 51 presents the two rates; one rate 
for LTA subjects and the other is for the HTA subjects. The FNR for the LTA subjects is 
about 0.89, whereas it is 0.92 for the HTA subjects. They are both high rates. There is no 
significant statistical difference between the two FNRs; p=1.000. As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.12 is accepted. 
Aspect Discussion: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 2.1 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.2 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.3 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.4 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.5 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.6 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.7 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.8 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.9 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.10 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.11 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.12 Accepted 
Table 52: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results 
among Phishing 
in assessing the effect o f the technical abi l i ty level 
Unaware users 
As presented in Table 52, all hypotheses in assessing the effect of high and low technical 
abilities in Phishing Unaware users are accepted. The hypotheses' analysis evaluated users 
without having treatments in the three groups (Control, New Approach and Old Approach). 
The result is that there is no significant difference between the decisions rates of high and 
low technical ability users. Therefore, the level o f the technical ability has no effect on 
Phishing detection or on recognizing legitimate websites among Phishing unaware people. 
148 
Chapter 9: Evaluation 
9.2.2.2. Aspect: Assessing the Effect of the Technical Ability Level among 
PhishingAware Users 
Hypothesis (2.13): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.13): In the Phishing Aware people group, there is no difference 
between the correct decisions rate (CDR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and 
the CDR for low technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .7292 .12290 
High 6 .7083 .10206 
Table 53: Descriptive statistics for CDRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.13 
The correct decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the 
decisions taken by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' with both high 
technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA). Thus, the focus is on the 
Phishing Aware people group. As presented in Table 53, the CDR for the LTA subjects 
is about 0.73, whereas it is 0.71 for the HTA subjects. The two rates are nearly the same, 
which reflects the similarity between the two groups. Additionally, there is no 
significant statistical difference between the two groups; J D = I . O O O . As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.13 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.14): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.14): In the Phishing Aware people group, there is no difference 
between the false positive rate (FPR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the 
FPR for low technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
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Result: Accept. 
Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .1667 .20412 
High 6 .2500 .15811 
Table 54: Descriptive statistics for FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.14 
The false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' with both high technical ability 
(HTA) and low technical ability (LTA). Thus, the focus is on the Phishing Aware people 
group. As shown in Table 54, the FPR for the L T A subjects is about 0.17, whereas it is 
0.25 for the HTA subjects. There is also no significant statistical difference between the 
two groups; p=A94. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.14 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.15): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.15): In the Phishing Aware people group, there is no difference 
between the false negative rate (FNR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the 
FNR for low technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
" Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 6 .3750 .34460 
High 6 .3333 .25820 
Table 55: Descriptive statistics for FNRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.15 
The false negative rates (FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' with both high technical ability 
(HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) . Thus, the focus is on the Phishing Aware people 
group. Table 55 presents the two rates. The FNR for the LTA subjects is about 0.38, 
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whereas it is 0.33 for the HTA subjects. They are approximately similar. There is no 
significant statistical difference between the two groups; /?= 1.000. As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.15 is accepted. 
Aspect Discussion: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 2.13 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.14 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.15 Accepted 
Table 56: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing the effect of the technical ability level 
among Phishing Aware users 
Regarding Phishing Aware users, Table 56 shows a summary of the hypotheses analysis 
results. There is no difference between the high and low technical ability users in Phishing 
detection and prevention. There is also no difference between the two groups (high and low 
technical ability) in properly judging legitimate websites. Therefore, technical ability has no 
effect on the decisions of Phishing Aware users in Phishing detection and in recognizing 
legitimate websites. 
9.2.2.3. Aspect- Assessing the Effect of the Technical Ability Level Regardless 
of the Phishing Knowledge (Phishing Aware and Unaware) 
Hypothesis (2.16): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.16): For all subjects with regard to their technical ability levels 
and regardless of their Phishing knowledge (Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware) 
and before having the treatments, there is no difference between the correct decisions 
rate CDR for high technical ability (HTA) people and the CDR for low technical 
ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
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Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 24 .5729 .11608 
High 24 .5417 .12039 
Table 57: Descriptive statistics for CDRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.16 
Phishing knowledge in this comparison is not considered. The focus is on the level 
of technical ability for all subjects who participated in all the experiments. Therefore, 
the correct decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by subjects with both high technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) 
before having their treatments. Table 57 presents the two rates; one rate for LTA 
subjects and the other is for the HTA subjects. The CDR for the LTA subjects is about 
0.57, whereas it is 0.54 for the HTA subjects. They are nearly the same. There is no 
significant statistical difference between the two CDRs; p=.541. As a resuh of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.16 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.17): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.17): For all subjects with regard to their technical ability levels 
and regardless of their Phishing knowledge (Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware) 
and before having the treatments, there is no difference between the false positive rate 
(FPR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FPR for low technical ability 
(LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 24 .0833 .19035 
High 24 .1458 .23215 
Table 58: Descriptive statistics for FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.17 
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As for the previous hypothesis 2.16, Phishing knowledge in this comparison is not 
considered. The focus is on the level of technical ability for all subjects who participated 
in all the experiments. Therefore, the false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by subjects with both high technical ability 
(HTA) and low technical ability ( L T A ) before having their treatments. Table 58 presents 
the two rates; one rate for LTA subjects and the other is for the HTA subjects. The FPR 
for the LTA subjects is about 0.08, whereas it is 0.15 for the HTA subjects. There is no 
significant statistical difference between the two rates; p=.494. As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 2.17 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.18): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.18): For all subjects with regard to their technical ability levels 
and regardless of their Phishing knowledge (Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware) 
and before having the treatments, there is no difference between the false negative rate 
(FNR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FNR for low technical ability 
(LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test, 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
•> Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 24 .7708 .32900 
High 24 .7708 .32900 
Table 59: Descriptive statistics for FNRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.18 
As for the previous hypotheses 2.16 and 2.17, Phishing knowledge in this 
comparison is not considered. The focus is on the level of technical ability for all 
subjects who participated in all the experiments. Therefore, the false negative rates 
(FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by subjects with both 
high technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) before having their 
treatments. Table 59 presents the two rates; one rate for LTA subjects and the other is 
for the HTA subjects. The FNRs for both the LTA subjects and the HTA subjects are 
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exactly the same. They are 0.77. Therefore, there is no significant statistical difference 
between the two FNRs; p= 1.000. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.18 is 
accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.19): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.19): For all subjects in the Control and Phishing Aware groups 
with regard to their technical ability levels and regardless of their Phishing knowledge 
(Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware), there is no difference between the correct 
decisions rate (CDR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the CDR for low 
technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 12 .6146 .15501 
High 12 .6250 .11918 
Table 60: Descriptive statistics for CORs comparisons related to hypothesis 2.19 
Phishing knowledge in this comparison is not considered. The focus is on the level 
of technical ability of subjects in the Control and Phishing Aware groups. The correct 
decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by 
subjects with both high technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA). Table 
60 presents the CDR for LTA subjects and the CDR for the HTA subjects. The CDR for 
the LTA subjects is about 0.61, whereas it is 0.63 for the HTA subjects. They are nearly 
the same. There is no significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=.830. 
As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.19 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.20): 
» Null Hypothesis (2.20): For all subjects in the Control and Phishing Aware groups 
with regard to their technical ability levels and regardless of their Phishing knowledge 
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(Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware), there is no difference between the false 
positive rate (FPR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FPR for low 
technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
" Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
" Discussion: 
Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 12 .1250 .16855 
High 12 .1667 .19462 
Table 61: Descriptive statistics for FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.20 
Phishing knowledge in this comparison is not considered. The focus is on the level 
of technical ability of subjects in the Control and Phishing Aware groups. Therefore, the 
false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by 
subjects with both high technical ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) . Table 
61 shows the two rates; one rate for LTA subjects and the other for the HTA subjects. 
The FPR for the LTA subjects is about 0.13, whereas it is 0.17 for the HTA subjects. 
There is no significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=.744. As a result 
of this analysis, the null hypothesis 2.20 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (2.21): 
• Null Hypothesis (2.21): For all subjects in the Control and Phishing Aware groups 
with regard to their technical ability levels and regardless of their Phishing knowledge 
(Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware), there is no difference between the false 
negative rate (FNR) for high technical ability (HTA) people and the FNR for low 
technical ability (LTA) people. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
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Level of Technical 
Ability N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low 12 .6458 .39107 
High 12 .5833 .37437 
Table 62: Descriptive statistics for FNRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 2.21 
As for the previous hypotheses in this aspect, Phishing knowledge is not considered 
in this comparison. The focus is on the level of technical ability for subjects in the 
Control and Phishing Aware groups. Therefore, the false negative rates (FNRs) shown in 
this hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by subjects with both high technical 
ability (HTA) and low technical ability (LTA) . Table 62 presents the two rates; one rate 
for LTA subjects and the other for the H T A subjects. The FNR for LTA subjects is 0.65 
and the FNR for HTA subjects is 0.58. There is no significant statistical difference 




Hypothesis 2.16 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.17 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.18 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.19 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.20 Accepted 
Hypothesis 2.21 Accepted 
Table 63: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing the effect of the technical ability level 
among both Phishing Aware and Lnaware users 
Table 63 shows a summary of the hypotheses analysis results in assessing the effect of 
technical ability level among both Phishing Aware and Phishing Unaware users. There is no 
difference between the two groups (high and low technical ability) in properly judging both 
Phishing and legitimate websites. Therefore, technical ability has no effect on the decisions 
of Phishing Aware and Phishing Unaware users in Phishing detection and in recognizing 
legitimate websites. 
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9.2.2.4. Theme Summary 
With regards to both Phishing Aware and Phishing Unaware users, it is found that their 
technical ability has no effect on their decisions in Phishing detection and in recognizing 
legitimate websites. 
9.2.3. Effect of Phishing Awareness and Phishing Unawareness on Phishing 
Detection 
Hypothesis (3.1): 
• Null Hypothesis (3.1): There is no difference between the correct decisions rate 
(CDR) for the Phishing Aware people group and the CDR for the Control group 
(Phishing Unaware). 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Reject. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Phishing N Mean Std. Deviation 
Awareness 
Unaware 12 .5208 .07217 
Aware 12 .7188 .10825 
Table 64: Descriptive statistics for CDRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 3.1 
The comparisons are focused on two groups. They are the Phishing Aware group and 
the Control group (Phishing Unaware). The correct decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this 
hypothesis are based on the decisions taken by subjects who are considered as 'Phishing 
Aware' and 'Phishing Unaware' people. As presented in Table 64, the CDR for the 
Phishing Unaware subjects is about 0.52, whereas it is 0.72 for the Phishing Aware 
subjects. The Phishing Aware group has a higher rate than the Phishing Unaware group. 
Additionally, there is a significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=.000. 
As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 3.1 is rejected. Therefore, the CDR for 
the Phishing Aware people group is better (more) than the CDR for the Control group 
157 
Chapter 9: Evaluation 
(Phishing Unaware). This means that Phishing awareness has a significant effect on 
properly judging legitimate and Phishing websites. Therefore, Phishing awareness has a 
significant effect on Phishing detection. 
Hypothesis (3.2): 
• Null Hypothesis (3.2): There is no difference between the false positive rate (FPR) for 
the Phishing Aware people group and the FPR for the Control group (Phishing 
Unaware). 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Reject. 
• Discussion: 
Level of Phishing 
Awareness N iVIean Std. Deviation 
Unaware 12 .0833 .16283 
Aware 12 .2083 .17944 
Table 65: Descriptive statistics for FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 3.2 
The comparison is between two groups; Phishing Aware group and Control group 
(Phishing Unaware). The false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based 
on the decisions taken by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' and 'Phishing 
Unaware' people. As shown in Table 65, the FPR for the Phishing Unaware subjects is 
about 0.08, whereas it is 0.21 for the Phishing Aware subjects. The Phishing Aware 
group has a higher (worse) rate than the Phishing Unaware group. There is a significant 
statistical difference between the two groups; p=.043. As a result of this analysis, the 
null hypothesis 3.2 is rejected. 
The reason why the Phishing Aware people have a worse FPR than the Phishing 
Unaware people is that, in the Control group, nearly all the subjects responded to the 
legitimate websites because they believed that they were legitimate websites. However, 
in the Phishing Aware group, subjects were worried about the websites' legitimacy 
because they already knew about the existence of Phishing websites in the real world. 
Then, i f they had a legitimate website to respond to, they preferred not to respond in 
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order to be on the safe side. Thus, the FPR in the Phishing Aware group is higher 
(worse) than the FPR in the Phishing Unaware group. 
Hypothesis (3.3): 
• Null Hypothesis (3.3): There is no difference between the false negative rate (FNR) 
for the Phishing Aware people group and the FNR for the Control group (Phishing 
Unaware). 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: RejecL 
• Discussion: 
Level of Phishing 
Awareness N Mean Std. Deviation 
Unaware 12 .8750 .25000 
Aware 12 .3542 .29113 
Table 66: Descriptive statistics for FNRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 3.3 
The comparison is between the Phishing Aware group and the Control group 
(Phishing Unaware). The false negative rates (FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based 
on the decisions taken by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' and 'Phishing 
Unaware' people. The FNR for the Phishing Unaware subjects is about 0.88, whereas it 
is 0.35 for the Phishing Aware subjects (See Table 66). The Phishing Aware group has a 
lower (better) rate than the Phishing Unaware group. There is also a significant 
statistical difference between the two groups; p=.000. As a result of this analysis, the 
null hypothesis 3.3 is rejected. Therefore, the FNR for Phishing Aware people group is 
better (less) than the FNR for the Control group (Phishing Unaware). This means that 
Phishing awareness has a significant effect on Phishing websites detection. 
Hypothesis (3.4): 
• Null Hypothesis (3.4): For all subjects with regard to their Phishing knowledge 
(Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware) and regardless of their technical ability level 
and before having the treatments, there is no difference between the correct decisions 
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rate (CDR) for the Phishing Aware people group and the CDR for the Phishing 
Unaware people group. 
Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
Result: Reject. 
Discussion: 
Level of Phishing 
Awareness N Mean Std. Deviation 
Unaware 36 .5069 .07285 
Aware 12 .7083 .09731 
Table 67: Descriptive statistics for CDRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 3.4 
For all subjects who participated in all the experiments, the comparisons are focused 
on two groups. They are the Phishing Aware group and the Phishing Unaware group. 
The correct decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken before having the treatments by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' and 
'Phishing Unaware' people. As shown in Table 67, the CDR for the Phishing Unaware 
subjects is 0.51, whereas it is nearly 0.71 for the Phishing Aware subjects. This means 
that the Phishing Aware group has a higher (better) rate than the Phishing Unaware 
group. The statistical difference between the two groups is significant; p=.000. As a 
result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 3.4 is rejected. This means that Phishing 
awareness has a significant effect on properly judging the legitimacy of websites. 
Hypothesis (3.5): 
• Null Hypothesis (3.5): For all subjects with regard to their Phishing knowledge 
(Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware) and regardless of their technical ability level 
and before having the treatments, there is no difference between the false positive rate 
(FPR) for the Phishing Aware people group and the FPR for the Phishing Unaware 
people group. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
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Level of Phishing 
Awareness N Mean Std. Deviation 
Unaware 36 .0833 .18898 
Aware 12 .2083 .25746 
Table 68: Descriptive statistics for FPRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 3.5 
For all subjects who participated in all the experiments, the comparison is between 
two groups; the Phishing Aware group and the Phishing Unaware group. The false 
positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions taken before 
having the treatments by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' and 'Phishing 
Unaware' people. As shown in Table 68, the FPR for the Phishing Unaware subjects is 
approximately 0.08, whereas it is about 0.21 for the Phishing Aware subjects. The 
Phishing Aware group has a higher (worse) rate than the Phishing Unaware group. 
However, there is no significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=.086. 
As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 3.5 is accepted. 
The reason why the Phishing Aware people have a worse FPR than the Phishing 
Unaware is the same reason as that discussed in the hypothesis 3.2. In the Phishing 
Unaware group, nearly all the subjects responded to the legitimate websites because they 
believed that they were legitimate websites. However, in the Phishing Aware group, 
subjects were worried about the websites' legitimacy because they already knew about 
the existence of Phishing websites in the real worid. Then i f they had a legitimate 
website to respond to, they preferred not to respond in order to be on the safe side. Thus, 
the FPR for the Phishing Aware group is higher (worse) than the FPR for the Phishing 
Unaware group. 
Hypothesis (3.6): 
• Null Hypothesis (3.6): For all subjects with regard to their Phishing knowledge 
(Phishing Aware or Phishing Unaware) and regardless of their technical ability level 
and before having the treatments, there is no difference between the false negative rate 
(FNR) for the Phishing Aware people group and the FNR for the Phishing Unaware 
people group. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
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Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
Result: Reject. 
Discussion: 
Level of Phishing 
Awareness N Mean Std. Deviation 
Unaware 36 .9028 .20069 
Aware 12 .3750 .31079 
Table 69: Descriptive statistics for FNRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 3.6 
For all subjects who participated in all the experiments, the comparison is between 
two groups; the Phishing Aware group and the Phishing Unaware. The false negative 
rates (FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions taken before having the 
treatments by subjects who are considered 'Phishing Aware' and 'Phishing Unaware' 
people. The FNR for the Phishing Unaware subjects is 0.90, whereas it is about 0.38 for 
the Phishing Aware subjects (See Table 69). The Phishing Aware group has a lower 
(better) FNR than the Phishing Unaware group. The statistical difference between the 
two groups is significant; p=.000. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 3.6 is 
rejected. This means that Phishing awareness has a significant effect on Phishing 
websites detection. 
9.2.3.1. Theme Summary 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 3.1 Rejected 
Hypothesis 3.2 Rejected 
Hypothesis 3.3 Rejected 
Hypothesis 3.4 Rejected 
Hypothesis 3.5 Accepted 
Hypothesis 3.6 Rejected 
Table 70: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing the effect of Phishing awareness and 
Phishing unawareness on Phishing detection 
Table 70 shows a summary of the results of the six hypotheses discussed for 
assessing the effect of Phishing awareness and Phishing unawareness on Phishing 
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websites detection. There is significant effect for the Phishing Aware users in accurately 
detecting Phishing websites and this allows them to prevent Phishing attacks. In total, 
the decisions of Phishing Aware users are better than the decisions of Phishing Unaware 
users. This appears in the comparisons of the correct decisions rates (CDRs) of the two 
groups. The difference between the CDRs shows that there is a significant positive effect 
of Phishing awareness in comparison with Phishing unawareness. As a result of this, 
Phishing awareness has a significant positive effect on users' decisions in websites' 
legitimacy. 
9.2.4. Anti-Phishing Knowledge Retention 
The theme of anti-Phishing knowledge retention has two different aspects. Each aspect 
is discussed separately. They are as follows: 
9.2.4.1. Aspect-'Assessing the Retention of Anti-PhishingKnowledge within 
Each Individual Group 
Hypothesis (4,1): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.1): With regards to the post-treatment websites, there is no 
difference between the correct decisions rate (CDR) of the Old Approach group in the 
second experiment and their CDR in the first experiment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
CDR in the first experiment 6 .6250 .13693 
CDR in the second experiment 6 .5833 .20412 
Table 71: Descriptive statistics for CDRs' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.1 
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The correct decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the 
decisions taken by the Old Approach group subjects after having their treatment (i.e. an 
anti-Phishing training email) in the first experiment and in the second experiment. The 
period between the two experiments varied from subject to subject. However, the 
average period was 16.7 days. Table 71 presents the two rates for the same subjects in 
the two experiments. The CDR in the first experiment is about 0.63, whereas it is 0.58 in 
the second experiment. There is no significant statistical difference between the two 
rates; ;7=.500. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 4.1 is accepted. 
The CDR is higher (better) in the first experiment than in the second experiment. 
This means that subjects performed better in terms of the proper judgment of websites' 
legitimacy at the time they received the Old Approach training. They did not maintain 
exactly the same performance when they were given the same tricks after approximately 
16.7 days. Their performance in the two experiments did not differ significantly. 
Hypothesis (4.2): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.2): With regards to the post-treatment websites, there is no 
difference between the false positive rate (FPR) of the Old Approach group in the 
second experiment and their FPR in the first experiment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
FPR in the first experiment 6 .0833 .20412 
FPR in the second experiment 6 .4167 .49160 
Table 72: Descriptive statistics for FPRs comparisons related to hypothesis 4.2 
The false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by the Old Approach group subjects after having their treatment in the first 
experiment and in the second experiment. As presented in Table 72, the FPR in the first 
experiment is approximately 0.08, whereas it is 0.42 in the second experiment. The FPR 
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is higher (worse) in the second experiment than the rate in the first experiment. 
However, there is no significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=.\25. 
As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 4.2 is accepted. 
This means that subjects performed better in terms of properly judging legitimate 
websites at the time they received the Old Approach treatment. However, they did not 
exactly maintain the same performance when they were given the same tricks after 
approximately 16.7 days. 
Hypothesis (4.3): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.3): With regards to the post-treatment websites, there is no 
difference between the false negative rate (FNR) of the Old Approach group in the 
second experiment and their FNR in the first experiment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
FNR in tlie first experiment 6 .6667 .25820 
FNR In the second experiment 6 .4167 .37639 
Table 73: Descriptive statistics for F N R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.3 
The false negative rates (FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by the Old Approach group subjects after having their treatment in the first 
experiment and in the second experiment. As presented in Table 73, the FNR in the first 
experiment is approximately 0.67, whereas it is 0.42 in the second experiment. The FNR 
is lower (better) in the second experiment than the rate in the first experiment. However, 
there is no significant statistical difference between the two groups;p=.]25. As a result 
of this analysis, the null hypothesis 4.3 is accepted. 
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This means that the subjects who had taken the Old Approach training performed 
better (but with no statistical difference) in terms of properly detecting Phishing 
websites after approximately 16.7 days. 
Hypothesis (4.4): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.4): With regards to the post-treatment websites, there is no 
difference between the correct decisions rate (CDR) of the New Approach group in the 
second experiment and their CDR in the first experiment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
° Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
CDR in tlie first experiment 6 .7500 .15811 
CDR in the second experiment 6 .5417 .18819 
Tabic 74: Descriptive statistics for C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.4 
The correct decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the 
decisions taken by the New Approach group subjects after having their treatment (i.e. 
anti-Phishing intervention) in the first experiment and in the second experiment. The 
period between the two experiments was 16.7 days as an average. As Table 74 shows, 
the CDR in the first experiment is about 0.75. The rate in the second experiment is 0.54. 
There is no significant statistical difference between the two groups;p=.l56. As a result 
of this analysis, the null hypothesis 4.4 is accepted. 
The CDR is higher (better) in the first experiment than the CDR in the second 
experiment. This means that subjects performed better in terms of the proper judgment 
o f the legitimacy o f websites at the time they received the New Approach training. 
However, they did not maintain exactly the same performance when they were given the 
same tricks after approximately 16.7 days. 
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Hypothesis (4.5): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.5): With regards to the post-treatment websites, there is no 
difference between the false positive rate (FPR) of the New Approach group in the 
second experiment and their FPR in the first experiment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
FPR in the first experiment 6 .0833 .20412 
FPR in ttie second experiment 6 .1667 .25820 
Table 75: Descriptive statistics for F P R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.5 
The false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by the New Approach group subjects after having their treatment in the first 
experiment and in the second experiment. As presented in Table 75, the FPR in the first 
experiment is approximately 0.08, whereas it is 0.17 in the second experiment. There is 
no significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=.500. As a result of this 
analysis, the null hypothesis 4.5 is accepted. 
The false positive rate FPR is higher (worse) in the second experiment than the FPR 
in the first experiment. This means that subjects performed better in terms of properly 
judging legitimate websites at the time they received the New Approach training. 
However, they did not exactly maintain the same performance when they were given the 
same tricks after approximately 16.7 days. 
Hypothesis (4.6): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.6): With regards to the post-treatment websites, there is no 
difference between the false negative rate (FNR) of the New Approach group in the 
second experiment and their FNR in the first experiment. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. 
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• Experimental design used: Within-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
FNR in the first experiment 6 .4167 .37639 
FNR in the second experiment 6 .7500 .41833 
Table 76: Descriptive statistics for F N R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.6 
The false negative rates (FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by the New Approach group subjects after having their treatment in the first 
experiment and in the second experiment. As presented in Table 76, the FNR in the first 
experiment is approximately 0.42, whereas it is 0.75 in the second experiment. There is 
no significant difference between the two groups; p=.l56. As a result o f this analysis, 
the null hypothesis 4.6 is accepted. 
The FNR is higher (worse) in the second experiment than the FNR in the first 
experiment. This means that the subjects performed (but with no statistical difference) 
better in terms of properly detecting Phishing websites just after they took the New 
Approach than when they repeated the experiment after in approximately 16.7 days. 
Aspect Discussion: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 4.1 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.2 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.3 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.4 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.5 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.6 Accepted 
Table 77: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing anti-PhlshIng knowledge retention for 
users within each group 
Approximately 16 days after conducting the first experiment, users of the New 
Approach and Old Approach were asked to perform a follow up experiment. The goal was 
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to see which approach's users retain their anti-Phishing knowledge better. Table 77 presents 
a summary of the results in assessing anti-Phishing knowledge retention in each group. 
There are no differences between the CDRs, FPRs and FNRs for the two experiments for 
each approach's users. This means that the users of both approaches retained their anti-
Phishing knowledge after 16 days from their first training. More importantly, the CDRs at 
the time of training were slightly better (but with no statistical difference) than their 
decisions after 16 days in both approaches. 
9.2.4.2. Aspect: Comparing the Retention of Anti-PhishingKnowledge 
between Groups 
Hypothesis (4.7): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.7): In the second experiment, there is no difference between the 
correct decisions rate (CDR) for the New Approach group and the CDR for the Old 
Approach group. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
CDR in the Old Approach group 6 .5225 .12259 
CDR in the New Approach group 6 .5417 .12910 
Table 78: Descriptive statistics for C D R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.7 
The correct decisions rates (CDRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the 
decisions taken by the two groups' subjects in the second experiment. The average 
period between the two experiments was 16.7 days. Table 78 presents the two rates for 
the Old Approach and New Approach groups. The CDR for the Old Approach group is 
about 0.52, whereas it is 0.54 for the New Approach group. The two rates are nearly the 
same. There is no significant statistical difference between the two groups; p=.526. As a 
result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 4.7 is accepted. 
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This means that subjects of both approaches performed nearly equally in terms of 
properly judging the legitimacy of websites after approximately 16.7 days. 
Hypothesis (4.8): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.8): In the second experiment, there is no difference between the 
false positive rate (FPR) for the New Approach group and the FPR for the Old 
Approach group. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
FPR in the Old Approach group 6 .4583 .45871 
FPR in the New Approach group 6 .0833 .12910 
Table 79: Descriptive statistics for F P R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.8 
The false positive rates (FPRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by the two groups' subjects in the second experiment. As presented in Table 79, 
the FPR for the Old Approach group is approximately 0.46, whereas it is 0.08 for the 
New Approach group. There is no significant statistical difference between the two 
groups; p=.089. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 4.8 is accepted. 
Hypothesis (4.9): 
• Null Hypothesis (4.9): In the second experiment, there is no difference between the 
false negative rate (FNR) for the New Approach group and the FNR for the Old 
Approach group. 
• Statistical analysis method used: Mann-Whitney test. 
• Experimental design used: Between-subjects. 
• Result: Accept. 
• Discussion: 
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Experiment N Mean Std. Deviation 
FNR in ttne Old Approach group 6 .5000 .31623 
FNR in the New Approach group 6 .8333 .30277 
Table 80: Descriptive statistics for F N R s ' comparisons related to hypothesis 4.9 
The false negative rates (FNRs) shown in this hypothesis are based on the decisions 
taken by the two groups' subjects in the second experiment. The FNR for the Old 
Approach group is exactly 0.50 whereas it is nearly 0.83 in the New Approach group 
(See Table 80). There is no significant statistical difference between the two groups; 
p=.067. As a result of this analysis, the null hypothesis 4.9 is accepted. 
Aspect Discussion: 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 4.7 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4,8 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.9 Accepted 
Table 81: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing anti-Phishing knowledge retention for 
users between groups 
Approximately 16 days after conducting the first experiment, the users of the New 
Approach and Old Approach were asked to perform a follow up experiment. The goal 
was to see which approach's users retained their anti-Phishing knowledge better. Table 
81 shows a summary of the results in the aspect of assessing the retention of the anti-
Phishing knowledge by the Old Approach and New Approach groups in the second 
experiment. There are no statistical differences between CDRs, FPRs and FNRs of both 
approaches' users in the second experiment. This means that the subjects of both 
approaches performed nearly equally in terms of properly judging legitimate and 
Phishing websites approximately 16.7 days after they had the two approaches. 
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9.2.4.3. Theme Summary 
Hypothesis Result 
Hypothesis 4.1 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.2 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.3 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.4 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.5 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.6 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.7 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.8 Accepted 
Hypothesis 4.9 Accepted 
Table 82: A summary of hypotheses' analysis results in assessing anti-Phishing knowledge retention for 
users 
Approximately 16 days after conducting the first experiment, users of both the New and 
Old Approaches were asked to perform a follow up experiment. The goal was to see which 
approach's users retained their anti-Phishing knowledge better. Two aspects were discussed. 
The first aspect assessed the anti-Phishing knowledge retention in each group between the 
first and second experiments. The other aspect assessed the anti-Phishing knowledge 
retention in the second experiment between the two groups. As sunnmarized in Table 82, 
there are no differences between the rates (CDRs, FPRS and FNRs) in the first experiment 
and the rates in the second experiment in each group. There are also no statistical 
differences between the rates for both approaches' users in the second experiment. It is 
found that firstly, users of both approaches retained their anti-Phishing knowledge after 16 
days from their first training. More importantly, the CDRs at the time o f training were 
slightly better (with no statistical difference) than their decisions after 16 days. Secondly, 
the subjects of both approaches performed nearly equally in terms of properly judging the 
legitimacy of websites after approximately 16.7 days. 
There are two facts resulting from the analysis of anti-Phishing knowledge retention. 
The first fact is that in the first experiment, the New Approach group is different 
significantly from the Old approach group with regards to correctly judging the legitimacy 
of websites (See Section 9.2.1.2). The second fact is that when the retention of anti-Phishing 
knowledge was assessed, there is no difference between the correct decision rate (CDR), the 
false positive rate (FPR) and the false negative rate (FNR) of the Old Approach group in the 
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second experiment and their rates in the first experiment. Similarly, the same results were 
found for the New Approach group (See Section 9.2.4.1). 
Based on the facts mentioned above, when the participants of the two groups were 
evaluated in the second experiment, logically and in theory the New Approach group should 
judge the legitimacy of websites better than the Old Approach group. However, in practice 
there is no significant difference between the two groups (See Section 9.2.4.2). This seems 
to be inconsistent. 
The reason behind this inconsistency is that the sample size in the first experiment is 
different from the second experiment. There were 24 subjects in the two groups in the first 
experiment whereas there were 12 subjects in the second experiment. 
Therefore, the data of the 12 subjects, who participated in the second experiment, 
collected in the first experiment was analyzed. It is found that there are no significant 
differences between the CDRs, FPRs and FNRs of the New Approach group and the Old 
Approach group. More importantly, the statistical difference between the CDRs is p=. 116. 
With regards to the statistical difference between FPRs, it is p=.773 and it is p=.\\9 
between the two FNRs. As a result of this, it is clear that the other 12 participants 
participated in the two groups in the first experiment made the difference. 
9.3. Summary 
This chapter evaluated the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were related to four 
different research themes and were assessed by statistical analysis. The chapter presented 
the themes evaluating the New Approach, the effect of high and low technical abilities on 
Phishing detection, the effect of Phishing awareness and Phishing unawareness on Phishing 
detection and anti-Phishing knowledge retention. The main results achieved in each theme 
are as discussed below. 
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1. Evaluating the New Approach: 
Evaluating the New Approach had three aspects. They are assessing users without 
treatments, assessing the New Approach in comparison with the Old Approach and 
assessing users before and after using the treatments. For assessing users without treatments, 
users in the three groups were nearly equal with regards to their decisions about legitimate 
and Phishing websites before using any treatment. There was no difference in their correct 
decisions' rate (CDR). There were also no differences in their false positive and false 
negative rates. The aim of assessing users without treatments was to make sure that there 
were no differences between users in the three groups (Control, New Approach and Old 
Approach) before having any treatment. 
In the aspect of assessing the New Approach in comparison with the Old Approach, it 
was found that there was a significant positive effect of using the New Approach in 
comparison with the Old Approach. The users of the New Approach were significantly 
better in judging legitimate and Phishing websites. In detail, the New and the Old 
Approaches were equal on helping the subjects to judge the legitimate websites. However, 
there was a significant effect o f using the New Approach in comparison with the Old 
Approach in helping subjects to judge the Phishing websites properly and this enabled them 
to detect the Phishing attacks. This means that the New Approach worked better than the 
Old Approach. This was demonstrated by the comparisons of the correct decisions' rate 
(CDR) of the two approaches. 
In assessing users before and after using the treatments, in the Control group, there were 
no differences between the correct decisions rates (CDRs), false positive rates (FPRs) and 
false negative rates (FNRs) before and after having the treatment (in this instance, an 
ordinary email from work). In the Old Approach group, there was no difference between the 
FPRs and the FNRs. The CDRs also were not significantly different. The CDR is more 
important because it is indicative of users' decisions on the total of both legitimate and 
Phishing websites. Therefore, the Old Approach had no significant effect on users' decisions 
on the legitimacy of websites. In the New Approach group, there was no significant 
difference between the FPRs before and after having the treatment (i.e. an anti-Phishing 
intervention). However, there was a significant difference between the FNRs (for the rate 
after the treatment). More importantly, the CDRs were significantly different. The CDR 
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after having the treatment was better than the rate before the treatment. Therefore, the New 
Approach had a significant effect on users' decisions on the legitimacy of websites. 
To sum up, the New Approach is better than the Old Approach in helping users to detect 
Phishing websites. The New Approach has a significant positive effect on users' decisions. 
2. Effects of high and low technical abilities on Phishing detection: 
There were three aspects in this evaluation. These were assessing the effect of the 
technical ability level among Phishing unaware users, assessing the effect of the technical 
ability level among Phishing aware users and assessing the effect of the technical ability 
level regardless of the Phishing knowledge (Phishing aware and unaware). With regards to 
the first aspect, the hypotheses' analysis evaluated users without having treatments in the 
three groups (Control, New Approach and Old Approach). The result is that there was no 
significant difference between the decisions rates o f high and low technical ability users. 
Therefore, the level of the technical ability had no effect on Phishing detection or on 
recognizing legitimate websites among Phishing unaware people. 
In terms of assessing the effect of the technical ability level among Phishing aware 
users, there was no difference between the high and low technical ability users in Phishing 
detection and prevention. There was also no difference between the two groups (high and 
low technical ability) in properly judging legitimate websites. Therefore, technical ability 
had no effect on the decisions of Phishing Aware users in Phishing detection and in 
recognizing legitimate websites. 
Assessing the effect of technical ability level among both Phishing Aware and Phishing 
Unaware users showed that there was no difference between the two groups (high and low 
technical ability) in properly judging both Phishing and legitimate websites. Therefore, 
technical ability had no effect on the decisions of Phishing Aware and Phishing Unaware 
users in Phishing detection and in recognizing legitimate websites. 
To sum up, the technical ability of users does not have an effect on their ability to detect 
Phishing websites. 
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3. Effect of Phishing awareness and Phishing unawareness on Phishing detection 
The results of the six hypotheses discussed for assessing the effect of Phishing 
awareness and Phishing unawareness on Phishing websites detection showed that there was 
significant effect for the Phishing Aware users in accurately detecting Phishing websites and 
this allows them to prevent Phishing attacks. In total, the decisions of Phishing Aware users 
were better than the decisions of Phishing Unaware users. This appeared in the comparisons 
of the correct decisions rates (CDRs) of the two groups. The difference between the CDRs 
showed that there was a significant positive effect of Phishing awareness in comparison 
with Phishing unawareness. 
To sum up, Phishing awareness has a significant positive effect on users' ability to 
detect Phishing websites. Phishing Aware users were better than Phishing Unaware users in 
detecting Phishing websites. 
4. Anti-Phishing knowledge retention: 
Approximately 16 days after conducting the first experiment, users of both the New and 
Old Approaches were asked to perform a follow up experiment. The goal was to see for 
which approach the users retained their anti-Phishing knowledge better. Two aspects were 
discussed. The first aspect assessed the anti-Phishing knowledge retention in each group 
between the first and second experiments. The other aspect assessed the anti-Phishing 
knowledge retention in the second experiment between the two groups. For the first aspect, 
there were no differences between the rates (CDRs, FPRS and FNRs) in the first experiment 
and the rates in the second experiment in each group. The results of the second aspect 
showed that there were also no statistical differences between the rates for both approaches' 
users in the second experiment. 
To sum up, users retain the anti-Phishing knowledge given to them by both the New 
Approach and the Old Approach. They were slightly better (with no statistical difference) in 
detecting Phishing websites at the time they first used the approaches. However, users of 
both approaches were nearly the same in terms of properly detecting Phishing websites 
approximately 16 days after having their approaches. 
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10. Comparisons 
10.1. Introduction 
After evaluating the New Approach, the effects of technical ability and Phishing 
knowledge on Phishing detection and legitimate website recognition and anti-Phishing 
knowledge retention in the previous chapter, this chapter presents comparisons with some 
related anti-Phishing approaches by others. It looks at the similarities and differences 
between the evaluations in this work and the work of others. Evaluation issues such as 
participants' recruitment, groups, scenarios, emails and websites, anti-Phishing tips used and 
implementation are discussed. Comparisons of the results are shown. 
10.2. Evaluation 
10.2.1. Participants Recruitment 
Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru et al.07a] evaluated their approach using participants 
who were recruited based on their technical abilities (TA), using the criteria presented in 
Chapter 3. People were classified as 'experts' or 'non-experts' using pre-study screening 
questions. Technical ability was judged on whether the participants had changed preferences 
or settings in their web browser, created a web page, and helped someone fix a computer 
problem. The participant who said 'no' to at least two of the screening questions was 
considered as 'non-expert' and selected to take part in their experiments. Kumaraguru et al. 
had 30 participants distributed equally into three groups (10 participants each group). The 
groups were called the security notices group, the graphical training intervention group and 
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the comic strip training intervention group. Therefore, they had two different training 
interventions groups and a security notices (Old Approach) group. They did not have a 
control group which did not take any treatment. 
In this thesis, the pre-study survey included questions about the Internet and email use, 
technical ability, web browser knowledge and knowledge of computer terms. The 
knowledge of computer related terms section had the question about Phishing knowledge. 
The questions about Phishing knowledge and participant's technical ability were the main 
concerns in the survey. A Phishing-Aware person is the one who defines Phishing correctly. 
Technical ability was judged based on the criteria used by Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru 
et al.07a]. The expert and non-expert users, in terms of their technical abilities, are named 
'high' and ' low' technical users respectively. High and low technical ability people were 
included in the experiments. 
In the evaluation experiments of the New Approach (APTIPWD), there were three 
groups, Control, Old Approach and New Approach. A l l participants were 'Phishing 
Unaware' regardless of their technical ability level. There were 36 participants in the 
experiment. Each group had 12 participants divided into two subgroups. High and Low 
technical ability. Each subgroup had 6 participants. The Old Approach group was nearly the 
same as the security notices group in Kumaraguru et al.'s approach evaluation because their 
treatment was an anti-Phishing email. However, the number of anti-Phishing tips given to 
both groups is different and discussed in Section 10.3. 
Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru et al.07a] conducted two surveys, a pre-study survey 
and a post-study survey. The aim from having the pre-study survey was to select only 'non-
experts' users to participate in the experiments. The post-study survey was to debrief the 
participants and ask them for feedback about their approach. In this research, two surveys 
were conducted. They were a pre-study survey and a pre-session survey. The pre-study 
survey was to classify participants into 'high technical ability' and ' low technical ability' 
and to select only Phishing Unaware people to participate in the experiments. The pre-
session survey took place when the participants came to the experiment's location and it was 
administered just before the participants performed the experiment. Its aim was to check 
whether each participant was properly classified. This is because the participants' technical 
ability or Phishing knowledge could have changed in the period between the pre-study 
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survey and the experiments. This means that when the pre-study survey was done, 
participants who: 
• had been classified as ' low' technical ability could be 'high' because their technical 
ability had improved, 
• were classified as 'high' technical ability could be ' low' because they could have 
made a mistake in answering the technical ability question in the pre-study survey, 
• were classified as 'Phishing Unaware' could be 'Aware' because they may have 
gained knowledge about Phishing from another source and 
• were classified as 'Phishing Aware' could be 'Unaware' because they could have 
made a mistake in answering the Phishing knowledge question in the pre-sUidy 
survey. 


























Yes No Yes Yes No 30 3 
Table 83: Summary of participant recruitment comparison discussion 
10.2.2. Effectiveness Ratios 
Kumaraguru et al.'s [Kumaraguru et al.07a] approach used one effectiveness ratio for 
evaluation. This effectiveness ratio is False Negative Rate (FNR), which reflects the 
participants' decisions about Phishing websites. In contrast, three effectiveness ratios were 
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used in the New Approach's evaluation. They are Correct Decisions Rate (CDR), False 
Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR). The CDR indicates the participants' 
decisions against both legitimate and Phishing websites. The FPR shows the participants' 
decisions against legitimate websites. 
Due to the fact that Kumaraguru et al.'s approach evaluation used just the ratio FNR, 
only the FNR results related to the New Approach are presented in Section 10.4.1. The CDR 
and FPR results are not presented. 
10.2.3. Scenarios 
The New Approach's evaluation experiments and those of Kumaraguru et al. 
[Kumaraguru et al.07a] used email and web role-play protocol. However, the New 
Approach's experiments used 14 emails and 9 legitimate and Phishing websites. 
Kumaraguru et al. used 19 emails but they did not specify the number o f websites used. 
Their approach was focused on emails whereas the New Approach was focused on websites. 
This may clarify why they used a larger number of emails. Table 84 presents a summary of 
the scenario comparison discussion presented in this section. 
Research Approach 
Scenario 
# Emails # Websites 
TTiis research 
Anti-Phishing approach for 
websites. 
14 9 
Kumaraguru et ai. 
[Kumaraguru ct al.07a] 
Anti-Phishing approach for emails. 19 Not reported 
Table 84: Summary of scenario comparison discussion 
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10.2.4. Implementation 
The evaluation experiments of both the New Approach and Kumaraguru et al.'s 
[Kumaraguru et al.07a] approach used identical copies of real emails and websites. The 
legitimate and Phishing websites were stored on local machines and run by Apache servers. 
However, Kumaraguru et al. created emails using SquirrelMail. SquirrelMail is a standards-
based web mail package that is easily administered [SquMail]. They used it to gain control 
of the messages they sent to their participants. In the New Approach's experiments, fake 
emails were written and sent using Microsoft Outlook 2002 and were read using Maktoob 
email portal [Maktoob]. Emails were sent by using Maktoob's M X Record as the outgoing 
mail or server. 
10.3. Training 
Kumaraguru et ai.'s [Kumaraguru et al.07a] approach used many anti-Phishing tips to 
train users to detect Phishing emails. The tips are Phishing emails with a professional 
looking format and message content, they are urgent messages, they warn of an account 
status threat and they have links that do not match with the status bar. In contrast, in 
evaluating the New Approach, one anti-Phishing tip for detecting a Phishing website was 
used. It was used by the intervention given to the New Approach users and it was also sent 
to the Old Approach users by email. This anti-Phishing tip was evaluated as the most 
effective tip in the evaluation of users' tips for Phishing websites detection, discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
Kumaraguru et al.'s [Kumaraguru et al.07a] approach used multimedia to present the 
anti-Phishing tips for detecting Phishing emails. The approach explains the anti-Phishing 
tips using screenshots for Phishing emails and comic strips. Kumaraguru et al. gave their 
participants anti-Phishing training twice. However, the anti-Phishing tip used in the New 
Approach was presented as plain text. The New Approach presented the anti-Phishing 
training only once. 
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The New Approach did not give training more than once and did not use multimedia or 
comic strips. This aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the idea of training intervention in 
Phishing websites detection. Table 85 shows a summary of training comparison discussion. 













1. Professional looking 
emails and messages 
content, 
2. Urgent messages. 
3. Account status threat. 
4. Links does not match 





Table 85: Summary of training comparison discussion 
10.4. Results 
10.4.1. Assessment Parts 
There are three parts in assessing the New Approach. They are assessing users without 
treatments, assessing users after having the treatments and assessing users before and after 
the treatments. Kumaraguru et al.'s [Kumaraguru et al.07a] evaluation assessed users in just 
two parts. They assessed users after having treatments and assessed users before and after 
the treatments. Kumaraguru et al. did not statistically compare their groups before having 
any treatments. However, in the New Approach's evaluation, comparisons were carried out 
between the three groups before they had the treatments in order to make sure that there 
were no significant differences between the groups prior to the treatment. 
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Regarding assessing users without treatment, in the New Approach's evaluation, there 
were no significant differences between the FNRs for the three groups. The statistical 
difference between each group and others is not significant; p=1.000. It was shown that 
users were equal with regards to their decisions to Phishing websites before using 
treatments. 
In terms of assessing the approaches after having the treatment, Kumaraguru et al. 
[Kumaraguru et al.07a] found that there was a significant difference between the notices 
group and the comic strips intervention group (p=.00\). There was also significant 
difference in the effectiveness of the treatment between the graphical intervention group and 
the comic strip group (p=.00\). However, the difference between the notices group and the 
graphical intervention group was not significant (p=.546). The mean scores across Phishing 
emails after the intervention were lowest for the comic strip group. In the New Approach's 
evaluation, there was a significant difference between the FNRs of the New Approach and 
the Old Approach groups {p=.0l2). There was also a significant effect of the New Approach 
in comparison with the Control group (p=.OOI). Furthermore, there was no statistical 
significant difference between the Old Approach group and the Control group (p=. 107). 
In assessing users before and after using the treatments, Kumaraguru et al. did not 
statistically compare the participants' decisions before and after their treatments within each 
group. However, they compared the decisions between their groups accrued before and after 
using the treatments. They found that there was a significant difference between the notices 
group and comic strip group (p=.00\). Also there was a significant difference between the 
graphical intervention group and the comic strip group (p=.007). There was no significant 
difference between the notices group and the graphical intervention group. Regarding the 
New Approach's evaluation, statistical comparisons between the participants' decisions 
before and after their treatments within each group were conducted. In the New Approach 
group, there was a significant statistical difference between the FNR after the treatment and 
the FNR before the treatment O=.001). However, there was no statistical difference between 
the FNR after the treatment and the FNR before the treatment in the Old Approach group 
{p=.063). There was also no statistical difference between the FNRs before and after the 
treatment (in this instance an ordinary email from work, which essentially was no treatment) 
in the Control group (p=.500). 
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20.4.2. Evaluation of the Effects of Technical Ability and Phishing 
Knowledge 
In this research, the effects of technical ability and Phishing knowledge on Phishing 
websites' detection were evaluated. User experiments were conducted in the evaluation. 
Regarding the effects of technical ability, the low technical ability (LTA) and the high 
technical ability (HTA) participants were nearly equal in the correctness of their decisions 
on legitimate and Phishing websites. Therefore, the technical ability had no effect on the 
decisions of users in Phishing websites detection and in recognizing legitimate websites. In 
contrast, it was shown that there was a significant positive effect for Phishing knowledge on 
Phishing websites detection. Phishing Aware people were better than Phishing Unaware 
people on Phishing websites detection. 
Because technical ability has no effect on the decisions of users in Phishing websites' 
detection, recruiting people based on their technical ability without knowing about their 
Phishing knowledge in order to conduct anti-Phishing experiments may produce biased 
results. This is because both low and high technical people may be Phishing Aware before 
participating in the evaluation experiments. People who know about Phishing may use their 
own Phishing knowledge rather than the anti-Phishing approaches' when they participate in 
an evaluation. Therefore, in evaluating an anti-Phishing approach, recruiting users based on 
their Phishing knowledge is better than recruiting them based on their technical ability. 
10.4.3. Anti-Phishing Knowledge Retention 
The evaluation was made of anti-Phishing knowledge retention for the users' of the New 
Approach (embedded) in comparison with the users' of the Old Approach of sending anti-
Phishing tips by email (non-embedded). Two user experiments were conducted to evaluate 
the retention of the anti-Phishing knowledge. It was found that users of both approaches 
retained their anti-Phishing knowledge after 16 days from their first training. Users' 
decisions at the time of the training was slightly better (i.e. no statistical difference) than 
their decisions after about 16 days. Additionally, users of the two approaches performed 
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nearly equally in terms of properly judging legitimate and Phishing websites after about 16 
days from experiencing the two approaches. With regards to the Kumaraguru et al.'s 
[Kumaraguru et al.07c] smdy, they compared the effectiveness of the training materials 
delivered via their approach (embedded or training multimedia intervention) and delivered 
via email messages (non-embedded). They found that participants in their approach group 
retained more knowledge than participants in a non-embedded training group. There was a 
significant difference between the two groups in identifying correctly the Phishing email. 
The results related to the Kumaraguru et al.'s study in anti-Phishing knowledge retention 
are better than the results in the retention study in this research. This might be because of 
three reasons. The first reason is that Kumaraguru et al. used multimedia for presenting their 
anti-Phishing materials. Multimedia (screenshots and comic strips) has a positive effect on 
information retention [Large06]. In contrast, anti-Phishing materials were shown in plain 
text in this research. 
The second reason is the difference between the periods between the first and second 
experiments in the two studies. The period in this research (mean= 16.7 days) is more than 
double the period in the Kumaraguru et al. study (mean= 7.2 days). The difference between 
the two periods might affect users' anti-Phishing knowledge retention because one of the 
factors that can affect people's knowledge retention is the time interval between training and 
practice [StothardNicholsonOl]. The longer the time between training and practice, the 
greater skill loss that people can have [ibid]. 
The third reason is that Kumaraguru et al. gave their participants training material twice 
whereas participants of the New Approach were given training material once (i.e. one 
intervention). Kumaraguru et al. state that the double training in a short time was helpful 
because some participants did not understand what was happening the first time the training 
information was shown but they read it carefully in the second time. 
However, one advantage of the New Approach is that it keeps the anti-Phishing training 
as an ongoing process (See Figure 26 in Chapter 7). Every time users try to submit 
information to a Phishing website, they w i l l be trained. Therefore, the New Approach has 
the capability to train users many times, which in turn improves their ability to detect 
Phishing websites. 
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Kumaraguru et al. [Kumaraguru et al.07c] used 42 participants in their anti-Phishing 
retention study. However, the research in this thesis used 12 participants who were asked to 
participate in the retention experiments (the second experiment). They were among the 36 
participants who took part in the first experiment. The target number of participants in the 
second experiment was as many as could come back. However, participants with low 
technical ability (LTA) and high technical ability (HTA) were needed within each group in 
order to ensure equal chances. Therefore, 12 participants were available and participated in 
the second experiment. Table 86 presents the comparison of participants and the period 
between experiments discussed in the anti-Phishing knowledge retention section. 
Research Approach Participants 
Period between 
Experiments 




Anti-Phishing approach for emails 42 7.2 days 
Table 86: Summary of anti-Phishing knowledge retention comparison discussion 
10.5. Comparison with another Approach 
In August, 2008, the APWG and Carnegie Mellon CyLab launched the ''Phishing 
Education Landing Page Program"' (PELPP) [PEI08]. There is a similarity and differences 
between PELPP and the New Approach proposed in this research. 
The similarity between them is that they consider helping people about Phishing 
websites detection during their normal use of the Internet. However, there are some 
differences between The Phishing Education Landing Page Program (PELPP) and the New 
Approach. They are as follows: 
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1. The Phishing Education Landing Page Program (PELPP) requires an involvement of 
external parties such as ISPs, registrars, and persons who have control of the Phishing 
page. This involvement is vital for the project to work since the external parties' need 
to redirect any Phishing URL to an anti-Phishing training webpage. Therefore, the 
PELPP requires amendments in the external parties' servers. 
2. The New Approach does not require an involvement o f other parties since it is 
based on its own proxy and blacklists. Therefore, it works by its own components. 
3. The New Approach uses the most effective tips evaluated by the research in this 
thesis whereas the PELPP does not state the reason why they use the tips presented in 
their ant-Phishing training webpage (See Figure 17 in Chapter 3). 
4. PELPP has been proposed but not been evaluated whereas the New Approach is 
evaluated and showed that it is more effective in helping users distinguish between 
legitimate and Phishing websites than the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing 
tips by email. 
10.6. Summary 
In this chapter, comparisons between the evaluations carried out in this research and 
some related anti-Phishing approaches by others were presented. The chapter presented 
discussions on the similarities and differences on issues such as participants' recruitment, 
groups, scenarios, emails and websites, anti-Phishing tips used, implementation and results. 
There were comparable issues such as participants' recruitment, effectiveness ratios, 
scenarios, implementation and training strategies. However, the results of evaluating the 
New Approach with the related studies were not comparable because the groups in the two 
studies were different. There were also differences in issues such as participants' knowledge 
(before participating in the experiments), the tips given to the participants in the 
experiments, the number of times that the intervention was given to the participants and the 
period length between the two phases of experiments. 
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11. Conclusions and Future Work 
11.1. Introduction 
The Internet has become a very important medium of communication recently. Many 
people go online and do a wide range of businesses. They can send emails, sell and buy 
goods, do different banking activities and even participate in political and social elections by 
casting a vote online. 
Security for conducting businesses online is vital and critical. A l l security-critical 
applications (e.g. online banking login page) that are accessed using the Internet are at risk 
of Internet fraud. Once users go online, they are at risk from online fraud (also known as 
Internet fraud). The parties involved in any transaction never need to meet and the user may 
have no idea whether the goods or services exist. Due to this, the Internet is a good vehicle 
to defraud the users who would like to buy goods or services using it [PhilippsohnOl]. The 
application access keys could be stolen. Applications such as e-commerce, online banking, 
e-voting, email and so forth might be targets for fraudsters. Violating the security in these 
applications would result in severe consequences such as financial loss in area such as e-
commerce and online banking. 
Phishing attacks are forms of Internet fraud and have become a serious problem for 
Internet users. The problem is when a user receives a Phishing email. The user's intention 
may be "go to eBay" but the actual implementation of the hyperlink may be "go to a server 
in South Korea" [Wu06]. Users gain their understanding o f interaction from the presentation 
or the way it appears on the screen. Some technical details of web pages and email messages 
are hidden and some of them are not understandable to most users. Thus, the user does not 
interpret the system clues or is unable to do so. This misunderstanding enables Phishing and 
makes it very hard to defend against. Due to the Phishing problem, anti-Phishing approaches 
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are required to mitigate it. There are anti-Phishing solutions that help in detecting and 
preventing Phishing attacks. The effectiveness of anti-Phishing approaches is always 
improved. 
The effectiveness of existing online anti-Phishing tips to detect Phishing emails and 
websites have been evaluated [Kumaraguru et al.07b]. However, this effectiveness research 
did not consider the effectiveness of each individual tip. 
People do not read anti-Phishing online training materials. Thus, Kumaraguru et al. 
[Kumaraguru et al.07a] considered helping people in detecting Phishing emails during their 
normal use of emails. However, Kumaraguru et al's approach does not consider helping 
people to detect Phishing websites. Phishing websites can be reached via various methods in 
addition to emails such as online advertisements and typing their web addresses in a web 
browser. Therefore, helping users to make correct decisions in distinguishing Phishing and 
legitimate websites during their normal use is required. 
In the process of designing anti-Phishing approaches, user experiments were conducted 
to evaluate them. Several approaches were evaluated using participants who were recruited 
based on their technical abilities [Downs et al.06, Kumaraguru et al.07a, Kumaraguru et 
al.07b, Sheng et al.07]. Participants were classified into 'experts' and 'non-experts' users 
based on pre-study screening questions. Participants, who were classified as 'non-experts', 
were selected to participate in the experiments. Participants who were technically 
considered non-experts could know about Phishing and how to detect attacks before 
participating in the evaluation experiments. Having participants with Phishing knowledge in 
advance may provide biased results in anti-Phishing approaches' evaluation experiments. 
This is because people who know about Phishing before participating in the evaluation 
experiments may use their own Phishing knowledge rather than the anti-Phishing 
approaches that are being evaluated. Downs et al. [Downs et al.07] studied whether there are 
correlations between some web environment experiences and susceptibility to Phishing. 
They found that people who correctly answered the knowledge question about the definition 
of Phishing (i.e. Phishing Aware people) were significantly less likely to fall for Phishing 
emails. Low technical users may be Phishing Aware and high technical users may be 
Phishing Unaware. Therefore, an investigation on the effects of technical ability and 
Phishing knowledge on Phishing websites' detection is required. This would clarify whether 
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or not the previous screening questions for recruiting low technical users in evaluating anti-
Phishing approaches are beneficial. 
In this thesis, problems related to the anti-Phishing effectiveness for Phishing websites 
detection have been addressed. First of all, the effectiveness of the most common users' tips 
for detecting Phishing websites was evaluated individually. A novel effectiveness criteria 
was proposed and used to examine each single tip. Then, the tips were ranked accordingly 
based on an effectiveness score. The research found the most effective anti-Phishing tips 
that users can focus on to detect and prevent Phishing attacks. The effective tips also can be 
focused by anti-Phishing training approaches. 
Secondly, the investigation that assesses using Phishing knowledge instead of technical 
ability in the screening questions to recruit participants was presented. User experiments 
were conducted to evaluate the effects of technical ability and Phishing knowledge. The 
results of the investigation showed that there is no effect of technical ability on Phishing 
website detection whereas there is a significant effect of Phishing awareness on Phishing 
website detection. Thus, recruiting people based on their technical ability without knowing 
their Phishing knowledge in order to conduct anti-Phishing experiments may produce biased 
results. Therefore, there is a need to make sure that the participants do not know about 
Phishing regardless of their technical ability level when they are evaluating the effectiveness 
of a new anti-Phishing approach. 
This thesis also proposed a novel Anti-Phishing Approach that uses Training 
Intervention for Phishing Websites' Detection (APTIPWD). User experiments were 
conducted to evaluate the approach. The results showed that New Approach is more 
effective than the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing tips by email in helping users 
distinguish between legitimate and Phishing websites. 
This thesis also evaluated the anti-Phishing knowledge retention for users. User 
experiments were conducted. There were comparisons made between the retention of the 
users' of the New Approach and the retention of users of the Old approach of sending anti-
Phishing tips by email. It was found that users of the Old and the New Approaches retain 
their anti-Phishing knowledge after 16 days from their first training. Users' decisions during 
the training are slightly better (i.e. no statistical difference) than their decisions after about 
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16 days. Additionally, users of the two approaches performed nearly equally in terms of 
properly judging legitimate and Phishing websites after about 16 days from having the two 
approaches. 
11.2. Criteria for Success 
A set of objectives entitled 'criteria for success' was set out in Chapter 1. This section 
addresses each criterion to find out to what degree the research has succeeded. 
1. An evaluation of the anti-Phishing tips' effectiveness for Phishing websites detection. 
An examination of the effectiveness of most common users' tips for detecting Phishing 
websites was presented in Chapter 6. Novel effectiveness criteria were proposed (See 
Section 6.2.2) and used to examine every tip and to rank it based on its effectiveness score. 
It was found that there is no completely effective tip (with an effective score of 1). The 
most effective tip met three out of the four criteria and it had an effectiveness score of 0.75. 
It did not meet the criterion four. This is because the tip helps in finding the true URL of a 
page but it does not help in verifying whether or not the URL is related to a legitimate 
website. Thus, it possibly produces False Positive (FP) or False Negative (FN) results by 
using it alone. Using a search engine, such as Google, to verify the URL after using the tip 
can overcome this weakness. 
2. Development of a more effective anti-Phishing approach and its evaluation. 
A range of anti-Phishing approaches and their effectiveness have been already 
developed. This thesis reviewed them and presented them in Chapter 3. The chapter finished 
with a discussion on the limitations of anti-Phishing approaches shown in Section 3.8. 
This thesis proposed a novel Anti-Phishing Approach that uses Training Intervention for 
Phishing Websites Detection (APTIPWD) described in Chapter 7. The New Approach 
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presents an intervening message to users who access Phishing websites and try to submit 
their information. The intervention message is triggered by anti-Phishing blacklists and uses 
the most effective anti-Phishing tip evaluated in Chapter 6. 
By using this approach, users do not need to attend training courses and do not need to 
access online training materials. This is because the approach brings information to end-
users and helps them immediately after they have made a mistake so that they can detect 
Phishing websites by themselves. 
Due to the fact that the blacklists are dynamic and therefore are hard to control, 
evaluating the New Approach on the real Internet was difficult . A better solution was to 
evaluate it under experimental conditions. In order to evaluate the approach, all possible 
scenarios were simulated and described in Section 7.3 and the blacklists (dynamic 
components) were made fixed (See Section 7.4,2.1). 
In order to evaluate the APTIPWD, a hypothesis was identified in Chapter 8 Section 
8.2.1. Then, in Chapter 8 user experiments were designed. The recruitment of participants, 
the effectiveness ratios identified, the considerations on simulating real Phishing attacks and 
methodology (experiment story board) of the experiment were specified in Sections 8.3., 
8.4, 8.5 and 8.6.2 respectively. 
In evaluating the hypothesis shown in Section 8.2.1, other hypotheses were extracted 
and were shown in Section 9.2.1 in Chapter 9. The extracted hypotheses were evaluated and 
analyzed individually. The New Approach was compared with a control group and the Old 
Approach of sending anti-Phishing tips to users. The analysis had three aspects. Firstly, 
there was an assessment of users without taking any of the treatments. Secondly, there was 
an assessment for using the New Approach in comparison with the Old Approach and the 
Control group. Thirdly, there was an assessment of each individual group before and after 
having the treatments. Details for these analyses can be found in Sections 9.2.1.1, 9.2.1.2 
and 9.2.1.3 respectively. To sum up, users in the three groups were nearly equal with 
regards to their decisions about legitimate and Phishing websites before having any 
treatment. After having the treatments, there was shown to be a significant positive effect of 
using the New Approach in comparison with the Old Approach. The New Approach was 
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successful and was better than the Old Approach in helping users properly judging 
legitimate and Phishing websites. 
3. Success to identify factors that influence users decisions against Phishing websites. 
The effects of technical ability and Phishing knowledge of users on Phishing websites' 
detection were discussed and shown in Criterion 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. 
3.1. Effect of technical ability on Phishing websites detection. 
The effect of the technical ability of users on Phishing websites' detection was 
discussed. User experiments were designed in Chapter 8 and then used. The effects of 
technical ability and the results were analyzed and discussed in Chapter 9. 
The research hypothesis was identified in Chapter 8 Section 8.2.2.1 and then user 
experiments were designed. In evaluating the hypothesis shown in Section 8.2.2.1, other 
hypotheses were extracted and these were shown in Section 9.2.2 in Chapter 9. The 
extracted hypotheses were evaluated and analyzed individually. The low technical ability 
(LTA) people were compared with high technical ability (HTA) people on Phishing 
websites detection. The analysis had three aspects. Firstly, Section 9.2.2.1 presented a 
detailed assessment of the effect of technical ability level among Phishing Unaware people 
on Phishing website detection. Secondly, Section 9.2.2.2 presented in detail an assessment 
of the effect of technical ability level among Phishing Aware people. Thirdly, Section 
9.2.2.3 presented an assessment of the effect of technical ability level regardless of Phishing 
knowledge (Unaware and Aware people). To sum up, it was found that technical ability had 
no effect on their decisions in Phishing website detection and in recognizing legitimate 
websites in the three aspects. 
3.2. Effect of Phishing knowledge on Phishing websites detection. 
The effect of Phishing knowledge for users on Phishing websites' detection was 
discussed. User experiments were designed in Chapter 8 and then used. The effects of 
Phishing knowledge on Phishing website detection and the results were analyzed and 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
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The research hypothesis was identified in Chapter 8 Section 8.2.2.2 and then user 
experiments were designed. The experiment methodology (story board) was presented in 
Section 8.6.4. In evaluating the hypothesis shown in Section 8.2.2.2, other hypotheses were 
extracted and these were shown in Chapter 9 Section 9.2.3. The extracted hypotheses were 
then evaluated and analyzed. The Phishing Unaware people were compared with Phishing 
Aware people on Phishing websites detection. It was found that there was a significant 
positive effect for the Phishing Aware users on detecting Phishing websites properly. The 
decisions of Phishing Aware users were better than the decisions of Phishing Unaware 
users. The conclusion was that Phishing awareness has a significant positive effect on users' 
decisions in Phishing website detection. 
4. An evaluation of the anti-Phishing knowledge retention when using the New 
Approach. 
The evaluation of the anti-Phishing knowledge retention by users who use the New 
Approach compared with the users' of the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing tips by 
email was presented. User experiments were designed in Chapter 8 and then used, and the 
results were analyzed and discussed in Chapter 9. 
The research hypothesis was identified in Chapter 8 Section 8.2.3. Two phases of user 
experiments were conducted to evaluate the retention of the anti-Phishing knowledge. The 
experiment methodology (story board) was presented in Section 8.6.3. In evaluating the 
hypothesis shown in Section 8.2.3, other hypotheses were extracted and shown in Section 
9.2.4 in Chapter 9. The extracted hypotheses were evaluated and analyzed individually. The 
users of the New Approach group were compared with the users of the Old Approach group 
on Phishing websites detection. The analysis had two different aspects. Firstly, there was an 
assessment of the anti-Phishing knowledge retention in each group individually in both the 
first and the second phases of the experiments. Secondly, there was an assessment of the 
retention of the anti-Phishing knowledge between the Old Approach and the New Approach 
groups in the second phase of the experiments. Details of these analyses can be found in 
Sections 9.2.4.1 and 9.2.4.2 respectively. To sum up, it was found that users of both 
approaches retained their anti-Phishing knowledge after 16 days from their first training. 
Users' decisions during the training are slightly better (i.e. no statistical difference) than 
their decisions after about 16 days. Additionally, users in the two approaches performed 
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nearly equally in terms of properly identifying legitimate and Phishing websites after 16 
days from experiencing the two approaches. 
5. Comparisons with other related studies. 
The work in this thesis was compared with the relevant work o f other researchers in 
Chapter 10. The chapter presented discussions on the similarities and differences on 
methodological issues such as the recruitment of participants, groups, scenarios, emails and 
websites, anti-Phishing tips used and implementation (See Section 10.2). The results' 
comparison was presented in Section 10.4. 
There were comparable issues such as participants' recruitment, effectiveness ratios, 
scenarios, implementation and training strategies. However, the results of evaluating the 
New Approach with the related studies were not comparable because the groups in the two 
studies were different. There are also differences in issues such as participants' knowledge 
(before participating in the experiments), the tips given to the participants in the 
experiments, the number of times that the training intervention was given to the participants 
and the period length between the two phases of experiments. 
6. A proof of concept implementation. 
In Chapter 7, a prototype proof o f concept implementation o f the Anti-Phishing 
Approach that uses Training Intervention for Phishing Websites Detection (APTIPWD) was 
presented. Section 7.4 discussed the design and the implementation of each component of 
the prototype. It was shown that the New Approach was doable and it could be implemented 
easily without writing a single line of a programming code and without undue disruption o f 
the users system. 
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11.3. Future Work 
Based on the research in this thesis, a number of possible future work directions can be 
identified. They are as follows: 
1. After finding the most effective anti-Phishing tips for Phishing websites detection, this 
could be used in developing (or improving the previous) anti-Phishing approaches that 
are aimed at detecting Phishing websites. 
2. The same effectiveness evaluation criteria for Phishing websites detection tips wi l l be 
carried out on anti-Phishing tips for Phishing emails detection. Then, i f the resulting tip 
is considered effective, it could be used in developing or improving any existing anti-
Phishing approach that is aimed at detecting Phishing emails. 
3. The evaluation o f the effectiveness of the most common anti-Phishing tips for Phishing 
websites detection carried out in this thesis is subjective. Therefore, an objective 
evaluation (using user experiments) wi l l be carried out in order to see i f the results in the 
two evaluations change. 
4. The possibility of using search engines automatically to verify the credibility and the 
legitimacy of a URL wil l be investigated. 
5. Due to the fact that promising findings have been achieved regarding the use of the New 
Approach (APTIPWD), the approach wi l l be implemented and applied to the real 
Internet using dynamic anti-Phishing blacklists that are updated continuously. 
6. Due to the facts that (i) the New Approach used the most effective tip found by a part of 
this research, (ii) the tip helps to verify the true URL of a page and (i i i) the structure of a 
URL is commonly based on English syntax, the New Approach evaluation experiments 
wi l l be re-conducted using non-English speakers. This wi l l investigate whether the URL 
could be verified improperly because of the users' language even i f it belongs to a well-
known website (False Positive). 
7. In case that the URL could be verified improperly because of the users' language even i f 
it belongs to a well-known website (False Positive), the criteria for evaluating the 
effectiveness of Phishing websites detection tips wi l l be improved and then applied to 
the tips again to see whether or not changes in the ranking occur. 
8. After finding that the previous screening questions for recruiting low technical users in 
evaluating anti-Phishing approaches are not beneficial, future research wi l l attempt to re-
conduct the experiments of previous researchers after recruiting people based on their 
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Phishing knowledge. The participants of the experiments wi l l be only those who are 
considered 'Phishing Unaware' regardless of their technical ability level. 
9. The definition of technical ability in this thesis is based on three technical skills (See 
Chapter 8). An investigation wi l l be carried out to identify the factors that might define 
technical ability in a more accurate manner. 
10. The effect of the New Approach on users' anti-Phishing retention in longer term wi l l be 
evaluated. 
11. The effect of multiple treatment sessions (e.g. double and triple) on the users' anti-
Phishing retention using the New Approach wi l l be evaluated. 
12. A l l the experiments in the research wi l l be re-conducted using bigger sample sizes. 
11.4. Summary 
The problems related to the anti-Phishing effectiveness for Phishing websites detection 
have been addressed in this thesis. First of all, the effectiveness of the most common users' 
tips for detecting Phishing websites individually was evaluated. Novel effectiveness criteria 
were proposed and used to examine every tip and to rank it based on its effectiveness score. 
The research found the most effective anti-Phishing tips that users can focus on to detect 
and prevent Phishing attacks. The effective tips also can be focused by anti-Phishing 
training approaches. Secondly, the investigation that used Phishing knowledge instead of 
technical ability in the screening questions to recruit participants was presented. The results 
o f the investigation showed that there is no effect o f technical ability on Phishing websites 
detection whereas there is a significant positive effect of Phishing awareness on Phishing 
website detection. Thus, there is a need to make sure that the participants do not know about 
Phishing regardless o f their technical ability level in evaluating the effectiveness o f a new 
anti-Phishing approach. Thirdly, a novel Anti-Phishing Approach that uses Training 
Intervention for Phishing Websites' Detection (APTIPWD) was proposed and evaluated by 
conducting user experiments. The results showed that the New Approach is more effective 
than the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing tips by email in helping users properly 
distinguish legitimate and Phishing websites. A prototype proof of concept implementation 
o f the New Approach was presented. It showed that the New Approach was viable and it 
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could be implemented easily without writing a single line of a programming code and 
without undue disruption of the users system. Finally, this thesis also evaluated the anti-
Phishing knowledge retention o f the New Approach's users. There were comparisons 
between the retention of the users' of the New Approach with the retention of the users of 
the Old Approach of sending anti-Phishing tips by email. It was found that users of the Old 
and the New Approaches retain their anti-Phishing knowledge after 16 days from their first 
training. Users' decisions at the time of using the approaches were slightly better (but with 
no statistical difference) than their decisions after about 16 days. Additionally, users in the 
two approaches performed nearly equally in terms of properly identifying legitimate and 
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The appendix presents the ftill table (21 tips) o f the evaluation o f the users' tips effectiveness 
for Phishing websites detection. 
# Tip Criteria 
TE T R 1 2 3 4 
v=0.25 v=0.25 v=0.25 v=0.25 
1 Do not use links to access a site. N N NA N 0 >6 
2 
Type in your browser the address of the 
site you intend to go or use a bookmark 
that you previously created. 
N Y NA Y 0.5 2 
3 
Do not give your personal contact or 
account information to a website that 
looks suspicious. 
N N NA N 0 > 6 
4 
Make sure you are on a secure connection 
when entering sensitive information. 
Secure Web pages will have the text 
https- instead of http: 
Y 
(73.8) N 
N N 0.25 5 
5 
Click on the padlock to check that the 
seller is who they say they are and that 
their certificate is current and registered 
to the right address. 
N N N N 0 > 6 
6 
Do not be fooled by a padlock that appears 
on the web page itself. It's easy for 
conmen to copy the image of a padlock. 
Look for one that is in the window frame 
of the browser itself 
N N N N 0 > 6 
7 
Before entering card details, look for 
MasterCard SecureCodeTM sign as an 
endorsement of retailers security. 
N N N N 0 >6 
8 
Before entering card details, look for the 
VeriSign Secured™ Seal. 
N N N N 0 > 6 
9 Use sites that carry the TrustUK logo. N N N N 0 >6 
10 
Look beyond the logo and do not give out 
your information before you check the 
privacy and security seals. Scammers 
often include actual logos and images of 
legitimate companies. 
N Y Y N 0.5 ~2 
11 
A fake website may have this caristaritic: 
The website's address is different from 
what you are used to, perhaps there are 
extra characters or words in it or it uses a 
completely different name or no name at 
all, just numbers. Check the address in 
your browser's address bar after you 
arrive at a website. 
Y 
(71.4) N N 




Even though you are asked to enter 
private information there is NO padlock 
in the browser window or 'httpsV/' at the 
beginning of the web address to signify 
that it is using a secure link and that the 
site is what it says it is. 
Y 
(90.4) N N N 
0.25 4 
13 
A fake website may have this caristaritic^ 
A request for personal information such 
as user name, password or other security 
details IN F U L L , when you are normally 
only asked for SOME of them. 
N N NA N 0 > 6 
14 
In the case of spotting dodgy sites: Use 
your instincts and commonsense. If it 
smells bad, it's probably rotten. 
N N NA N 0 >6 
15 
In the case of spotting dodgy sites: Avoid 
sites that hype investments, whether in 
shares or alleged rarities like old wine, 
whisky or property. Do your homework 
and always get professional advice before 
making investment decisions. 
N N NA N 0 > G 
16 
In the case of spotting dodgy sites: Be 
wary of sites that promise easy profits. 
N N NA N 0 >6 
17 
In the case of spotting dodgy sites: Do a 
web search to see if anyone has had any 
problems with a suspicious-looking 
website. 
N N NA N 0 > 6 
18 
In the case of spotting dodgy sites: Be 
wary of websites that are advertised in 
unsolicited emails from strangers. 
N N NA N 0 > C 
19 
A fake website may have this 
characteristic: The website's address is 
different from what you are used to, 
perhaps there are extra characters or 
words in it or it uses a completely 
different name or no name at all, just 
numbers. Check the True URL. The true 




Y N 0.75 1 
20 
Read about phishing, social engineering, 
e-commerce fraud and identity theft. 
Much of this advice to individuals also 
applies to businesses. 
N N NA N 0 >6 
21 Be suspicious of deals that seem too good 
to be true. They usually are. 




The appendix presents the Scenario Information sheets given to participants in the evaluation 
experiments in order to explain to them the experiment simple scenarios. The Scenario 
Information sheet (1) was used in the first experiment whereas Scenario Information sheet (2) was 
used in the second and third experiments. They are very similar to each other. This appendix 
presents also the pre-study and pre-session surveys used. 
Scenario Information Sheet (1) 
T H E U S E O F W W W : H o w P E O P L E E F F E C T I V E L Y M A N A G E A N D U S E T H E I N T E R N E T A N D E M A I L S 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this study. You will participate in a short interaction with emails and websites as you do in 
your normal surfing. You will be playing the role of 'Dave Smith'. Dave Smith is an imaginary person who works in the marketing 
department in an IT company. Therefore, please follow the following scenario: 
1. Imagine that you are Dave Smith. 
2. OK Dave, check your email and deal with the emails in your inbox as you do usually. 
3. Deal with ennails in order starting from the lop one. 
4. All the IDs and passwords for you Dave to use in this study are written down below in this sheet. 
That's it! 
Dave Smith's IDs and passwords 
PayPal 
Email Address: davesmith2001@hotmail.com 
PayPal Password: carl 000 
Amazon 
Email Address: davesmith2001@hotmail.com 
Password: car2001 
eBay 















Password: carl 11 
Scenario Information Sheet (2) 
T H E U S E O F W W W : H o w P E O P L E E F F E C T I V E L Y M A N A G E A N D U S E T H E I N T E R N E T A N D E M A I L S 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this study. You will participate in a short interaction with emails and websites as you do in 
your normal surfing. You will be playing the role of 'Dave Smith'. Dave Smith is an imaginary person who works in the marketing 
department in an IT company. Therefore, please follow the following scenario: 
1. Imagine that you are Dave Smith. 
2. OK Dave, check your email and deal with the emails in your inbox as you do usually. 
3. Deal with emails in order starting from the top one. 
4. All the IDs and passwords for you Dave to use in this study are written down below in this sheet. 
That's it! 
Dave Smith's IDs and passwords 
Argos 
Looin Name: davesmith2001 
Password: carl000 
Comet 





Egg Online Bank 
Account Number: 05/09/1980 
Postcode: DH1 3LE 





Personal ID: 23458679876 
Passcode: car2001 
Registration number: 20012 
Co-operative Bank 
Sort Code: 466787 
Account Number- 23736892 
PIN: car333 
Natwest Bank 
Customer Number 0509807638963 
Password: carl 11 
Postcode: DH1 3LE 
Pre-study Survey 
T H E U S E O F W W W : H o w P E O P L E E F F E C T I V E L Y M A N A G E A N D U S E T H E I N T E R N E T A N D E M A I L S 
A. Your Contacts 
I .Your Name:* 
2. Your E-mail: 
B. The Internet and e-mail Usage 
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4. Have you ever purchased anything on the web before? * 
D NO. 
5. Have you had an active account with PayPal? * 
^ Yes. 
^ NO. 
B. Have you used the Internet to access your bank account? * 
^ Yes. 
^ NO. 
7. Have you ever used eBay to either purchase or sell anything? * 
^ > e s . 
^ No. 
B. Have you changed preferences or settings in your web browser? * 
: C " Y e s . 
9. Have you created a web page? * 
C NO. 
10. Have you helped someone fix a computer problem? (e.g. software problem, browser problem, etc.) ' 
^ \ e s . 
' I I I I Internet 
Look at to this image and please answer the related following two questions (12 & 13)7 
12. Have you seen "this lock image" before? * 
^ Yes. 
^ No. 
13. What does the lock image mean about a web site? * 
It means that you need a key or a password to enter the site. 
' ~ It means that a website is trustworthy. 
It means that any infomiation you enter will be sent securely. 
It means that any information being displayed will be sent securely. 
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websites put Something Email or 
on your put on your website 
computer so computer trying to 
An Internet you do not without your An Instant trick you 
I have seen 
this word 
Email trying before but I I have never 
search 
engine 
have to type pemiission. messaging into giving to sell you do not know seen this 
in the same that changes 
information the way your 
the next computer 






something. what it word before 
means for 
computers. 
Virus c c c c c c c c 
Spyware c c c • • • c c c c 
Phlshing c c c c c c • c c c 
Cool^ie c c c n c c n c c c 
Messenger c E c • c c • c c • 
Google c c c c c c • c c 
Pre-session Survey 
T H E U S E OF WWW: How PEOPLE EFFECTIVELY MANAGE AND USE THE INTERNET AND EMAILS 




This appendix shows the statistical methods and the results used for testing all hypotheses 
discussed in Chapter 9. A glossary is provided by the end of this appendix to explain the 
technical terms used in tables. 
Hypothesis 1.1 [Kruskal-Wallis Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank 
Control Group 12 19.46 
Pre_Correct_Rate 
Old Approach Group 12 16.58 






Asynnp. Sig. .273 
Exact Sig. .464 
Point Probability .242 
a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.1 (Control vs. Old) FMann-Whitnev Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 13.46 161.50 




Mann-Whitney U 60.500 
Wilcoxon W 138.500 
Z -1.384 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .166 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .514(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .522 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .261 
Point Probability .261 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
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Hypothesis 1.1 (Control vs. New) [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 12.50 150.00 




Mann-Whitney U 72.000 
Wilcoxon W 150.000 
Z .000 
Asynnp. SIg. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. [2"(1-tailed Sig.)] 1.000(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .761 
Point Probability .522 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.1 (Old vs. New) [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Old Approach Group 12 11.54 138.50 




Mann-Whitney U 60.500 
Wilcoxon W 138.500 
Z -1.384 
Asymp. Sig. (2-taiied) .166 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .514(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .522 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .261 
Point Probability .261 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.2 [Kruskal-Wallis Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank 
Control Group 12 17.00 
Pre_FPR 
Old Approach Group 12 21.50 








Asymp. Sig. .174 
Exact Sig. .316 
Point Probability .184 
a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.2 (Control vs. Old) rMann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 11.00 132.00 




Mann-Whitney U 54.000 
Wilcoxon W 132.000 
Z -1.476 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .140 
Exact Sig. 12'(1-tailed Sig.)] .319(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .317 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .158 
Point Probability .140 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.2 (Control vs. New) FMann-Whitnev Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 12.50 150.00 




Mann-Whitney U 72.000 
Wilcoxon W 150.000 
Z .000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] 1.000(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .761 
Point Probability .522 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
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Hypothesis 1.2 (Old vs. New) TMann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Old Approach Group 12 14.00 168.00 




Mann-Whitney U 54.000 
Wilcoxon W 132.000 
Z -1.476 
Asymp. Sig. (2-talled) .140 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .319(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .317 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .158 
Point Probability .140 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.3 rKruskal-Waliis Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank 
Control Group 12 19.00 
Pre_FNR 
Old Approach Group 12 17.50 






Asymp. Sig. .842 
Exact Sig. 1.000 
Point Probability .344 
a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.3 (Control vs. Old) riVlann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 13.00 156.00 






Mann-Whitney U 66.000 
Wilcoxon W 144.000 
Z -.492 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .623 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailecl Sig.)) .755(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .342 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.3 (Control vs. New) [Mann-Whitnev Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 12.50 150.00 




Mann-Whitney U 72.000 
Wilcoxon W 150.000 
Z .000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. [2*{1-tailed Sig.)] 1.000(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-failed) .705 
Point Probability .410 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable; Group 
Hypothesis 1.3 (Old vs. New) rMann-Whitnev Test) 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Old Approach Group 12 12.00 144.00 






Mann-Whitney U 66.000 
Wilcoxon W 144.000 
Z -.492 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .623 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .755(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .342 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.4 [Kruskal-Wallis Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank 
Control Group 12 14.13 
Post_Correct_Rate 
Old Approach Group 12 14.50 






Asymp. Sig. .001 
Exact Sig. .001 
Point Probability .000 
a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.4 (Control vs. Old) [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 12.46 149.50 
Post_Con-ect_Rate Old Approach Group 12 12.54 150.50 
Total 24 
Test Statistics (b) 
Post_Correct_Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 71.500 
Wilcoxon W 149.500 
Z -.035 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .972 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .977(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .127 
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a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.4 (Control vs. New) TMann-Whitney Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 8.17 98.00 
Post_Correct_Rate New Approach Group 12 16.83 202.00 
Total 24 
Post_Correct_Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 20.000 
Wilcoxon W 98.000 
Z -3.256 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .002(3) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .001 
Point Probability .001 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.4 (Old vs. New) fMann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Old Approach Group 12 8.46 101.50 




Mann-Whitney U 23.500 
Wilcoxon W 101.500 
Z -2.995 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .003 
Exact Sig. [2*( 1-tailed Sig.)] .004(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .004 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .002 
Point Probability .002 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
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Hypothesis 1.5 [Kruskal-Wallis Testi 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank 
Control Group 12 17.00 
Old Approach Group 
Post FPR 
12 21.50 






Asymp. Sig. .335 
Exact Sig. .490 
Point Probability .206 
a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.5 (Control vs. Old) [Mann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 11.00 132.00 




Mann-Whitney U 54.000 
Wilcoxon W 132.000 
Z -1.238 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .216 
Exact Sig. [2-(1-tailed Sig.)] .319(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .400 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .200 
Point Probability .155 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.5 (Control vs. New) [Mann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 12.50 150.00 






Mann-Whitney U 72.000 
Wilcoxon W 150.000 
Z .000 
Asymp, Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] 1.000(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .680 
Point Probability .360 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable; Group 
Hypothesis 1.5 (Old vs. New) [Mann-Whitney Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Old Approach Group 12 14.00 168.00 




Mann-Whitney U 54.000 
Wilcoxon W 132.000 
Z -1.238 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .216 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .319(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-lailed) .400 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .200 
Point Probability .155 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.6 [Kruskal-Wallis Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank 
Control Group 12 24.25 
Post_FNR 
Old Approach Group 12 19.96 






Asymp. Sig. .004 
Exact Sig. .002 
Point Probability .000 
a Kruskal Wallis Test 
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b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.6 (Control vs. Old) TMann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 14.21 170.50 




Mann-Whitney U 51.500 
Wilcoxon W 129.500 
Z -1.367 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .172 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .242(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .214 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .107 
Point Probability .027 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.6 (Control vs. New) TMann-Whitney Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Control Group 12 16.54 198.50 




Mann-Whitney U 23.500 
Wilcoxon W 101.500 
Z -3.007 
Asymp. Big. (2-tailed) .003 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .004(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .001 
Point Probability .001 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 1.6 (Old vs. New) [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Old Approach Group 12 15.67 188.00 






Mann-Whitney U 34.000 
Wilcoxon W 112.000 
Z -2.480 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .013 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .028(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .023 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .012 
Point Probability .008 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 










a Pre_Correct_Rate < Post_ 
b Pre_Correct_Rate > Post_ 





Pre_Con-ect_ Rate - Post_Correct_Rate 
Z .000(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .688 
Point Probability .375 
a The sum of negative ranks equals the sum of positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 1.8 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test! 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 2(a) 1.50 3.00 
Positive Ranks 0(b) .00 .00 
Pre FPR-Post FPR 
Ties 10(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre_FPR < Post_FPR 
b Pre_FPR > Post_FPR 




Pre_FPR - Post_FPR 
Z -1.414(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .157 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .500 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .250 
Point Probability .250 
a Based on positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 1.9 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testi 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 0(a) .00 .00 
Positive Ranks 2(b) 1.50 3.00 
Pre FNR - Post FNR 
Ties 10(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre_FNR < Post_FNR 
b Pre_FNR > Post_FNR 
c Pre FNR = Post FNR 
Test Statistics(b) 
Pre_FNR - Post_FNR 
z -1.414(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .157 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .500 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .250 
Point Probability .250 
a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 1.10 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testi 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 3(a) 2.67 8.00 
Pre_Conect_Rate - Positive Ranks 1(b) 2.00 2.00 
Post_Correct_Rate Ties 8(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre_Correct_Rate < Post_Correct_Rate 
b Pre_Correct_Rate > Post_Correct_Rate 
c Pre Correct Rate = Post Correct_Rate 
Pre_Con-ect_Rate - Post_Correct_Rate 
z -1.134(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .257 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .500 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .250 
Point Probability .188 
a Based on positive ranks. 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Hypothesis 1.11 rWilcoxon Signed Ranks Test! 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 4(a) 3.50 14.00 
Positive Ranks 2(b) 3.50 7.00 
Pre FPR-Post FPR 
Ties 6(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre_FPR < Post_FPR 
b Pre_FPR > Post_FPR 
c Pre FPR = Post FPR 
Test Statistics(b) 
Pre_FPR - Post_FPR 
z -.816(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .414 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .688 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .344 
Point Probability .234 
a Based on positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 1.12 IWilcoxon Signed Ranks Test] 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 0(a) .00 .00 
Positive Ranks 4(b) 2.50 10.00 
Pre FNR-Post FNR 
Ties 8(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre_FNR < Post_FNR 
b Pre_FNR > Post_FNR 
c Pre FNR = Post FNR 
Pre_FNR - Post_FNR 
z -1.890(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .059 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .125 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .063 
Point Probability .063 
a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 1.13 fWilcoxon Signed Ranks Test] 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 9(a) 5.00 45.00 
Pre_Correct_Rate - Positive Ranks 0(b) .00 .00 
Post_Correct_Rate Ties 3(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre Corect Rate < Post Correct Rate 
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b Pre_Correct_Rate > Post_Correct_Rate 
c Pre_Correct_Rate = Post_Correct_Rate 
Test Statistics(b) 
Pre_Conect_Rate - Post_Correct_Rate 
z -2.762(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .006 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .004 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .002 
Point Probability .002 
a Based on positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 1.14 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test! 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 3(a) 2.50 7.50 
Positive Ranks 1(b) 2.50 2.50 
Pre FPR - Post FPR 
Ties 8(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre_FPR < Post_FPR 
b Pre_FPR > Post_FPR 
c Pre FPR = Post FPR 
Test Statistics(b) 
Pre_FPR - Post_FPR 
z -1.000(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .317 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .625 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .313 
Point Probability .250 
a Based on positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 1.15 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test! 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 0(a) .00 .00 
Positive Ranks 10(b) 5.50 55.00 
Pre FNR-Post FNR 
Ties 2(c) 
Total 12 
a Pre_FNR < Post_FNR 
b Pre_FNR > Post_FNR 




Pre_FNR - Post_FNR 
z -2.889(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailecl) .004 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .001 
Point Probability .001 
a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 2.1 [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 5.67 34.00 




Mann-Whitney U 13.000 
Wilcoxon W 34.000 
Z -.962 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .336 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .485(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .636 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .318 
Point Probability .227 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.2 fMann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 6.83 41.00 




Mann-Whitney U 16.000 
Wilcoxon W 37.000 
Z -.422 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .673 
Exact Sig. (2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .818(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .136 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
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Hypothesis 2.3 TMann-Whitnev Test ! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 7.00 42.00 




Mann-Whitney U 15.000 
Wilcoxon W 36.000 
Z -.631 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .528 
Exact Sig. [2"(1-tailed Sig.)] .699(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .727 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .364 
Point Probability .136 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.4 TMann-Whitnev Test ! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low/ 6 7.00 42.00 




Mann-Whitney U 15.000 
Wilcoxon W 36.000 
Z -1.000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .317 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .699(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .500 
a Not corrected for lies. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.5 fMann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 5.50 33.00 






Mann-Whitney U 12.000 
Wilcoxon W 33.000 
Z -1.173 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .241 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .394(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .545 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .273 
Point Probability .242 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Tectinical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.6 TMann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Tectinical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 7.00 42.00 




Mann-Wtiitney U 15.000 
Wilcoxon W 36.000 
Z -.638 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .523 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .699(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .409 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Tectinical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.7 fMann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Tectinical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 7.00 42.00 






Mann-Whitney U 15.000 
Wilcoxon W 36.000 
Z -1.000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .317 
Exact Sig. (2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .699(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .500 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.8 TMann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low/ 6 7.00 42.00 




Mann-Whitney U 15.000 
Wilcoxon W 36.000 
Z -1.000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .317 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .699(3) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .500 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.9 FMann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 5.50 33.00 






Mann-Whitney U 12.000 
Wilcoxon W 33.000 
Z -1.483 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .138 
Exact Sig. (2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .394(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .455 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .227 
Point Probability .227 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.10 TMann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 18 19.94 359:00 
Pre_Correct_Rate High 18 17.06 307.00 
Total 36 
Pre_Correct_Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 136.000 
Wilcoxon W 307.000 
Z -1.716 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .086 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .424(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .257 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .129 
Point Probability .129 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.11 [Mann-Whitnev Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 18 17.50 315.00 






Mann-Whitney U 144.000 
Wilcoxon W 315.000 
Z -.882 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .378 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .584(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .658 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .329 
Point Probability .240 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.12 fMann-Whitnev Testi 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 18 18.00 324.00 




Mann-Whitney U 153.000 
Wilcoxon W 324.000 
Z -.415 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .678 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .791(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .299 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.13 FlVlann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 6.92 41.50 






Mann-Whitney U 15.500 
Wilcoxon W 36.500 
Z -.527 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .598 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .699(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .273 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.14 FMann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 5.67 34.00 




Mann-Whitney U 13.000 
Wilcoxon W 34.000 
Z -.874 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .382 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .485(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .494 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .247 
Point Probability .130 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.15 fMann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 6 6.58 39.50 






Mann-Whitney U 17.500 
Wilcoxon W 38.500 
Z -.086 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .932 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .937(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .100 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.16 rMann-Whitnev Test i 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 24 25.85 620.50 
Pre_Correct_Rate High 24 23.15 555.50 
Total 48 
Test Statistics(a) 
Pre Correct Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 255.500 
Wilcoxon W 555.500 
Z -.867 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .386 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .541 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .270 
Point Probability .111 
a Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.17 FlVlann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 24 23.00 552.00 




Mann-Whitney U 252.000 
Wilcoxon W 552.000 
Z -1.019 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .308 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .494 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .247 
Point Probability .163 
a Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
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Hypothesis 2.18 FMann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 24 24.50 588.00 




Mann-Whitney U 288.000 
Wilcoxon W 588.000 
Z .000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .550 
Point Probability .099 
a Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.19 [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 12 12.21 146.50 
Toral_Correct_Rate High 12 12.79 153.50 
Total 24 
Test Statistics(b) 
Toral Con-ect Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 68.500 
Wilcoxon W 146.500 
Z -.216 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .829 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .843(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .830 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .415 
Point Probability .035 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.20 [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 12 11.83 142.00 






Mann-Whitney U 64.000 
Wilcoxon W 142.000 
Z -.515 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .606 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .671(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .744 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .372 
Point Probability .133 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 2.21 FMann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Technical Ability N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Low 12 13.21 158.50 




Mann-Whitney U 63.500 
Wilcoxon W 141.500 
Z -.517 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .605 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .630(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .626 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .313 
Point Probability .016 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Technical Ability 
Hypothesis 3.1 TMann-Whitnev Test] 
Ranks 
Level of Phishing Awareness N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Unaware 12 7.67 92.00 





Toral Correct Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 14.000 
Wilcoxon W 92.000 
Z -3.581 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .000(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
Point Probability .000 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Phishing Awareness 
Hypothesis 3.2 riWann-Whitnev Test] 
Ranks 
Level of Phishing Awareness N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Unaware 12 10.08 121.00 




Mann-Whitney U 43.000 
Wilcoxon W 121.000 
Z -1.868 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .062 
Exact Sig. [2"(1-tailed Sig.)] .101(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .086 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .043 
Point Probability .022 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Phishing Awareness 
Hypothesis 3.3 TMann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Level of Phishing Awareness N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Unaware 12 17.17 206.00 






Mann-Whitney U 16.000 
Wilcoxon W 94.000 
Z -3.406 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed Sig.)] .001(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
Point Probability .000 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: Level of Phishing Awareness 
Hypothesis 3.4 [Mann-Whitney Test i 
Ranks 
Level of Phishing Awareness N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Unaware 36 19.81 713.00 
Pre_Correct_Rate Aware 12 38.58 463.00 
Total 48 
Pre Con-ect Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 47.000 
Wilcoxon W 713.000 
Z -5.208 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
Point Probability .000 
ing Awareness 
Hypothesis 3.5 TMann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Level of Phishing Awareness N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Unaware 36 23.00 828.00 




Mann-Whitney U 162.000 
Wilcoxon W 828.000 
Z -1.766 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .077 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .113 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .086 
Point Probability .068 
a Grouping Variable: Level of Phishing Awareness 
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Hypothesis 3.6 [Mann-Whitney Test! 
Ranks 
Level of Phishing Awareness N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Unaware 36 29.22 1052,00 




Mann-Whitney U 46.000 
Wilcoxon W 124.000 
Z -4.735 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
Point Probability .000 
a Grouping Variable: Level of Phishing Awareness 
Hypothesis 4.1 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranl<s Testi 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 1(a) 2.00 2.00 
Retention _Post_Corr_Rate - Positive Ranks 1(b) 1.00 1.00 
Post_ Correct_Rate Ties 4(c) 
Total 6 
a Retention_Post_Corr_Rate < Post_Correct_Rate 
b Retention_Post_Corr_Rate > Post_Con-ect_Rate 
c Retention_Post_Con-_Rate = Post_Correct_Rate 
Test Statistics(b) 
Retention_Post_Corr_Rale - Post_Correct_Rale 
z -.447(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .655 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (l-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .250 
a Based on positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 4.2 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testi 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 0(a) .00 .00 
Retention Post FPR Positive Ranks 3(b) 2.00 6.00 
- Post_FPR Ties 3(c) 
Total 6 
a Retention Post FPR < Post FPR 
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b Retention_Post_FPR > Post_FPR 
c Retention_Post_FPR = Post_FPR 
Test Statistics(b) 
Retention_Post_FPR - Post_FPR 
z -1.633(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .102 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .250 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .125 
Point Probability .125 
a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 4.3 [Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test! 
Ranks 
a Retention_Post_FNR < Post_FNR 
b Retention_Post_FNR > Post_FNR 
c Retention Post FNR = Post FNR 
Test Statistics(b) 
a Based on positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 4.4 fWilcoxon Signed Ranl<s Testi 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 3(a) 2.00 6.00 
Retention Post FNR Positive Ranks 0(b) .00 .00 
- Post_FNR Ties 3(c) 
Total 6 
Retention Post FNR - Post FNR 
Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 







N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 4(a) 3.13 12.50 
Retention_Post_Corr_Rate - Positive Ranks 1(b) 2.50 2.50 
Post_Correct_Rate j jgg 1(c) 
Total 6 
a Retention_Post_Corr_Rate < Post_Correct_Rate 
b Retention_Post_Corr_Rate > Post_Correct_Rate 
c Retention Post Corr Rate = Post Con-ect Rate 
Retention Post Corr Rate - Post Correct Rate 
Z -1.414(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .157 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .313 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .156 
Point Probability .125 
a Based on positive ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Hypothesis 4.5 fWilcoxon Signed Ranks Testi 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 0(a) .00 .00 
Retention_Post_FPR Positive Ranks 1(b) 1.00 1.00 
- Post_FPR Ties 5(c) 
Total 6 
a Retention_Post_FPR < Post_FPR 
b Retention_Post_FPR > Post_FPR 
c Retention Post FPR = Post_FPR 
Retention_Post_FPR - Posl_FPR 
Z -1.000(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .317 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .500 
Point Probability .500 
a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 4.6 rWilcoxon Signed Ranks Test i 
Ranks 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 1(a) 2.50 2.50 
Retention_Post_FNR Positive Ranks 4(b) 3.13 12.50 
- Post_FNR Ties 1(c) 
Total 6 
a Retention_Post_FNR < Post_FNR 
b Retention_Post_FNR > Post_FNR 
c Retention_Post_FNR = Post_FNR 
Test SUtistics(b) 
Retention_Post_FNR - Post_FNR 
z -1.414(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .157 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .313 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .156 
Point Probability .125 
a Based on negative ranks, 
b Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Hypothesis 4.7 [Mann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Retention_Total_Co 
rr_Rate 
First-Old Approach Group 










Retention Total Corr Rate 
Mann-Whitney U 18.000 
Wilcoxon W 39.000 
Z .000 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. [2"(1-tailed Sig.)] 1.000(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .526 
Point Probability .052 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 4.8 [Mann-Whitney Testi 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
First-Old Approach Group 6 8.00 48.00 
Retenlion_Total_FPR First-New Approach Group 6 5.00 30.00 
Total 12 
Test Statistics(b) 
Retention Total FPR 
Mann-Whitney U 9.000 
Wilcoxon W 30.000 
Z -1.554 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .120 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .180(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .177 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .089 
Point Probability .049 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
Hypothesis 4.9 [Mann-Whitney Test i 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
First-Old Approach Group 6 4.83 29.00 




Mann-Whitney U 8.000 
Wilcoxon W 29.000 
Z -1.696 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .090 
Exact Sig. [2*{1-tailed Sig.)] .132(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .134 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .067 
Point Probability .043 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
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Retention Inconsistency Analysis 
C D R [Mann-Whitney Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Post_Correcl_Rate First-Old Approach Group 6 5.00 30.00 
First-New Approach Group 






Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Exact Sig. I2'(1-tailed 
Sig.)] 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 












a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
F P R [Mann-Whitney Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Post_FPR First-Old Approach Group 6 6.50 39.00 
First-New Approach Group 




Mann-Whitney U 18.000 
Wilcoxon W 39.000 
Z .000 
Asymp. Sig. {2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed 
Sig.)] 1.000(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .773 
Point Probability .545 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
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FNR [Mann-Whitney Test] 
Ranks 
Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Post_FNR First-Old Approach Group 6 8.00 48.00 
First-New Approach Group 




Mann-Whitney U 9.000 
Wilcoxon W 30.000 
Z -1.563 
Asynnp. Sig. (2-tailed) .118 
Exact Sig. (2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .180(a) 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .238 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .119 
Point Probability .097 
a Not corrected for ties, 
b Grouping Variable: Group 
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